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SANDRA L. RIERSON† 
INTRODUCTION 
The cause of action for dilution, which punishes those who 
purportedly dilute the selling power of famous trademarks by blurring or 
tarnishing them, is a relatively new and controversial one.1  Trademark 
litigation has traditionally turned on claims of infringement, which 
require proof of a likelihood of confusion between the plaintiff’s mark 
and that of the defendant.2  The interests of consumers and trademark 
holders are at least theoretically aligned in such actions:  when the court 
prohibits infringement, consumers are better off because they are no 
longer duped into buying products they do not want, and trademark 
owners benefit because they no longer lose sales and have their 
reputations damaged by inferior products masquerading as the real thing.  
Dilution, by contrast, manifests no such convergence.  A plaintiff may 
state a claim for dilution even though no one is likely to be confused; 
plaintiff and defendant do not compete; and plaintiff has incurred no 
actual economic injury.3 
                                                
† Associate Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. This article has 
benefited from the helpful feedback and critique of Scott Baskin, Barton Beebe, 
Stacey Dogan, K. J. Greene, Mark Lemley, Shaun Martin, Thomas McCarthy, 
Kenneth Port, Lisa Ramsey, Brenda Simon, and Rebecca Tushnet, for which I 
am very grateful.  I also received helpful comments and insights from the 
participants in the 2010 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference hosted by 
Boalt Hall School of Law, the 2011 Works-in-Progress in Intellectual Property 
(WIPIP) Symposium hosted by Boston University School of Law, and the Junior 
Faculty Forum at Thomas Jefferson School of Law.  I am also indebted to 
Benjamin Auten, Melissa Dempsey, Sevy Fisher, Edward Tsui, and (especially) 
Man Huynh for their invaluable research assistance, and to Thomas Jefferson 
School of Law for its generous support.   
1 Although state anti-dilution laws started appearing in the 1940’s, see infra note 
72, the first federal dilution statute was passed in 1995. Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act (FTDA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1995).  The act was substantially 
revised and renamed in 2006.  See Trademark Dilution Revision Act (TDRA), 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006). 
2 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a) & 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006) (requiring proof of 
likelihood of confusion for an infringement claim). 
3 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (permitting liability “regardless of the presence or 
absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic 
injury”). 
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Statutory dilution claims are traditionally justified on the theory 
that even non-confusing uses of a famous trademark (or similar mark) 
can nonetheless minutely dilute the source-identifying power of the 
targeted trademark.4  The alleged harm from dilution is cumulative: 
unchecked, the dilutive activity subjects the trademark to death by a 
thousand cuts.5  Both the original federal dilution statute of 1995 and its 
substantial enlargement in 2006 assume that the source-identifying 
capacity of a trademark is akin to a glass of water:  spill a drop here, spill 
a drop there and eventually your glass is empty.  This Article advances 
three claims.  First, dilution statutes incorrectly assume that the source-
identifying function of a trademark is akin to a rivalrous good (a good 
that is dissipated by use).  If marks are nonrivalrous and therefore 
function more like words than disposable goods, the economic 
justification for the dilution cause of action ceases to exist.  
Second, even if diluting but noninfringing uses of famous 
trademarks do impair the source identifying capacity of some marks, the 
social and transaction costs imposed by dilution law still outweigh the 
harm that it is designed to avert.  Dilution claims inflict anticompetitive 
burdens and, as a result, may entrench dominant (often oligopolist) firms 
at the expense of market entrants.  Dilution laws have serious non-
economic costs as well, as they infringe upon protected speech without 
sufficient justification.  For these reasons and others, dilution law causes 
more harm than it prevents. 
                                                
4 This presumed damage may arise from either “dilution by blurring,” which 
exists when similarity between two marks impairs the distinctiveness of the 
more famous one, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B), or “dilution by tarnishment,” 
which typically exists when the defendant uses a famous trademark in an 
unwholesome context. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C). 
5 Numerous cases have embraced the idea that the harm caused by dilution is a 
gradual, cumulative one.  See, e.g., Acad. of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. 
Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1457 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(describing dilution as the “gradual ‘whittling away’” of a mark’s value); 
Ameritech, Inc. v. Am. Info. Technologies Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 965 (6th Cir. 
1987) (describing dilution as a “gradual diminution in the mark’s 
distinctiveness,” which “corrodes the senior user’s interest in the trademark”); 
Allied Maint. Corp. v. Allied Mech. Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162, 1164 (N.Y. 
1977) (describing purpose of New York’s anti-dilution statute as prevention of 
“the ‘whittling away’ of an established trade-mark’s selling power and value”); 
Augusta Nat., Inc. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 193 U.S.P.Q. 210, 222 
(S.D. Ga. 1976) (reasoning that if defendant were allowed to use the term 
“Ladies’ Masters” to describe a women’s golf tournament, “there is reasonable 
certainty that the value of plaintiff's mark will be eroded; a little now, more later, 
until the ‘magic’ of the [original] Masters will be mortally dissipated if not 
completely dispelled”). 
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Finally, the true foundation for dilution law lies in the misplaced 
fiction of corporate personality, not in alleged economic harms.  We do 
not require trademark holders to prove actual economic injury in the 
context of a dilution claim because, in truth, there probably is none.  
Instead, we have granted the holders of famous trademarks the 
equivalent of a moral right to these marks:  an extension of the rights 
granted to a creator of an expressive work in the copyright context.   
Trademark holders are vested in their brands, many of which are 
deliberately anthropomorphized, and the dilution statute reifies and 
protects these rights as a matter of federal law.  
When dilution is recognized for what it really is, it becomes even 
harder to justify its existence.  Although the Pillsbury Doughboy and 
Barbie may well be trademarks that are imbued with personality traits in 
the minds of consumers (as well as in the minds of their respective 
corporate parents), they do not have the type of creative “soul” that 
normatively warrants this type of protection.  Properly viewed, the 
federal dilution statute is a legislative precursor to the type of corporate 
personification underlying the Supreme Court’s analogous treatment of 
corporate speech under the First Amendment in Citizens United6 and is 
equally misplaced.   Trademark holders do not have an abstract moral 
right to ownership of particular words.  Absent anticompetitive effects, 
those words properly remain in the public domain.  By granting near-
monopoly protection to famous marks, notwithstanding the absence of 
actual economic injury, the federal dilution statute turns competition on 
its head and serves to entrench and further concentrate economic power 
in the hands of dominant corporate firms at the expense of consumers 
and competitors alike.  Dilution law should be repealed or, at the very 
least, reformed. 
I. THE INTENT AND REALITY OF DILUTION 
 
In the 1920s, Frank Schechter, a trademark practitioner and 
academic, proposed a cause of action to protect the uniqueness of a mark 
as a way to remedy what he perceived to be arbitrary and harmful 
limitations on the reach of trademark infringement law.  Although the 
claim for dilution he proposed was not initially a powerful one, it has 
since become so.  The Trademark Dilution Revision Act (TDRA) has 
expanded the scope and practical impact of the dilution cause of action.  
However, the economic justification for the dilution cause of action, 
which requires no proof of actual harm or damages, remains as elusive as 
ever. 
                                                
6 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); see infra text accompanying 
notes 337-338.  
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A. The Origins of the Dilution Doctrine 
The concept of trademark dilution arose at a time when the 
“needs of modern business” demanded the expansion of trademark law.7  
The cause of action for trademark dilution was one proposal to 
accomplish that goal.  The desire to expand trademark law was achieved 
by the 1946 Lanham Act and subsequent amendments to it, but the 
emphasis then and, until recently, now was on trademark infringement, 
not dilution.  The historical genesis of dilution claims has substantial 
significance for its contemporary breadth. 
1. The Rational Basis for Trademark Protection 
The cause of action for trademark dilution traces its roots to 
Frank Schechter’s 1927 article in the Harvard Law Review, The Rational 
Basis of Trademark Protection.8  In this article, Schechter observed that 
many courts had grown impatient with “old theories of trademark 
protection,” which he believed were insufficient to “serve the needs of 
modern business.”9  Although Schechter agreed that trademark law 
needed to expand to keep pace with the evolution of consumer culture in 
the United States, he rejected a subjective approach that relied on “good 
conscience” and “judicial sensibilities” to achieve that result.10  Instead, 
he argued for a new paradigm in trademark law, planting a seed that went 
on to become the cause of action for trademark dilution.  Schechter 
argued that a trademark, especially a strong one, was injured by “the 
gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the 
public mind of the mark” when the mark was used on non-competing 
goods.11  Schechter concluded that “the preservation of the uniqueness of 
a trademark should constitute the only rational basis for its protection.”12 
                                                
7 Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. 
REV. 813, 813 (1927).   In the introduction to his article, Schechter opined that 
judicial impatience with “old theories of trademark protection” were “indicative 
of a desire to keep abreast of and to serve the needs of modern business.”  Id. 
8 Id.  For a thorough and compelling analysis of Schechter’s article, see Robert 
G. Bone, Schechter’s Ideas in Historical Context and Dilution’s Rocky Road, 24 
SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 469 (2008). 
9 Schechter, supra note 7, at 813; see also id. at 824 (observing that “the proper 
expansion of trademark law has been hampered by obsolete conceptions both as 
to the function of a trademark and as to the need for its protection”). 
10 Id. at 813. 
11 Id. at 825.  Schechter further argued that, the stronger the mark, the greater the 
need for protection against this type of harm:  “The more distinctive or unique 
the mark, the deeper its impress upon the public consciousness, and the greater 
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The bulk of Schechter’s article derides what he perceived to be 
the cumbersome limitations of trademark law as it existed in 1927.  His 
chief complaint was that trademark law failed to prohibit copying a 
trademark so long as the copier did not place the mark upon goods that 
were directly competing with those manufactured by the original 
trademark holder.13  At the time, many courts held that if two users of the 
trademark (or substantially similar marks) were not directly competing 
with each other, there could be no unfair competition and hence no 
trademark infringement.14  Although this rule was fading in 1927, as 
evidenced by a growing trend toward narrowing its interpretation, 
Schechter was nonetheless impatient with the pace of change and 
                                                                                                         
its need for protection against vitiation or dissociation from the particular 
product in connection with which it has been used.”  Id. 
12 Id. at 831.   
13 Id. at 821–24.  Schechter’s second major critique focused on the territoriality 
principle of trademark law.  Under the common law, a trademark holder had 
priority in its mark only in the geographic location in which the mark was being 
used.  To Schechter’s great dissatisfaction, many courts interpreted this 
territoriality principle quite narrowly, in one case holding that “a nationally 
known chain of theatres, with a branch in Boston, did not extent its market, or 
rather its audience, to [other cities in Massachusetts].”  Id. at 824 (citing Loew’s 
Boston Theatres Co. v. Lowe, 143 N.E. 496 (Mass. 1924)); see also id. 
(discussing similar cases).  The Supreme Court recognized the territoriality 
principle in trademark law in United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 
U.S. 90, 101 (1918), and Hanover Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415 
(1916).  Schechter argued that these decisions were based on “an antiquated 
neighborhood theory of trade” and that, even in 1927, consumers tended to shop 
“far from home” and therefore relied on trademarks “as symbols of quality and 
guarantees of satisfaction.”  Schechter, supra note 7, at 824. 
14 Schechter, supra note 7, at 824 n.52 (citing cases).  In a case that classically 
illustrates this principle, the Seventh Circuit refused to enjoin the use of the 
mark “Borden” on ice cream, even though a different company had developed 
the trademark and had used it for years to sell condensed milk, because the 
original trademark holder had never used the mark to sell ice cream.  Borden Ice 
Cream Co. v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510, 514 (7th Cir. 1912).  
The court reasoned that, even if the public was deceived by this use of the 
“Borden” name, such use was not actionable unless it actually diverted sales 
from the original mark holder (which it could not, given that the company did 
not manufacture ice cream).  Id. at 513–15; see also, e.g., Corning Glass Works 
v. Corning Cut Glass Co., 90 N.E. 449, 450 (N.Y. 1910) (refusing to enjoin 
defendant’s use of the name “Corning Cut Glass Co.” in part because plaintiff 
manufactured glass products, but did not cut glass and therefore did not compete 
with defendant). 
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rejected even nominal adherence to what he considered to be outdated, 
ineffectual rules.15 
2. The Historical Backdrop of Schechter’s Idea 
Although Schechter’s dilution proposition has been lately 
characterized as a radical, property-based theory inconsistent with the 
mainstream of trademark law,16 it may not have been considered radical 
at the time it was written.  Indeed, it was arguably the opposite:  a 
throwback to the mid-to-late nineteenth century view of trademarks.  
During this era, only “technical trademarks” (primarily fanciful or 
                                                
15 Schechter, supra note 7, at 813, 823–24 (comparing cases).  The 1905 version 
of the federal trademark statute prohibited registration of marks that were so 
similar to currently registered marks “of the same descriptive properties” as to 
“be likely to cause confusion or mistake in the mind of the public or to deceive 
purchasers.”  Trade-Mark Act of 1905, 15 U.S.C. § 85 (1905) (repealed 1946).  
Many courts expressed frustration with the ambiguousness of this statutory 
language.  See, e.g., Philco Corp. v. Phillips Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 663, 672 (7th 
Cir. 1943) (observing that “[i]t would be difficult to choose words more 
ambiguous than this phrase”); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Hockmeyer, 40 F.2d 99, 101 
(C.C.P.A. 1930) (noting that the phrase “has given the courts considerable 
concern,” leading to inconsistency and arbitrary decision-making).  Some courts 
interpreted the phrase “descriptive properties” expansively; others did not.  See, 
e.g., Rosenberg Bros. Co. v. Elliott, 7 F.2d 962, 966 (3d Cir. 1925) (holding that 
men’s suits and overcoats share the same descriptive properties as men’s hats 
and caps, because they are worn together); Philadelphia Inquirer Co. v. Coe, 133 
F.2d 385, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (holding that magazine supplement section of 
Sunday newspaper shares the same descriptive properties as a stapled, tabloid 
weekly news magazine, reasoning that if “coffee can be classed with horse-
radish, fish with tea, [and] mouth washes with cold creams,” then these 
publications clearly belong to the same class); compare France Milling Co. v. 
Washburn-Crosby Co., 7 F.2d 304, 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1925) (concluding both 
parties were entitled to use the mark “Gold Medal,” where one applied the mark 
to wheat, pancake and buckwheat flour, while the other applied the mark to pure 
or straight wheat flour) with Arrow Distilleries v. Globe Brewing Co., 117 F.2d 
347, 351 (4th Cir. 1941) (holding no infringement when defendant used the 
mark “Arrow” on cordials and liqueurs and plaintiff applied the mark to beer, 
because the manufacture of beer and ale and the manufacture of cordials and 
liqueurs are “separate industries”).  
16 See, e.g., Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the 
Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 797 (1997) 
(characterizing dilution as a “radical alternative to the consumer protection 
model of trademark rights”); Kenneth L. Port, The “Unnatural” Expansion of 
Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?, 85 TRADEMARK 
REP. 525, 552-59 (1995) (justifying trademark dilution as a claim based on tort, 
not trespass).  
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arbitrary marks) were protected against trademark infringement.17   
Schechter similarly argued that “arbitrary, coined or fanciful marks or 
names,” such as Aunt Jemima’s and Kodak, should be given a 
significantly broader degree of protection than “words or phrases in 
common use,” such as Gold Medal and Universal.18  Although 
Schechter’s reasons for supporting a dilution cause of action diverged 
sharply from the justifications for the old common law regime, the end 
result was arguably not that different. 
During this era, a great deal of legal argument focused on 
whether a given name for a good or service qualified as a “technical 
trademark.”  Most early trademark cases were decided by courts of 
equity, because courts of law were not empowered to award equitable 
relief, the typical form of remedy in a trademark infringement case.  
Equity courts based their jurisdiction on the plaintiff’s property interest 
in the trademark.19  If the plaintiff did not have a technical trademark, 
there was no property to protect and hence no jurisdiction.  Similarly, 
early trademark statutes allowed registration of only those names that 
qualified as technical trademarks.20  Trade names or “non-technical 
trademarks,” such as marks based on personal names, geographic terms, 
                                                
17 See Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Tennessee Mfg. Co., 138 U.S. 537, 547 (1891) 
(holding that “a generic name, or a name merely descriptive of an article of 
trade, of its qualities, ingredients, or characteristics” cannot be employed as a 
trade-mark); Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 323 (1871) (holding that “a 
generic name, or a name merely descriptive of an article of trade, of its qualities, 
ingredients, or characteristics, [cannot] be employed as a trade-mark and the 
exclusive use of it be entitled to legal protection”); see generally Deven R. Desai 
& Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1789, 1811–16 (2007) (discussing the distinctions between common law 
trademarks and trade names). 
18 Schechter, supra note 7, at 828–30. 
19 RUDOLF CALLMAN, 2 THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS § 
66.3 (1945) (citing Millington v. Fox, 3 Myl. C. 338 (1838) and other cases); 
WALTER J. DERENBERG, TRADE-MARK PROTECTION AND UNFAIR TRADING 48 
(1936). 
20 Only technical trademarks could be registered under the federal Trade-Mark 
Act of 1905, which specified that personal names, geographic terms and terms 
that were “descriptive of the goods with which they are used, or of the character 
or quality of such goods” could not be registered.  Trade-Mark Act of 1905, 15 
U.S.C. § 85 (1905) (repealed 1946).  The 1905 Act was intended to codify, not 
alter, the common law of trademarks.  Trade-Mark Act of 1905, 15 U.S.C. § 103 
(1905) (repealed 1946) (clarifying that the Act did not “prevent, lessen, 
impeach, or avoid any remedy at law or in equity which any party aggrieved by 
any wrongful use of any trade-mark might have had if . . . . this Act had not been 
passed”). 
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or descriptive words or phrases, could not be registered or infringed.21  
At least in theory, the degree to which a word or phrase was entitled to 
legal protection depended on whether it was classified as a technical 
trademark.22  If the mark or name fit into this category, its owner held 
what many courts characterized as an exclusive property right in that 
trademark, creating a virtual monopoly on the part of the trademark 
holder.23  
The United States Supreme Court characterized technical 
trademarks as the exclusive property of their owners during this period.  
In The Trade-Mark Cases, decided in 1879, the Court set forth this 
proposition in no uncertain terms: 
The right to adopt and use a symbol or a device to distinguish the 
goods or property made or sold by the person whose mark it is, to 
the exclusion of use by all other persons, has been long recognized 
by the common law. . . and by the statutes of some of the States.  It 
                                                
21 Trade-Mark Act of 1905, 15 U.S.C. § 85 (1905) (repealed 1946); see also, 
e.g., Candee, Swan & Co. v. Deere & Co., 54 Ill. 439, 466 (1870) (holding that 
plaintiff could not have a property interest in the name “Moline Plow” or the 
words “Moline, Ill.,” despite evidence of secondary meaning, as others had a 
right to manufacture plows in Moline, Illinois, and similarly designate their 
origin). 
22 See Church & Dwight Co. v. Russ, 99 F. 276, 278–79 (C.C. Ind. 1900) 
(discussing differences between technical trademarks and trade names); Daniel 
M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal 
Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 316–17 (1979) (describing differences 
between technical trademarks and trade names in the context of late-nineteenth 
century legal formalism); Milton Handler & Charles Pickett, Trade-Marks and 
Trade Names – An Analysis and Synthesis: I, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 168, 168-70 
(1930) (explaining the technical differences between trademarks and trade 
names) [hereinafter Trade-Marks and Trade Names: Part I]; Charles Grove 
Haines, Efforts to Define Unfair Competition, 29 YALE L. J. 1, 8 (1919) 
(observing that “[u]nfair competition is distinguishable from the infringement of 
trade-marks”); JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES 
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4 (4th ed. 1924) (opining that trademark rights are 
“broader and by far . . . more valuable” than rights to a trade name); RUDOLF 
CALLMAN, 2 THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS § 66.1 
(1945) (quoting Handler & Pickett).  
23 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth 
Century:  The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. 
Rev. 325, 343–44 (1980) (describing early treatment of trademarks as “absolute 
property”); McClure, supra note 22, at 317–19 (characterizing early treatment of 
technical trademarks as conferring monopolistic property rights); Grafton 
Dulany Cushing, On Certain Cases Analogous to Trade-Marks, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 321, 322 (1890) (noting that “[a] trademark has become an absolute 
right”).   
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is a property right. . . .  This exclusive right was not created by . . . 
Congress, and does not now depend upon it for its enforcement.24 
In fact, trademarks’ status as property led to the demise of the 
first federal trademark statute.  The Supreme Court held that the law was 
unconstitutional because trademarks, as a form of property, were 
regulated by state law, and Congress had no power to define or regulate 
that property.25  
As a result of the judiciary’s characterization of trademarks as 
exclusive property, certain limitations inherent in modern trademark law 
did not apply to technical trademarks at the turn of the century.  For 
example, the owner of a technical trademark did not have to show 
“likelihood of [consumer] confusion” to prove that a trademark had been 
infringed.26  Nor was the technical trademark owner required to 
demonstrate bad intent on the part of the defendant, proof of which was 
initially required in cases involving non-technical trademarks.27  
                                                
24 The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) (emphasis added).  The Court 
concluded that “[t]hese propositions are so well understood as to require neither 
the citation of authorities nor an elaborate argument to prove them.”  Id.  See 
also G. W. Cole Co. v. Am. Cement & Oil Co., 130 F. 703, 705 (7th Cir. 1904) 
(characterizing trademarks as “the exclusive property of [their] proprietor[s]”); 
Derringer v. Plate, 29 Cal. 292, 295 (1865) (observing that “[t]he trademark is 
property, and the owner’s right of property in it is as complete as that which he 
possesses in the goods to which he attaches it, and the law protects him in the 
enjoyment of the one as fully as of the other. . . .”). 
25 See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 93 (holding that “[a]s the property in 
trademarks and the right to their exclusive use rest on the laws of the States, and, 
like the great body of the rights of person and of property, depend on them for 
security and protection, the power of Congress to legislate on the subject . . . . if 
such power exist at all, must be found in the Constitution of the United States. . . 
.”); see also id. at 96–97 (holding that the federal trademark statute, as written, 
was not authorized under the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution).   
26 See Milton Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IOWA L. REV. 175, 183–84 
(1936) (observing that “[s]imulation of a tradename will be restrained only if 
there is a likelihood of confusion of the public,” while “[c]ommercial usage of 
the identical trademark in the same business field is taboo, regardless of the 
element of confusion”). 
27 See Elgin Nat’l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665, 674 
(1901) (noting when “a plaintiff has the absolute right to the use of a particular 
word or words as a trademark, then, if an infringement is shown, the wrongful or 
fraudulent intent is presumed, and . . . the further violation of the right of 
property will. . . be restrained”) (emphasis added); Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. 
Tennessee Mfg. Co., 138 U.S. 537, 548 (1891) (noting that “fraudulent intent 
would be inferred” if plaintiff could prove infringement of a technical 
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Similarly, the dilution cause of action, both in Schechter’s inception and 
its modern-day application, does not require the plaintiff to prove either 
of these elements.  
By the time Schechter wrote his Rational Basis article, the all-or-
nothing approach to trademark law was largely extinct.  Courts in the 
United States quickly abandoned the formalist doctrine that attempted to 
demarcate a bright line between technical trademarks, designated as the 
exclusive property of their owners, and trade names, to which 
substantially fewer rights would attach.  This model was found to be 
simultaneously under-and over-inclusive:  trade names were given too 
little protection, whereas trademarks received too much.  
The old model, which granted almost unlimited protection to 
technical trademarks and precious little to descriptive terms or other 
types of trade names, was under-inclusive because it did not always 
reach deliberately deceitful conduct.  Courts of equity were reluctant to 
allow outright deception to go undeterred and unpunished, regardless of 
whether the aggrieved business owner had chosen a technical trademark 
as the name for his business.  Accordingly, courts began to extend 
protection to non-technical trademarks, or trade names, when (1) those 
names had acquired secondary meaning (i.e., the consuming public 
associated the trade name with a particular business);28 and (2) the 
                                                                                                         
trademark); Barton v. Rex-Oil Co., 2 F.2d 402, 404 (3d Cir. 1924) (“A technical 
trade-mark being treated as property, infringement thereof carries with it the 
presumption of fraud; but where no exclusive right to the use of a trade-mark 
exists, fraud – unfair competition – in the use of the mark by another must be 
proved. . . .”); see also HOPKINS, supra note 22, at § 118 (noting that, in 
technical trademark cases, defendant’s good faith was relevant to the issue of 
punitive damages only, not liability); McClure, supra note 22, at 317–18 (noting 
that in contrast to trade name cases, trademark infringement does not require 
proof of fraudulent intent); Milton Handler & Charles Pickett, Trade-Marks and 
Trade Names – An Analysis and Synthesis: II , 30 COLUM. L. REV. 759, 769–70 
(1930) [hereinafter Trade-Marks and Trade Names: Part II]; Handler, supra 
note 26, at 184 (“A trademark will be protected even against innocent 
infringement; a tradename, only against fraudulent simulation.”). 
28 See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS: DEFINITION OF TRADE NAME 
§ 716 (b) cmt. b (1938) (stating that a trade name has acquired “secondary 
meaning” when “a substantial number of present or prospective purchasers 
understand the designation, when used in connection with goods, services, or a 
business, not in its primary lexicographical sense, but as referring to a particular 
place or association”); HARRY D. NIMS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND 
TRADE-MARKS § 50 (3d ed. 1929) (“In the absence of secondary meaning, the 
law of unfair competition does not protect a name which is based on or is truly 
descriptive of the construction common to, or characteristics of an article.”); see 
also Standard Oil Co. of Maine v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 45 F.2d 309, 310 
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plaintiff could prove fraud by the defendant.29  To establish fraud, most 
courts required the plaintiff to show that the defendant had deliberately 
attempted to pass off his goods as those of the plaintiff.30  However, most 
                                                                                                         
(1st Cir. 1930) (holding that appellee was entitled to protection against “unfair 
or fraudulent use” of the names “Standard Oil” and “Standard Oil Company” in 
competition, because the names had acquired secondary meaning,); Computing 
Scale Co. v. Standard Computing Scale Co., 118 F. 965, 967 (6th Cir. 1902) 
(holding that when a word “is incapable of becoming a valid trade-mark. . . yet 
has by use come to stand for a particular maker or vendor, its use by another in 
this secondary sense will be restrained as unfair and fraudulent competition. . . 
.”); Am. Waltham Watch Co. v. U.S. Watch Co., 53 N.E. 141, 142 (Mass. 1899) 
(holding that, although “Waltham” was not a valid trademark, it had acquired 
secondary meaning and hence was entitled to protection from unfair 
competition). 
29 For example, in a case decided at the turn of the century, the California 
Supreme Court affirmed an injunction in favor of plaintiff, whose business 
operated under the name “Mechanics’ Store,” because the name had acquired 
secondary meaning and defendant had chosen a similar name for the purpose of 
poaching plaintiff’s customers.  Weinstock, Lubin & Co. v. Marks, 42 P. 142, 
145, 146 (Cal. 1895).  Plaintiff’s name, “Mechanics’ Store,” was admittedly 
descriptive and ineligible for protection as a technical trademark.  Id. at 144.  
The court found that defendant had acted with fraudulent intent when he chose 
the name “Mechanical Store,” by seeking to deceive “the public, and especially 
plaintiff’s customers, and thereby secur[e] the advantages and benefits of the 
good will of plaintiff’s business.”  Id. The court reasoned that “it is a fraud on a 
person who has established a business for his goods, and carries it on under a 
given name. . . , for some other person to assume the same name or mark, or the 
same with a slight alteration, in such a way as to induce persons to deal with him 
in the belief that they are dealing with a person who has given a reputation to 
that name or mark.”  Id.  See also Cushing, supra note 23, at 332 (arguing that in 
“cases analogous to trade-marks,” for example, cases involving common law 
trade names, “fraud is the gist of the action”); HOPKINS, supra note 22, at § 22 
(“While fraud is presumed from the wrongful use of a trademark it must be 
proven, directly or by inference, in all cases of unfair competition which do not 
involve a technical trademark.”); Vandevelde, supra note 23, at 345 (observing 
that trade names were not considered property and therefore would be protected 
only to prevent fraud). 
30 See, e.g., Hilson Co. v. Foster, 80 F. 896, 897 (C.C.N.Y. 1897) (holding that 
“[n]o man has a right to use names, symbols, signs or marks which are intended, 
or calculated, to represent that his business is that of another,” and “[f]raud 
should be clearly proved”); Drive It Yourself Co. v. North, 130 A. 57, 59 (Md. 
App. 1925) (use of “merely generic or descriptive” words may be enjoined only 
if there is “actual fraud or intent to deceive”); DERENBERG, supra note 19, at 53 
(noting that, “until about [1916], [the courts] always sought to discover and to 
stress in unfair competition cases – as opposed to trade-mark infringement cases 
– the elements of an intentional fraud as the basis of their jurisdiction”); 
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courts eventually dropped the fraud requirement, so long as the plaintiff 
could prove actual or likely confusion on the part of the consumer.31 
Similarly, the old model was over-inclusive because it granted 
overly broad, exclusive rights to technical trademark holders.  The extent 
of these rights almost immediately raised fears that trademark law 
created anti-competitive monopolies.32  As one federal court observed in 
1923:  “Patents, copyrights, and trade-marks excite two deeply seated 
feelings. One is the feeling of anyone who has originated anything of his 
right to claim an exclusive property in it and to the trade growing out of 
it.  The other is a hatred of monopoly.”33  This desire to avoid granting 
monopolies to trademark owners led courts to adopt the now-familiar 
maxim that trademark rights are not held “in gross.”34  Less than forty 
                                                                                                         
McClure, supra note 22, at 317 (noting that in an unfair competition claim 
plaintiff  “was required to prove . . . fraudulent intent by the defendant”).   
31 See, e.g., Boice v. Stevenson, 187 P.2d 648, 653 (Ariz. 1947) (holding that 
“[t]he universal test [of unfair competition] is whether the public is likely to be 
deceived”) (citation omitted); New York World’s Fair v. World’s Fair News, 
256 A.D. 373, 374 (N.Y. App. 1939) (holding that “[t]he determining factor is 
not that people have actually been deceived but that there is a likelihood of that 
happening”) (citation omitted); Sartor v. Schaden, 101 N.W. 511, 513 (Iowa 
1904) (holding that, even if a word is not “capable of becoming an arbitrary 
trade-mark,” if it has acquired secondary meaning its use will be restrained if 
“confusion [of the public] has been or is likely to be produced”); see also 
Handler & Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names: Part I, supra note 22, at 169 
(holding that a competitor’s use of trade names will be restrained only when 
such use “render[s] it likely that the public will confuse the products bearing the 
marks”); Zechariah Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1296–
97 (1940) (noting that “[f]raud has been squeezed out of” cases involving trade 
names and trademarks); RUDOLF CALLMAN, 2 THE LAW OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS § 66.1 (1945) (observing that the distinction 
between technical trademarks and trade names is “gradually disappearing”); see 
generally E.H. Schloper, Annotation, Doctrine of Secondary Meaning in the 
Law of Trademark and of Unfair Competition, 150 A.L.R. 1067, 1133 (1944) 
(noting split of authorities as to whether “it is necessary for the plaintiff to show 
actual fraud on the part of the defendant” in cases where plaintiff’s rights in a 
trade name are predicated on secondary meaning).   
32 See McClure, supra note 22, at 306–08 (discussing tension between trademark 
protection and its potential for anticompetitive effects). 
33 Loughran v. Quaker City Chocolate & Confectionery Co., 286 F. 694, 697 
(E.D. Pa. 1923).  Professor Zechariah Chafee, a noted First Amendment scholar, 
similarly observed, “It may seem shabby for a defendant to appropriate valuable 
ideas from the plaintiff . . . . but in the words of the song: ‘The best things in life 
are free.’”  Chafee, supra note 31, at 1317–18.    
34 See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) 
(holding that a trade-mark right is not “a right in gross or at large, like a 
statutory copyright or a patent for an invention”). 
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years after characterizing trademarks as an “exclusive” form of property, 
the Supreme Court gave a considerably more qualified definition of 
trademarks as property interest: 
Common-law trademarks, and the right to their exclusive use, are, 
of course, to be classed among property rights, but only in the sense 
that a man’s right to the continued enjoyment of his trade reputation 
and the good will that flows from it, free from unwarranted 
interference by others, is a property right, for the protection of 
which a trademark is an instrumentality.  [T]he right grows out of 
use, not mere adoption.35 
This push and pull resulted in the gradual conflation of the two 
categories of marks, as courts both expanded the protection given to 
trade names and limited the scope of rights accorded to technical 
trademarks.36  The judiciary essentially pulled both doctrines to a middle 
ground that was equally inhabited by both types of marks, and courts 
began to treat the two classes of common law marks essentially the 
same.37  In 1916, the Supreme Court embraced the merger of doctrine 
with regard to technical trademarks and trade names under the general 
rubric of unfair competition law: 
Courts afford redress or relief upon the ground that a party has a 
valuable interest in the good-will of his trade or business. . . .  The 
essence of the wrong consists of the sale of the goods of one 
manufacturer for those of another.  This essential element is the 
same in trade-mark cases as in cases of unfair competition 
unaccompanied by trademark infringement.  In fact, the common 
                                                
35 Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916); see also 
Loughran, 286 F. at 697 (observing that “[m]ere dealers in commodities are 
prone to think themselves entitled to a . . . monopoly [like that extended to 
patents and copyrights] unlimited in time. This is a mistake. The only right they 
have is their right to sell their goods as such and to protection against the goods 
of another being palmed off upon their customers as theirs.”). 
36 See, e.g., Hanover, 240 U.S. at 413; Church & Dwight Co. v. Russ, 99 F. 276, 
278 (C.C. Ind. 1900) (observing that “[t]he tendency of the courts at the present 
time seems to be to restrict the scope of the law applicable to technical trade-
marks, and to extend its scope in cases of unfair competition”) (citations 
omitted); Haines, supra note 22, at 21 (same). 
37 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 28, at § 717 cmt. a (stating that 
“there are no important differences between the protection given to the interest 
in trade-marks and that given to the interest in trade names”); Chafee, supra note 
31, at 1298 (observing that, in 1940, the only important difference between trade 
names and technical trademarks related to federal registration, which was only 
allowed for technical trademarks under the 1905 Act).      
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law of trademarks is but a part of the broader law of unfair 
competition.38 
Schechter was thus bucking the trend when he argued for a 
different form of trademark protection for inherently distinctive marks.  
Schechter’s dilution cause of action (although he never referred to it by 
that name) was reserved for fanciful or arbitrary marks; he did not intend 
that it would apply to words or terms that were not inherently distinctive.  
His argument for distinguishing the two classes of marks was directly 
contrary to the definite trend in favor of conflating them. 
3. Schechter:  Legal Formalist, Realist, or Both? 
To be properly understood, Schechter’s ideas must be analyzed 
in the context of his era.  When Schechter published his famous thesis 
that became the genesis of the dilution doctrine, trademark law and the 
law in general were in a state of transition.  The once-ubiquitous doctrine 
of legal formalism was fading, and legal realism, or positivism, was 
dawning over the American legal landscape.  Moreover, the nation as a 
whole was also in a state of transition.  American business was booming 
in 1927 as the nation basked in economic prosperity in the aftermath of 
World War I.  Although the Great Depression loomed on the not-too-
distant horizon, few could have conceived, let alone anticipated, a 
worldwide economic collapse in 1927. 
The supposedly bright-line distinction between technical 
trademarks and trade names was typical of legal formalism, which 
permeated American jurisprudence during the late nineteenth century.  
The legal formalists believed that “the law was objective, unchanging, 
extrinsic to the social climate, and, above all, different from and superior 
to politics.”39  In the formalist period, typically defined as lasting from 
                                                
38 Hanover, 240 U.S. at 412-13 (emphasis added).  Although trademark law is 
commonly referred to as a subset of the law of unfair competition, at least 
during the modern era, an argument can be made that the concept of unfair 
competition derived from trademark law rather than the other way around.  
Derenberg observed that “the law of unfair competition first developed at the 
beginning of the 20th century and was considered an outgrowth of trademark 
law.”  DERENBERG, supra note 19, at 39-40. 
39 WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW:  THE SUPREME COURT IN 
AMERICAN LIFE 187 (1988); see also Morton J. Horwitz, The Rise of Legal 
Formalism, 19 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 251, 252 (1975) (characterizing legal 
formalism as “an intellectual system which gave common law rules the 
appearance of being self-contained, apolitical, and inexorable”).   
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1873 to 1937,40 “results in individual cases were accomplished not by an 
assessment of competing principles and policies, but rather an 
‘automatic’ application of rules deduced logically from greater principles 
that supposedly dictated a single, correct result in every case.”41  In sum, 
legal formalists favored supposedly objective, bright-line rules over 
balancing tests.42  To determine whether a plaintiff could recover in a 
trademark infringement suit, the formalist jurist would only need to 
determine whether the name in question qualified as a technical 
trademark.  If it did, plaintiff had an exclusive property right therein and 
could preclude defendant from using the mark, much the same as he 
could prevent the defendant from trespassing on his real property. 
Schechter’s dilution proposal may be viewed as a plea to return 
to the certainty of bright-line rules preferred by the legal formalists.43  In 
The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, Schechter decried the 
unpredictability of then-current trademark law.  Dilution is, in fact, not 
that different than the formalist conception of trademark law at the turn 
of the century.  The extent of rights attendant to the trademark under the 
modern dilution doctrine turns on whether the mark is characterized as 
famous,44 analogous to the designation of a mark as a technical 
trademark.  Once a mark is deemed famous, in practice few limitations 
are placed on the trademark holder’s ability to prevent others from using 
the mark.   Schechter’s dilution theory, as articulated in 1927, can be 
                                                
40 Wiecek fixes the start date for the “judicial hegemony of the formalist era” as 
1873, marked by two dissenting opinions in The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 
36 (1872) (opinions of Justices Field and Bradley).  WIECEK, supra note 39, at 
115–16.  The formalist era unofficially ended with a string of Supreme Court 
cases in 1937 that upheld the Constitutionality of President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation.  Id. at 137–39. 
41 McClure, supra note 22, at 320. 
42 Although the formalist era supposedly ended in 1937, the philosophy has been 
reinvigorated to a certain extent by some modern-day conservatives.  The Chief 
Justice of the United States Supreme Court, John Roberts, embraced formalism 
in colloquial terms when he famously told the United States Senate, “[I]t’s my 
job to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat.”  Roberts: ‘My job is to call 
balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat,’ CNN POLITICS, (Sept. 12, 2005),  
http://articles.cnn.com/2005-09-12/politics/roberts.statement_1_judicial-role-
judges-judicial-oath?_s=PM:POLITICS; see generally Frederick Shauer, 
Formalism, 97 YALE L. J. 509 (1988). 
43 See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. 
REV. 621, 686 (2004) (arguing that Schechter “believed that antidilution 
protection would bring greater predictability to the law” by “returning it to 
formalism”). 
44 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2006) (restricting dilution protection to the owners 
of “famous” trademarks). 
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characterized as a proposal to re-propertize certain categories of marks.45  
The modern dilution doctrine serves that same function. 
However, as Professor Robert Bone has argued, portraying 
Schechter as a legal formalist, yearning for the days of bright-line rules 
and easy answers, oversimplifies Schechter’s dilution proposal.46  
Schechter’s push for a new paradigm in trademark law was openly 
driven by a pragmatic desire to serve the needs of modern business, a 
distinctly realist approach that was the polar opposite of the stated goals 
(though perhaps not the results achieved by) the formalists.  Schechter 
“believed that dilution was the real reason to protect marks because it 
was the reason that fit the way marks actually functioned in the 
marketplace, and he urged judges to acknowledge this fact openly 
because doing so would produce better decisions.”47  Therefore, 
Schechter is perhaps best characterized as a transitional figure between 
the formalist and realist eras.  His dilution proposal embodied aspects of 
both legal philosophies. 
4. Dilution’s Temporary Demise 
The desire to merge legal doctrine with regard to trademarks and 
trade names – as described above, a marked departure from the legal 
regime proposed by Schechter – was also born of the realist movement.  
The legal realists observed that technical trademarks and trade names 
functioned much the same in practice.  Therefore, it made little sense to 
protect one more or less than the other.  Edward S. Rogers, a leading 
trademark scholar who is credited as the author of the Lanham Act,48 
observed the following: 
The notion that there is ‘property’ in trademarks as a separate thing 
was once quite generally entertained and for a while it served well 
enough, but it was very soon perceived that a trader’s customers 
might be diverted by the imitation of things which were not 
                                                
45 See, e.g., McClure, supra note 22, at 323–24 (characterizing Schechter’s 
proposal as “[t]he furthest extension of the concept of ‘protection of property’ to 
expand protection of trademarks”). 
46 Bone, supra note 8, at 483–85.  Although Beebe ultimately characterizes 
Schechter’s dilution proposal as a formalist one, he too observes that Schechter 
“had the critical instincts of a realist.” Beebe, supra note 43, at 686. 
47 Bone, supra note 8, at 471.  
48 Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trademarks, 
14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 173, 178–80 (1949) (describing Lanham Act history 
and Rogers’ own role therein); see generally Walter J. Derenberg, The 
Contribution of Edward S. Rogers to the Trademark Act of 1946 in Historical 
Perspective, 62 TRADEMARK REP. 189 (1972). 
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trademarks and in which property rights could not be maintained, 
such as . . . the misuse of personal names, descriptive words and the 
like.49 
Three years after Schechter published his Rational Basis article, 
another “epoch making article”50 on the subject of trademark law 
appeared, this time in the Columbia Law Review, entitled Trade-Marks 
and Trade Names – An Analysis and Synthesis.51  The authors of the 
article, Milton Handler and Charles Pickett, argued that there was no 
“rational basis”52 for the legal distinctions then existing between 
technical trademarks and trade names.53  Handler and Pickett were 
consummate realists who argued that the tenets of trademark law should 
derive from a realistic depiction of the way marks functioned in practice, 
not the formal label that was attached to a particular mark: 
Whether or not there is property in trademarks or trade names seems 
to us a fruitless and unhelpful inquiry.  Both types of mark 
frequently are the most valuable assets of a business.  [ ] It is 
enough that plaintiff has a material interest which is worthy of 
protection.  It does not matter much what label is tagged to it. . . .  
The approach to the law of trade-marks would probably be more 
realistic if courts entirely abandoned the property notion.54 
However, Handler and Pickett, unlike Schechter, did not argue 
that trademark law needed a new paradigm.  Although Handler and 
Pickett cited Schechter numerous times, they never discussed his specific 
                                                
49 Edward S. Rogers, New Concepts of Unfair Competition under the Lanham 
Act, 38 TRADEMARK REP. 259, 260 (1948); see also Haines, supra note 22, at 21 
(noting that cases affording relief to plaintiffs whose business names did not 
qualify as technical trademarks were based upon “principles of common honesty 
and sportsmanship”). 
50 Chafee, supra note 31, at 1297; see also DERENBERG, supra note 19, at 42 
(citing Handler & Pickett).   
51 The article was published in two parts, Handler & Pickett, Trade-Marks and 
Trade Names: Part I, supra note 22, and Handler & Pickett, Trade-Marks and 
Trade Names: Part II, supra note 27. 
52 Handler & Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names: Part I, supra note 22, at 
169.  
53 Handler & Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names: Part II, supra note 27, at 
776.  
54 Id. at 776 n.81.  Handler and Pickett wrote that “[t]he and lawyer and business 
man, unlike the grammarian, is not primarily interested in etymology for its own 
sake.”  Handler & Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names:  Part I, supra note 
22, at 180.  
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proposal that became the dilution cause of action.55  Handler and 
Pickett’s idea that all types of marks should be entitled to protection 
under the likelihood of confusion standard, unlike Schechter’s dilution 
proposal, came to fruition when Congress enacted the 1946 Lanham Act. 
B.  Trademark Law in the Modern Era 
The 1946 Lanham Act codified and unified the law of 
trademarks in the United States, which had become strictly a creature of 
state law after the Supreme Court’s 1938 decision in Erie.56  Although 
Schechter most likely would have been pleased by many of the 
developments codified in the federal statute,57 Congress did not embrace 
his claim for dilution.  Instead, the Act reflected the predominant trend, 
as convincingly advocated by Handler and Pickett, of treating all types of 
marks essentially the same.  Moreover, the Act preserved the likelihood 
of confusion standard for trademark infringement of all types of marks 
(until it was amended in 1995 to include a dilution cause of action). 
The Lanham Act represented a triumph of legal realism, as it 
swept away many of the rules that, in the minds of many practitioners 
                                                
55 See, e.g., Handler & Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names: Part I, supra 
note 22, at 176 n.24 (citing Schechter’s critique of the rule limiting trademark 
protection in cases where marks were placed on dissimilar goods).  
56 Although the Supreme Court held the federal trademark statute 
unconstitutional in The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 97 (1879), this decision 
did not eliminate the federal common law of trademarks.  Until the Supreme 
Court famously overruled Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), the federal courts 
were free to decide substantive issues of state law, unrestrained by the decisions 
of state courts, so long as those laws were not codified in a state statute.  See 
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  Therefore, if a state had not 
adopted a trademark statute, a federal court hearing a trademark case in that state 
(under diversity jurisdiction) was free to interpret the applicable common law 
doctrines as it saw fit, even if its interpretation differed from that of the state 
courts.  The Erie Doctrine – which dictated that federal courts sitting in diversity 
were required to follow state law precedents, whether based on common law or 
statutes – invalidated the federal common law of trademarks.  See Rogers, supra 
note 48, at 263 (decrying the “chaos” created by Erie’s invalidation of the “great 
body of Federal [common] Law dealing with trade-marks and unfair 
competition”); accord Chafee, supra note 31, at 1299, 1300 (predicting that the 
valuable and “great body of federal unfair competition law” would likely be 
“torn into pieces” as a result of Erie, rendering the United States “a legal 
checkerboard” in this area of the law). 
57 Schechter died in 1937, ten years after publishing his famous article in the 
Harvard Law Review and approximately ten years before the Lanham Act was 
enacted.  Therefore, his opinion of the evolution of trademark law, even in the 
relatively short term, will never be known. 
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and academics, had artificially limited the scope of trademark law and its 
ability to prevent unfair competition.  Edward S. Rogers explained the 
impact of the Act as follows: 
Under the modern law . . . , unfair competition includes any act, not 
necessarily fraudulent, which artificially interferes with the normal 
course of trade to the disadvantage of another.  There need be no 
competition if the artificial interference is present.  It is true, of 
course, that most of the cases have arisen between competitors in 
business, but the fact of competition or its absence ought not to be 
controlling.  It is the nature or the result of the act, not the 
occupation of the actor which should determine its character.58 
The Act codified the merger of doctrine as to technical 
trademarks and trade names.  Since 1946, the Lanham Act has extended 
trademark registration rights and other types of protection to descriptive 
marks, geographic marks, and other types of marks that were not 
considered “trademarks” under the common law, so long as they have 
acquired secondary meaning, or distinctiveness.59  Although the 1946 
Lanham Act addressed many of Schechter’s concerns about trademark 
law,60 it did not create a separate cause of action for fanciful and 
                                                
58 Rogers, supra note 48, at 262 (emphasis added). 
59 Compare Trade-Mark Act of 1905, 15 U.S.C. § 85 (1905) (repealed 1946) 
(stating “[t]hat no mark by which the goods of the owner of the mark may be 
distinguished from other goods of the same class shall be refused registration as 
a trade-mark on account of the nature of such mark unless such mark” was 
“descriptive of the goods with which they are used, or of the character or quality 
of such goods”) with Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (stating that, with certain 
exceptions, “nothing in this [statute] shall prevent the registration of a mark used 
by the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in 
commerce” even if the mark is merely descriptive).  However, the modern 
Lanham Act does not allow registration of generic words or phrases, regardless 
of whether they have acquired distinctiveness. 15 U.S.C. §1064; see also Desai 
& Rierson, supra note 17, at 1809–10 (discussing the prohibition of registering 
generic names under the Lanham Act).   
60 For example, Schechter rejected the common law rule that trademark rights 
were limited to the mark holder’s geographic area of use, i.e., those geographic 
areas in which the mark had acquired “goodwill.”  Schechter, supra note 7, at 
824.  The Lanham Act gave the holder of a registered mark nationwide priority 
in that mark, even if a junior user was the first to acquire goodwill in a given 
geographic area.  Lanham Act, ch. 540, § 2(d), 60 Stat. 427, 428 (1946) 
(amended 1988).  However, the Lanham Act does not automatically grant the 
senior user the right to enjoin others’ use of its mark.  To state a claim for 
infringement, the senior user must always prove likelihood of confusion 
between the two marks.  See, e.g., Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 
267 F.2d 358, 361, 364 (2d Cir. 1959) (finding no likelihood of confusion and 
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arbitrary marks.  Instead, the 1946 Lanham Act created a single cause of 
action, trademark infringement, for all classes of valid trademarks, 
judged under the likelihood of confusion standard.  Even today, the 
inherent strength of the mark, i.e., whether the mark is descriptive, 
suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful,61 remains relevant to a claim of 
trademark infringement, but only as a factor in the likelihood of 
confusion analysis.62 
The Lanham Act also addressed Schechter’s dissatisfaction with 
the judiciary’s reluctance to find trademark infringement when the senior 
and junior users’ goods or services were not identical.  The 1905 
Trademark Act prevented registration of a mark that was likely to cause 
confusion with a mark that was already registered, but only if the marks 
were placed on goods of the “same descriptive properties” as those of the 
senior user.63  The Lanham Act of 1946 eliminated this requirement.  
Under the revised version of the Act, a junior user could not register or 
use a mark “in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or advertising 
of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is 
likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers as to the 
source of origin of such goods or services.”64  As a result, the courts have 
relegated the similarity (or lack thereof) between the types of goods or 
                                                                                                         
therefore no trademark infringement due to separate trading areas, where trading 
areas were only sixty miles apart).  
61 See Desai & Rierson, supra note 17, at 1805–10 (explaining the spectrum of 
marks).  
62 See Borinquen Biscuit Corp. v. M.V. Trading Corp., 443 F.3d 112, 121 (1st 
Cir. 2006); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 
1961); Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1983); Pizzeria 
Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984); Exxon Corp. v. 
Texas Motor Exch. of Houston, Inc., 628 F.2d 500, 504 (5th. Cir. 1980); Wynn 
Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1186-87 (6th Cir. 1988); Barbecue Marx, 
Inc. v. 551 Ogden, Inc., 235 F.3d 1041, 1045 (7th Cir. 2000); Anheuser-Busch, 
Inc. v. Balducci Publ’n, 28 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 1994); AMF Inc. v. 
Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 349 (9th Cir. 1979); Sally Beauty Co., Inc. v. 
Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 975-76 (10th Cir. 2002); Tana v. Dantanna’s, 611 
F.3d 767, 776 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of 
the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1633–
40  (2006) (discussing strength of the mark as a factor in likelihood of confusion 
analysis). 
63 Trade-Mark Act of 1905, 15 U.S.C. § 85 (1905) (repealed 1946).   
64 Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, §43(a)(1)(A), 60 Stat. 444, 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(a)(1)(A) (1946); see also Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing 
Co., 314 F.2d 149, 151 (9th Cir. 1963) (noting this distinction between the 1905 
and 1946 versions of the statute); id. at 160–61 (finding likelihood of confusion 
between use of trademark “Black and White” for beer and Scotch whiskey). 
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services offered by the plaintiff and defendant to a single factor in the 
multi-factor litmus test for likelihood of confusion.65 
The scope of the likelihood of confusion standard was broadened 
again in 1962, when Congress eliminated even more qualifying language 
from the statute by deleting the reference to “purchasers.”66  Although 
some courts have interpreted this deletion more narrowly,67 many have 
held that its effect has been to prohibit uses of a mark that result in a 
likelihood of confusion by third parties, not the purchaser of the relevant 
good or service (post-sale confusion)68 and confusion by the purchaser 
prior to (but not at) the point of sale (initial interest confusion).69  At the 
                                                
65 See, e.g., Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, 531 F.3d 1, 35 (1st 
Cir. 2008); Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495; Sabinsa Corp. v. Creative Compounds, 
LLC, 609 F.3d 175, 189 (3d Cir. 2010); Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1535; Amstar 
Corp. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 261 (5th Cir. 1980); Wynn Oil, 839 
F.2d at 1187; Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc.  237 F.3d 891, 899–900 (7th Cir. 
2001); SquirtCo. v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980); 
Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 350; Universal Money Ctrs., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 22 F.3d 1527, 1532–33 (10th Cir. 1994); Caliber Auto. Liquidators, Inc. v. 
Premier Chrysler, Jeep, Dodge, LLC, 605 F.3d 931, 939–40 (11th Cir. 2010); 
see also Beebe, supra note 62, at 1631–33 (discussing the competitive proximity 
factor in likelihood of confusion analysis). 
66 See S. Rep. No. 87-2107, at 4 (1962) reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2844, 
2847.  Under the current version of the statute, which has existed since 1962, the 
Lanham Act prohibits all uses of a trademark that are “likely to cause confusion, 
or to cause mistake, or to deceive.”  25 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006).   
67 The legislative history of the 1962 amendments suggests that the word 
“purchasers” was deleted because “the provision actually relates to potential 
purchasers as well as to actual purchasers.” S. Rep. No. 87-2107, at 4 (1962). As 
a result, some courts have held that, even under the current version of the Act, 
the focus remains on potential confusion on the part of actual or potential 
purchasers, not third parties.  See, e.g., Elec. Design & Sales, Inc. v. Elec. Data 
Sys. Corp., 954 F.2d 713, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (construing the likelihood of 
confusion inquiry to generally turn on whether actual or potential purchasers are 
confused); Astra Pharmaceutical Prods. v. Beckman Instruments, 718 F.2d 1201, 
1206 (1st Cir.1983) (considering the classes of “prospective purchasers” in 
assessing the likelihood of confusion).   
68 See, e.g., Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1245 (6th Cir. 
1991) (“the Act’s protection is not limited to confusion at the point of sale”); A 
& H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 216 (3d 
Cir. 2000); Lois Sportswear, USA v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 872, 874 
(2d Cir.1986). 
69 See, e.g., Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 
F.3d 1137, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 2011); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’n 
Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1024-26 (9th Cir. 2004); Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul 
Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539, 549 (6th Cir. 2005) (defining initial 
interest confusion as “when a manufacturer improperly uses a trademark to 
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same time, Congress eliminated language from the Act referring to 
confusion “as to the source of origin” of the plaintiff’s goods or 
services.70  As a result, the Act has been interpreted to prohibit confusion 
as to sponsorship or endorsement of a good or service, rather than its 
source.71  Suffice it to say, Schechter would scarcely recognize the 
likelihood of confusion standard as it exists today. 
Schechter’s desire to expand trademark law was therefore 
emphatically achieved by the 1946 Lanham Act, but not exactly in the 
manner he had envisioned.  The cause of action he had proposed, 
however, did not die.  Dilution materialized in state statutes as early as 
1947, and many states still recognize a dilution cause of action.72  
Congress federalized dilution when it enacted the Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act (FTDA) in 1995.73  Federal dilution law was substantially 
revised in 2006, when Congress passed the Trademark Dilution Revision 
Act (TDRA).74  The dilution cause of action has thus existed for over 
sixty years, not as a substitute for trademark infringement (as Schechter 
proposed), but coexistent with it.  Remarkably, it has persisted—and 
                                                                                                         
create initial customer interest in a product”); Perfumebay.com Inc. v. eBay, 
Inc., 506 F.3d 1165, 1176 (9th Cir. 2007); Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan 
Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1018-20 (9th Cir. 2004).  
70 S. Rep. No. 87-2107, at 4 (1962).     
71 See, e.g., Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg and Co., 633 F.2d 912, 
920 (9th Cir. 1980) (concluding that the name and emblem at issue were not 
trademarks partly due to lack of evidence showing customers being misled about 
sponsorship or endorsement); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat 
Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir.1979) (holding that the consumers’ 
confusion about the mark owner’s sponsorship or approval of use as sufficient 
for the confusion requirement).   
72 Massachusetts enacted the first dilution statute in 1947.  Act of May 2, 1947, 
ch. 307, § 7a, 1947 Mass. Acts 300 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 110H § 13 (West Supp. 2007)).  New York, Illinois, and Georgia soon 
followed suit.  See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 368-d (1961 N.Y. Laws 1806, 
1813) (recodified at N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 360-l (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 
2008)); 140 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ¶ 22 (West 1986) (superseded by 765 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 1036/5, 1036/65 (West 2001)); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-
451 (2000).  See also Bone, supra note 8, at 497–504 (discussing evolution of 
state dilution law). 
73 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 4, 109 Stat. 
985, 986 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000), superseded in part by Trademark 
Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2, 120 Stat. 1730 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006)).  Some commentators have argued that, 
even though dilution is now a federal claim, it remains a marginal cause of 
action that has little practical impact.  See infra notes 339-342 and 
accompanying text. 
74 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
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thrived—despite the lack of a convincing or even coherent explanation 
for its existence. 
C.  The Failure of the Traditional Justification for Trademark 
Dilution Law  
The claim for dilution, as embodied in the TDRA, the FTDA, 
and numerous state statutes, derives from the notion that an “association” 
between the junior and senior users’ marks, even in the absence of a 
likelihood of confusion, will diminish the distinctiveness of the senior 
mark, thereby reducing its value.75  Although some have argued that the 
dilution cause of action is justified by the same law and economics 
theories that traditionally support trademark infringement claims, those 
arguments have been subjected to vigorous critique.  The attempt to 
rationalize dilution on the same terms as trademark infringement is akin 
to fitting a square peg into a round hole, and just as futile. 
1. Dilution by Blurring 
The TDRA defines dilution by blurring as an “association arising 
from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark 
that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.”76  The mark’s 
distinctiveness is impaired, at least in theory, because the consumer’s 
ability to recall the famous trademark is compromised due to the 
consumer’s exposure to the mark in unrelated contexts.  The effect of 
each dilutive use is cumulative and eventually can even result in the 
demise of the mark.77  Whether this phenomenon actually occurs in 
practice is the subject of substantial debate.  
To understand how dilution is supposed to work, it is helpful to 
start with the law and economics explanation for a different cause of 
action: trademark infringement.78  This theory rests on the notion that 
trademarks are economically efficient because they act as a form of 
commercial shorthand.79  By quickly and effectively communicating 
                                                
75 See infra note 133.  
76 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B).  
77 See infra note 129 and accompanying text.  
78 See generally Desai & Rierson, supra note 17, at 1797–99 (discussing the 
traditional law and economics explanation of trademark law). 
79 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic 
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269 (1987) (noting that “a trademark conveys 
information that allows the consumer to say to himself, ‘I need not investigate 
the attributes of the brand I am about to purchase because the trademark is a 
shorthand way of telling me that the attributes are the same as that of the brand I 
enjoyed earlier.”). 
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information about goods or services to consumers, they reduce consumer 
search costs in the marketplace.80  The efficiency of a trademark depends 
on its ability to act as a source identifier:  when the consumer sees the 
mark, she has to know that the good or service to which it is attached 
derives from a particular source, with certain known and attendant 
attributes.81  For example, few people in the United States (and in many 
other nations around the globe) are forced to wonder what they will get 
when they order a hamburger at McDonald’s.®  For better or worse, when 
they see the Golden Arches, consumers know what to expect.  
Trademark infringement—using another’s trademark (or a similar mark) 
in a manner that is likely to confuse consumers—is prohibited, at least in 
part, because it makes trademarks less reliable and, hence, less 
efficient.82    
                                                
80 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) 
(stating that “trademark law. . . reduces the customer’s costs of shopping and 
making purchasing decisions, for it quickly and easily assures a potential 
customer that this item—the item with this mark—is made by the same producer 
as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past”) 
(citations omitted); see also Misawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. 
Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942) (observing that a trademark conveys to 
customers the “desirability of the commodity upon which it appears”); Ralph 
Folsom & Larry Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1323, 1336 
(1980) (noting that trademarks help to reduce search costs and enhance 
distributional efficiency); Stephen L. Carter, Comment, The Trouble with 
Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 762 (1990) (arguing that “[t]he principal benefit 
of trademark protection is that it lowers consumer search costs”).  
81 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining a trademark as a “word, name, symbol, or 
device” that is used to “identify and distinguish [the mark holder’s] goods . . . 
from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the 
goods, even if that source is unknown”); accord 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3.1 (4th ed. 2005) 
(“[T]o become a ‘trademark’ is to identify the source of one seller’s goods and 
distinguish that source from other sources[.]”); but see FRANK I. SCHECHTER, 
THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS 150 
(1925) (arguing that the consumer does not regard a trademark as an indication 
of origin “but rather as a guaranty that the goods purchased under the trade-mark 
will have the same meritorious qualities as those previously noted by him in his 
purchases of other goods bearing the same mark”).   
82 Landes and Posner have observed that “[t]he benefits of trademarks in 
lowering search costs presuppose legal protection because the cost of 
duplicating someone else’s trademark is small and the incentive to incur this 
cost in the absence of legal impediments will be greater the stronger the 
trademark.”  WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 168 (2003). 
No. 2] THE MYTH AND REALITY OF DILUTION 236 
Prohibiting trademark infringement furthers other policy goals as 
well.  In the classic case of passing off, the infringer injures the 
consumer by tricking her into buying something that she did not want: 
the consumer wanted to purchase product A, but instead she was lured 
into buying product B.83  Trademark infringement also harms the 
trademark holder by putting the “goodwill” associated with the mark, 
loosely defined as the mark’s reputation with consumers, in the hands of 
someone outside the mark holder’s control.84 
                                                
83 See Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Spear, 2 Sand. 599, 605–06 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849) 
(observing that, when a trademark is infringed, “[t]he purchaser has imposed 
upon him an article that he never meant to buy”).  Arguably, the consumer is not 
really injured if product B is equal to, or better than, product A in terms of 
quality, but this kind of consumer injury is not required to prove trademark 
infringement.  See, e.g., Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 
799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that defendant’s manufacture of 
similar-quality goods (as opposed to goods of lesser quality) may actually 
increase the likelihood of confusion and therefore be more likely to infringe).  
Moreover, the trademark holder (here, the maker of product A) can decrease the 
quality of his own goods or services at will, without notice to the consumer, at 
any time.  See generally Irene Calboli, The Sunset of “Quality Control” in 
Modern Trademark Licensing, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 341, 348 (2007) [hereinafter 
Calboli, The Sunset of Quality Control]; Elizabeth C. Bannon, The Growing Risk 
of Self-Dilution, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 570 (1992). For these reasons, several 
commentators have argued that the benefit to consumers provided by traditional 
trademark law has been overstated.  See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Likelihood of 
Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 730–32 (2004) (pointing out that, 
because a trademark imposes no “actual obligation” upon its holder, the mark’s 
benefits to consumers are overstated, unless the consumers continually monitor 
the quality of the products bearing the trademark); see also Irene Calboli, 
Trademark Assignment “with Goodwill”: A Concept Whose Time Has Gone, 57 
FLA. L. REV. 771, 833–36 (2005) [hereinafter Calboli, Trademark Assignment 
with Goodwill] (arguing that trademarks should be transferable “with or without 
goodwill,” in part because trademark owners have always had the ability to 
change the quality or nature of their products at will); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., 
Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999) (further critiquing the 
traditional economic justification for trademark law). 
84 The “goodwill” associated with a trademark has been described by financier 
Warren Buffet (in the context of discussing the Sees Candies brand) as a 
“pervasive favorable reputation with consumers based on countless pleasant 
experiences that they have had with both product and personnel.”  Warren E. 
Buffet, The Essays of Warren Buffet: Lessons for Corporate America, 19 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 173 (1997) (selected, arranged, and introduced by 
Lawrence E. Cunningham); see also Hanover Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 
403, 413 (1916) (reasoning that “a party has a valuable interest in the good will 
of his trade or business, and in the trademarks adopted to maintain and extend 
it”); Hilson Co. v. Foster, 80 F. 896, 897 (C.C.N.Y. 1897) (“Where the goods of 
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For example, if a consumer sees the Golden Arches and thinks 
she is in McDonald’s but, in reality, the restaurant is a “McDowell’s” 
and serves food that does not taste as good as McDonald’s, then both the 
consumer and McDonald’s will potentially suffer.85  The consumer is 
harmed because she thought she paid for a McDonald’s hamburger, but 
in fact she bought something different and, in this example, something 
worse.  McDonald’s is similarly harmed because the goodwill associated 
with its trademark has suffered a blow, at least as to this consumer.  The 
customer’s experience with the imposter McDowell’s has lowered her 
expectations as to quality associated with the McDonald’s brand, and 
therefore she may buy her fast food somewhere else in the future.  
Moreover, the next time she sees the Golden Arches, she is not quite as 
sure about what she is going to get when she places an order. 
The law and economics theory for trademark infringement does 
not easily transfer to a cause of action for dilution, because dilution, by 
definition, does not require the plaintiff to prove that consumers are 
likely to be confused.86  If the consumer is not confused (or even likely to 
be confused) by the defendant’s use of a mark, then she has not been 
tricked into buying something that she does not want.  Moreover, the 
                                                                                                         
a manufacturer have become popular not only because of their intrinsic worth, 
but also by reason of the ingenious, attractive and persistent manner in which 
they have been advertised, the good will thus created is entitled to protection.”); 
SCHECHTER, supra note 81, at 144 (stating that, when a trademark is infringed, 
“the owner is robbed of the fruits of the reputation that he had successfully 
labored to earn”); Calboli, Trademark Assignment with Goodwill, supra note 83, 
at 785-95 (explaining the history and evolution of the concept of goodwill in 
trademark law); see generally Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill:  A History of 
the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U.L. REV. 547 (2006). 
85 In the 1988 film Coming to America, comedian Eddie Murphy gets a job at a 
fast food restaurant called “McDowell’s.” Coming to America (Paramount 
Pictures 1988).  The ongoing legal conflict between McDonald’s and 
McDowell’s is a humorous subplot in the movie.  This conflict is summarized 
when the in-movie owner of McDowell’s, Cleo McDowell, states:  “Look . . . 
me and the McDonald’s people got this little misunderstanding.  See, they’re 
McDonald’s; I’m McDowell’s.  They got the Golden Arches; mine is the 
Golden Arcs.  They got the Big Mac; I got the Big Mick.  We both got two all-
beef patties, special sauce, lettuce, cheese, pickles and onions, but their buns 
have sesame seeds.  My buns have no seeds.”  Id. 
86 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (specifying that dilution is actionable “regardless 
of the presence of absence of actual or likely confusion”); see also Starbucks 
Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc. 588 F.3d 97, 109 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting 
that “the absence of actual or even of a likelihood of confusion does not 
undermine evidence of trademark dilution”); Franklin Mint Co. v. Manatt, 
Phelps & Phillips, LLP, 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 143, 170 (Cal. App. 2010) (“In the 
dilution context, likelihood of confusion is irrelevant.”).  
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mark holder’s goodwill has not suffered, because the consumer knows 
that the goods or services are coming from two distinct sources, and 
neither is owned or endorsed by the other.87 
Therefore, a claim for dilution by blurring does not further the 
policy goals of either preventing consumer fraud or preserving the mark 
owner’s goodwill.  Rather, the traditional justification for dilution by 
blurring focuses on the source identifying function of the mark and its 
ability to bolster economic efficiency in the marketplace.88  
Commentators have argued that trademarks function less efficiently in 
the marketplace if the consumer makes multiple associations with a 
given mark, rather than just one.  At least in theory, what Schechter 
characterized as the “uniqueness” of the famous mark is imperiled by 
these noninfringing uses.  Professors Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley 
give the following example: 
Blurring takes a formerly unique mark (say, Exxon), which 
consumers can associate with the mark owner without any 
necessary context, and applies it to unrelated products – say, Exxon 
pianos or Exxon carpets.  Even if the consumer understands that 
these different Exxons are unrelated, the proliferation of Exxon-
marked products may make it more difficult for consumers to figure 
out which company is responsible for any particular product.89 
                                                
87 As discussed infra, dilution by tarnishment proceeds on the theory that 
association with unsavory goods or services can damage a trademark holder’s 
reputation or goodwill, even when consumers are not likely to be confused and 
therefore understand that the senior user is not the source of, and does not 
endorse, the offensive goods or services.  See infra notes 116-127 and 
accompanying text. 
88 Judge Posner explained the consumer search cost rationale for dilution by 
blurring in Ty Inc. v. Perryman: “Suppose an upscale restaurant calls itself 
‘Tiffany.’  There is little danger that the consuming public will think it’s dealing 
with a branch of the Tiffany jewelry store if it patronizes this restaurant.  But 
when consumers next see the name ‘Tiffany’ they may think about both the 
restaurant and the jewelry store, and if so the efficacy of the name as an 
identifier of the store will be diminished. Consumers will have to think harder—
incur as it were a higher imagination cost—to recognize the name as the name of 
the store.”  Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002). 
89 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn 
from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1198 (2006) (emphasis added); 
see also Jerre B. Swann, Sr., Dilution Redefined for the Year 2000, 37 HOUS. L. 
REV. 729, 759 (2000) (defining dilution as “the difference between a brand with 
a meaning substantially in the abstract, and a brand with a substantial meaning 
only in context or after cueing”). 
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Dogan and Lemley conclude that blurring “can make it somewhat more 
difficult for consumers to associate a famous mark with its owner.”90 
 
The cause of action for dilution by blurring thus rests upon two 
critical assumptions: 1) using the same (or similar) marks on different 
goods or services, in contexts that will not support a cause of action for 
trademark infringement (because consumers are not likely to be 
confused), decreases consumers’ ability to “associate [the famous mark] 
with the mark owner without any necessary context”91; and 2) preserving 
consumers’ ability to identify the famous trademark with the holder of 
the mark, absent context, has value and should be protected.  Both of 
these statements are properly subject to substantial empirical challenge. 
The first conclusion—that imbuing a famous trademark with 
multiple meanings devalues or weakens the original definition of the 
mark—requires the belief that trademarks do not behave like other 
words.  Language is not immutable.92  Countless words in the English 
language have multiple meanings and, outside the trademark context, 
few would suggest that additional or even derivative meanings 
necessarily sap strength from the word’s original definition.93  Deven 
Desai and I have made a similar argument in the context of the 
                                                
90 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 89, at 1198; see also Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in 
Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 
516 (2008) (describing dilution theory, in cognitive terms, as a “tragedy of the 
mental commons, in which a consumer’s mind is overpopulated with meaning 
and her understanding of a brand descends into incoherence”); Stacey L. Dogan 
& Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 
HOUS. L. REV. 777, 790 (2004) (noting that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
focuses on uses that “increase consumer search costs” by blurring); Mark A. 
Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE 
L. J. 1687, 1704 n.90 (1999) (arguing that “[t]he information consumers can 
obtain and process is in part a function of how clear the association between 
mark and product remains in their minds; ‘clutter’ therefore imposes real costs 
on consumers”); see generally Shahar J. Dilbary, Famous Trademarks and the 
Rational Basis for Protecting “Irrational Beliefs,” 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 605 
(2007). 
91 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 89, at 1198.  
92 See Shawn M. Clankie, Brand Name Use in Creative Writing: Genericide or 
Language Right?, in PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN A POSTMODERN WORLD 253, 262 (Lide Buranen & Alice M. Roy 
eds., 1999) (“Language change and innovation are natural and, in general, 
unmanageable.”). 
93 In the trademark context, multiple definitions of the same word are assumed 
to have dilutive effect.  See, e.g., Swann, supra note 89, at 759 (noting that 
“[d]ilution equals the diffusion of a singular definition in the dictionary of 
commercial terms”). 
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genericism doctrine, reasoning that “unorthodox” uses of a trademark in 
noncommercial contexts should not necessarily indicate that a mark has 
fallen victim to genericide.  In that piece, we gave the following 
example: 
[T]he word ‘snow’ is defined as (1) ‘precipitation in the form of . . . 
white ice crystals’; (2) ‘a dessert made of stiffly beaten whites of 
eggs, sugar, and fruit pulp’; (3) cocaine or heroin; or (4) ‘to deceive, 
persuade, or charm glibly.’94  Even though definitions 2-4 are fairly 
clearly derived from the first definition of the word ‘snow,’ their 
existence does not undermine . . .  the validity of the word ‘snow’ as 
it refers to fluffy, white, frozen precipitation. We determine the 
meaning of the word by the context in which it is used.95 
If the word “snow” were a famous trademark used to sell frozen 
precipitation, dilution by blurring could prevent the use of the word 
“snow” in other contexts, e.g., to refer to a dessert, on the grounds that 
doing so would impede the word’s ability to identify the fluffy white 
stuff that is a form of precipitation rather than food.  Using the word to 
refer to cocaine or heroin would additionally support a cause of action 
for dilution by tarnishment.  Dilution laws presume that, unlike other 
words, trademarks are not resilient to multiple uses. 
Trademark law has traditionally tolerated multiple uses of the 
same word in unrelated contexts, so long as these uses are not likely to 
cause consumer confusion.  For example, United Airlines and United 
Van Lines have peacefully co-existed for years, as have marks like 
Champion spark plugs and Champion sportswear, Ace retail hardware 
stores and Ace bandages, Tropicana orange juice and the Tropicana Las 
Vegas hotel, and numerous others.96  Consumers use context to attach the 
appropriate meaning to the word being used, in commercial as well as 
noncommercial settings.  For example, if a person were instructed to 
                                                
94 WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1117 (1983). 
95 Desai & Rierson, supra note 17, at 1839. 
96 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 24:11 (4th ed. 2005) (listing “well-known examples” of marks 
that can “peacefully co-exist without confusion”).  A recent empirical study has 
shown that, in part due to the expansion of trademark infringement doctrine and 
anti-dilution law, brand sharing has declined significantly over the past fifty 
years.  Robert Brauneis & Paul Heald, Trademark Infringement, Trademark 
Dilution, and the Decline in Sharing of Famous Brands: An Introduction and 
Empirical Study, 59 BUFF. J. INT’L L. 141 (2011); Robert Brauneis & Paul 
Heald, The Myth of Buick Aspirin: An Empirical Study of Trademark Dilution by 
Product and Trade Names, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 255 (2011). 
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“make a reservation at the Tropicana,” that person would be highly 
unlikely to think about orange juice. 
Some empirical research has attempted to prove that the use of a 
famous trademark on an unrelated product does, in fact, impede the 
mark’s effectiveness as a source identifier for the original user of the 
mark.97  Maureen Morrin and Jacob Jacoby conducted a study in which 
consumers were exposed to allegedly dilutive ads that used famous 
trademarks in unfamiliar contexts, e.g., Heineken popcorn and Hyatt 
legal services.98  The consumers were then asked to identify the senior 
user’s mark, e.g., Heineken beer and Hyatt hotels.99  The results of the 
study were inconsistent between these two brands.  The study showed 
that exposure to dilutive ads, as compared to exposure to unrelated ads, 
increased the amount of time required to identify the proper mark by 125 
milliseconds (increasing the response time from 645 milliseconds to 770 
milliseconds), as to the Heineken brand.100  However, exposure to 
dilutive ads had no measurable negative impact on response rates with 
regard to the Hyatt brand.  In fact, response rates of study participants 
who were exposed to dilutive ads were 130 milliseconds faster than those 
of participants exposed to unrelated ones (decreasing the response time 
from 810 milliseconds to 680 milliseconds).101 
Although these studies are frequently cited as empirical evidence 
of a dilutive effect, their findings are less than convincing.  The impact 
identified by these studies, even taken at face value, is objectively 
minimal, literally measured in milliseconds.102  As Professor Daniel 
Klerman has argued, an increase in response time of 125 milliseconds 
(approximately one-tenth of a second), as in the Heineken example, is 
not economically significant.103 Moreover, the study results also 
                                                
97 Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution: Empirical Measures 
for an Elusive Concept, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 265 (2000). 
98 Id. at 268.  
99 Id. at 268–69.    
100 Id. at 269. 
101 Id.  
102 Id. at 269–70.   
103 Daniel Klerman, Trademark Dilution, Search Costs, and Naked Licensing, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1759, 1765 (2006).  Klerman calculates that, at the rate of 
$250 an hour, the increase in search costs shown in the Heineken example 
would amount to less than a cent.  Id.  Some dilution proponents argue that even 
milliseconds of delay in associating a mark with its proper product are 
substantial enough to affect consumer purchasing decisions and therefore such 
delays cause real economic harm to trademark holders.  See Tushnet, supra note 
90, at 522 n.68 (citing a study demonstrating that “dilution-generated delayed 
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demonstrate that the dilutive effect, even measured in milliseconds, does 
not impact all marks equally and should not be presumed.  In the Hyatt 
example, for instance, exposure to dilutive ads appeared to reinforce 
rather than undermine the brand’s distinctiveness.  These findings tend to 
suggest, and Morrin and Jacoby have concluded, that the strongest, or 
most “famous” trademarks are more resilient and therefore less likely to 
suffer a dilutive effect,104 which is somewhat ironic given that those 
marks are the only ones entitled to protection from dilution.105 
Another limitation of the study derives from the examples of 
dilution by blurring that it utilized.  The facts supporting a dilution claim 
are typically not as clear-cut as those shown to survey respondents in the 
Morrin and Jacoby study.  The 2006 amendments to the federal dilution 
statute (the TDRA) have been interpreted by the circuit courts to de-
emphasize mark similarity.106  Marks like “Heineken popcorn” and 
“Hyatt legal services,” which employ direct copies of famous marks on 
unrelated goods or services, are simply not the typical dilution case.107 
Another question not addressed by this study is whether the 
effect measured in the laboratory persists in real-life commercial settings.  
As discussed above, when determining the meaning and the effectiveness 
of language, the power of context is difficult to overstate.108  The law and 
                                                                                                         
response” is correlated with decreased probability that subjects would later 
choose the diluted brand).    
104 Morrin & Jacoby, supra note 97, at 270-71.  Morrin and Jacoby found that 
“very strong brands are immune to dilution because their memory connections 
are so strong that it is difficult for consumers to alter or create new ones with the 
same brand name.”  Id. at 274; see also Klerman, supra note 103, at 1765 (citing 
Morrin’s study as indicating some strong brands may be more “resistant to 
harm”).     
105 See Barton Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution 
Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 1143, 1162–63 (2006). 
106 See infra notes 142–186 and accompanying text.  
107 The Morrin and Jacoby study examined one mark (Dogiva Dog Biscuits) that 
was not identical to the famous mark that it theoretically diluted (Godiva 
Chocolates).  The Dogiva ad was included in the study to provide an example of 
tarnishment.  Morrin & Jacoby, supra note 97, at 268.  The study suggested that 
exposure to Dogiva Dog Biscuits delayed the study participant’s ability to 
identify Godiva Chocolates by 73 milliseconds, if the participant had not been 
previously exposed to ads for Godiva chocolate.  Curiously, when survey 
participants were exposed to Godiva and Dogiva ads, the delay in their response 
times increased to 129 milliseconds.  Id. at 269. 
108 Tushnet, supra note 90, at 529–32 (discussing the impact of context in terms 
of the source-identifying power of trademarks and words in general).  As 
Tushnet succinctly concludes, “When context is king, dilution loses much of its 
theoretical appeal.”  Id. at 529. 
243 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW [Vol. 11 
economics explanation of trademark law is based on the notion that 
trademarks function as source identifiers in the commercial marketplace.  
A mark’s ability to act as a source identifier for the consumer outside 
that context, or in no context at all (a situation which is more likely to 
exist, if at all, in a controlled study rather than any ordinary consumer 
experience), is of questionable value.109  The aim of trademark law is not 
(and should not be) to preserve a mark’s ability to identify a particular 
source in the abstract, outside the realm of commerce and indeed devoid 
of any context at all. 
Context is crucial because trademarks are words—even though 
they are words that simultaneously function as valuable corporate 
assets—and therefore do not behave in the same manner as more tangible 
forms of “property.”  Dilution by blurring stems from the premise that a 
trademark is essentially a rivalrous good:  one that is depleted by use.  
Any child will tell you (in so many words) that candy, for example, is a 
rivalrous good.  If one child takes a bite of a chocolate bar, then there is 
less chocolate to go around for everyone else.  If everyone helps 
themselves to the chocolate, even by small bites, eventually the chocolate 
is gone.  Dilution assumes that the source identifying capacity of a 
trademark similarly functions as a rivalrous good.  In theory, the famous 
mark has a finite amount of source identifying capacity, which is 
depleted by non-infringing (yet commercial) uses on unrelated goods and 
services. 
Trademarks, by contrast, may well be nonrivalrous goods.110  
Nonrivalrous goods, like information or scientific research, can be 
                                                
109 As linguist Roger Shuy has written, “[w]ords in isolation seldom occur in our 
lives, except in spelling bees and grocery lists. Since humans commonly use 
context to disambiguate and figure out what is meant, it is reasonable to expect 
them to keep on doing this with trademarks.”  Roger Shuy, Linguistic Thoughts 
on Trademark Dilution, 5-6 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
author).  See also Klerman, supra note 103, at 1765–66 (observing that 
“[c]onsumers just do not confront trademarks in the abstract very often, and, 
when they do, context usually makes the product category obvious”). 
110 As Professor Boyle explains, “Unlike the earthly commons, the commons of 
the mind is generally ‘non-rival.’  Many uses of land are mutually exclusive.  If 
I am using the field for grazing, it may interfere with your plans to use it for 
growing crops.  By contrast, a gene sequence, an MP3 file, or an image may be 
used by multiple parties; my use does not interfere with yours.  To simplify a 
complicated analysis, this means that the threat of overuse of fields and fisheries 
is generally not a problem with the informational or innovational commons.”  
James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the 
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 41 (2003); see also Sonia 
Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1601, 1663, 1695 
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“consumed” by multiple people at the same time, without depletion and 
at low cost per additional consumer.  Outside the context of trademark 
law, words or language would almost certainly be characterized as 
nonrivalrous.  Words are not depleted and do not lose their expressive 
meaning due to overuse.  In fact, the opposite is true: if the population 
stops using a word, its meaning may be permanently lost. Entire 
languages have died or become extinct due to lack of use.111  Moreover, 
some evidence suggests that repetition of a word actually reinforces 
(rather than detracts from) its meaning.112  Nor does the existence of 
homonyms (as in the case of the word “snow” discussed above) 
necessarily indicate that the word’s primary or original definition is 
weak.  The question is whether famous trademarks, which are both 
language and valued assets, behave more like words or tangible property 
in terms of their rivalrous or nonrivalrous characteristics. 
Because trademarks are words, there is a strong argument that 
trademarks largely function like other words and therefore can be used in 
multiple contexts simultaneously, without depletion.  Trademarks are 
less likely to behave like real estate or some other form of tangible 
property that is necessarily dissipated through use.  Moreover, even 
assuming that the source-identifying function of a trademark is “whittled 
away” by allegedly diluting uses, the resulting chips are infinitesimally 
small, which is why trademark holders are not required to prove damages 
to prevail on a dilution claim.113  If proof of actual damages were 
required, the cause of action would almost certainly be practically 
meaningless.114  Trademark holders may be unable to prove damages in 
these types of cases because they simply do not have any.115 
                                                                                                         
(2010); Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and 
Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 946 (2005). 
111 See generally K. DAVID HARRISON, WHEN LANGUAGES DIE: THE 
EXTINCTION OF THE WORLD'S LANGUAGES AND THE EROSION OF HUMAN 
KNOWLEDGE (2007). 
112 See Tushnet, supra note 90, at 536 (describing one study as suggesting that 
“dilution does not harm many famous trademarks because adding associations to 
low-frequency words does not interfere with retrieval or recognition – and may 
even help”); see also id. at 540 (“By adding branches to a trademark’s mental 
tree, multiple associations make it bigger, which improves availability in a well-
forested mind.”) 
113 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006) (cause of action for dilution does not depend 
on “the presence or absence of . . . actual economic injury”); see also Miss. 
Code Ann. § 75-25-1 (2011) (same). 
114 Although the Supreme Court initially interpreted the FTDA to require proof 
of “actual dilution,” it specified that, under this standard, plaintiffs were not 
required to prove “the consequences of dilution, such as an actual loss of sales 
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2. Dilution by Tarnishment  
The TDRA also prohibits use of a trademark that is “likely to 
cause dilution by tarnishment [of a famous mark].”116  Dilution by 
tarnishment is further defined as a use that “harms the reputation of the 
famous mark.”117  The language of the statute itself provides no further 
guidance as to what constitutes an actionable claim for dilution by 
tarnishment.  Dilution by blurring and dilution by tarnishment are similar 
in that, as to both causes of action, the plaintiff need not prove likelihood 
of consumer confusion, actual economic injury, or actual dilution.118  
Moreover, both causes of action stem from the consuming public’s 
“association” of the junior user’s mark with that of the senior user.  
However, in a claim for dilution by tarnishment, the association between 
the two marks is actionable not because it harms the mark’s 
distinctiveness, but because, in theory, it harms the mark owner’s 
goodwill.  As stated by the Second Circuit, “[t]he sine qua non of 
tarnishment is a finding that plaintiff's mark will suffer negative 
associations through defendant’s use.”119 
Dilution via tarnishment arguably increases consumer search 
costs in the same manner as a claim for dilution by blurring:  by 
                                                                                                         
or profits.”  Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003).  The 
revised statute, the TDRA, changed the standard of proof to one of likelihood of 
dilution and specifies that plaintiffs are not required to prove any “actual 
economic injury.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(1) (2006).  The Subcommittee on 
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, in 2004 and 2005, heard 
testimony from a representative of the International Trademark Association, 
who argued that the “actual dilution” standard established in Moseley was too 
burdensome for trademark holders: “By the time measurable, provable damage 
to the mark has occurred much time has passed, the damage has been done, and 
the remedy, which is injunctive relief, is far less effective.”  H.R. Rep. No. 109-
23, at 5 (2006), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1091, 1093–94. 
115 Professor Farley has also proffered this explanation: “Let me suggest that 
trademark owners desire a likelihood of dilution standard rather than an actual 
dilution standard because they cannot prove actual dilution.  There is a good 
reason that trademark owners cannot prove actual dilution.  My thesis is that 
there is no such harm; it does not exist . . . .  The main problem with dilution law 
is that it provides a remedy without a supportable theorization of the harm.”  
Christine Haight Farley, Why We are Confused about the Trademark Dilution 
Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1175, 1184 (2006).  
116 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(1). 
117 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(2)(C). 
118 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(1). 
119 Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 
1996).  
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diminishing the mark’s capacity as a source identifier.120  However, 
tarnishment is more commonly associated with an alternative policy 
justification for trademark law, the preservation of the mark owner’s 
goodwill.121  Unlike the injury suffered by a mark holder in a case of 
trademark infringement, the alleged injury to goodwill targeted by a 
cause of action for dilution by tarnishment is indirect, due to the lack of 
consumer confusion.  The tarnishment claim arises from the fear that the 
famous trademark holder will suffer guilt by (admittedly indirect) 
association.  In other words, the theory is that even though the consumer 
is unlikely to think that the trademark holder is the source of the junior 
user’s unsavory or inferior product or service, she will nonetheless no 
longer have uniformly positive associations with the original trademark 
as a result of her exposure to the tarnishing use.122  In a case of 
tarnishment, the consumer’s distaste for the unsavory or inferior product 
has “rubbed off” on the famous trademark, thereby damaging it.123 
The concept of dilution by tarnishment has more intuitive appeal 
than the claim of dilution by blurring and therefore has proved to be less 
controversial (although not without its critics).124  Even if we assume that 
the tarnishment phenomenon of guilt by association does in fact occur, 
however, we still must wrestle with the difficult question of how it 
                                                
120 See Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002) (characterizing 
tarnishment as “a second form of dilution,” reasoning that “[a]nalytically it is a 
subset of blurring, since it reduces the distinctness of the trademark as a signifier 
of the trademarked product or service”); see generally Layne T. Smith, 
Comment, Tarnishment and the FTDA: Lessening the Capacity to Identify and 
Distinguish, 2004 BYU L. REV. 825, 850–60 (2004). 
121 See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.  
122 Judge Posner explains the tarnishment phenomenon with the following 
example: Suppose a “striptease joint” adopts the name “Tiffany.”  “[C]onsumers 
will not think the striptease joint [is] under common ownership with the jewelry 
store.  But because of the inveterate tendency of the human mind to proceed by 
association, every time they think of the word ‘Tiffany’ their image of the fancy 
jewelry store will be tarnished by the association of the word with the strip 
joint.”  Ty Inc., 306 F.3d at 511.  
123 See Tushnet, supra note 90, at 522-23 (noting that “emotion drives cognition, 
meaning that negative associations may do real, even measurable harm” to a 
trademark holder, describing such associations as “poisoned fruit”); see also 
Stacey L. Dogan & Marc Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or 
Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 494 (2005) (describing dilution by 
tarnishment as a form of “subconscious pollution”).  
124 See generally Jessica Taran, Dilution by Tarnishment: A Case for Vulgar 
Humor, 7 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1 (2002); Regina Schaffer-Goldman, Note, 
Cease-and-Desist:  Tarnishment’s Blunt Sword in its Battle against the 
Unseemly, the Unwholesome, and the Unsavory, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 1241 (2010). 
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should be proven.  Like dilution by blurring, the theory behind the cause 
of action for dilution by tarnishment is that tarnishing uses of a 
trademark cause the trademark holder an economic harm, albeit such a 
minor one that it may not be measurable in an individual case.  Proving 
that consumers’ exposure to an allegedly tarnishing use of a famous 
trademark has negatively impacted their opinion of the mark, or the 
opposite (lack of tarnishing effect), can be difficult if not impossible, at 
least not without spending large sums of money for experts and survey 
consultants. 
In most cases, of course, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving 
its case.  However, in tarnishment cases involving uses of a mark related 
to sex or the illegal use of drugs, courts rarely require trademark holders 
to prove harm to sustain a claim of dilution by tarnishment.  In fact, 
courts have adopted a virtual per se rule regarding uses of trademarks in 
contexts involving pornography, finding almost uniformly that such uses 
tarnish the image of the mark holder.125  On the other hand, when the 
allegedly tarnishing use is a non-vulgar parody or generally does not 
relate in any way to sex or the illegal use of drugs, the dilution plaintiff is 
less likely to prevail.126 
                                                
125 See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinemas, Ltd., 604 
F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1979) (enjoining use of Dallas Cowboy cheerleader 
uniforms in a pornographic film); Kraft Foods Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. 
Supp. 2d 942, 948–50 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (holding that pornographic website’s use 
of the mark “VelVeeda” was likely to tarnish the Velveeta trademark); 
Victoria’s Cyber Secret Ltd. P’ship v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 
1339, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (holding that defendants’ use of domain names 
“victoriassexsecret.com” and “victoriassexysecret.com” to sell “entertainment of 
a lascivious nature suitable only for adults” was likely to tarnish the Victoria’s 
Secret trademark).  When a defendant uses sexual imagery, particularly 
pornography, to mock the trademark holder or the mark itself in a manner that 
might otherwise be considered a parody, courts are typically not amused.  See, 
e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 125, 126, 134 (N.D. 
Ga. 1981) (enjoining use of Pillsbury Doughboy character in magazine which 
featured the Doughboy in various sexual positions); but see Burnett v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962, 972 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (dismissing 
claim of dilution by tarnishment by actress Carol Burnett based on lewd 
portrayal of her “Charwoman” character in an episode of the cartoon Family 
Guy, on grounds that use of Burnett’s character was noncommercial parody). 
126 See, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 506, 
508 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding defendant’s use of wild boar puppet named 
“Spa’am” in the movie Muppett Treasure Island did not dilute or tarnish the 
SPAM trademark (for lunch meat)).  See also infra notes 223–228 and 
accompanying text (discussing Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity 
Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007)).  
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Proof of dilution by tarnishment, like dilution by blurring, is 
perhaps elusive because, at least in the typical case, no dilution has 
occurred.  In other words, the trademark holder probably cannot prove 
that he has been harmed because, in fact, he has not been harmed.  Even 
if he has suffered some economic harm, it may well be minute.  
However, as noted above, the burden of proof in these cases seems to be 
shifting from the plaintiff to the defendant.  Although the TDRA purports 
to prevent unauthorized uses of a famous mark that are likely to “cause 
dilution” of it, it has eliminated the plaintiff’s duty to prove economic 
harm altogether.127 
D.  The Expansion of Dilution Protection 
At least initially, state legislatures and the United States 
Congress adopted the dilution cause of action to combat the problem of 
“hypothetical anomalies” such as “Dupont shoes, Buick aspirin tablets, 
Schlitz varnish, Kodak pianos, [and] Bulova gowns.”128  Schechter, in 
theorizing the need for a dilution cause of action, cited similar examples:  
“[i]f ‘Kodak’ may be used for bath tubs and cakes, ‘Mazda’ for cameras 
and shoes, or ‘Ritz-Carlton’ for coffee, these marks must inevitably be 
lost in the commonplace words of the language, despite the originality 
and ingenuity in their contrivance, and the vast expenditures in 
advertising them . . . .”129  In other words, the cause of action was 
considered necessary to combat the perceived harm caused by the use of 
well-known trademarks to sell unrelated goods by someone other than 
the owner of the well-known trademark.  Trademark holders arguably 
needed the dilution cause of action to prevent such uses, because they 
fell outside the scope of trademark infringement law.  Even today, courts 
consider the proximity of goods when determining whether consumers 
are likely to be confused by defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s 
trademark.130  Like the trademark infringement standard, the modern 
                                                
127 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006).  
128 Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 
1031 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting the legislative history of New York’s state dilution 
statute).  The United States Congress similarly cited “DUPONT shoes, BUICK 
aspirin, and KODAK pianos” as hypothetical misuses of a trademark that a 
federal dilution cause of action would combat.  H.R. Rep. 104-374, at 3 (1996), 
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030 (legislative history of Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act).  
129 Schechter, supra note 7, at 830.  Schechter’s statement here blurs the 
concepts of dilution and genericide, portraying the ultimate “death” of the 
trademark as the inevitable result of unchecked dilution.  See Desai & Rierson, 
supra note 17, at 1842–44 (discussing the link between the dilution and 
genericide doctrines). 
130 See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.  
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dilution doctrine has evolved far beyond its historical roots and the stated 
reasons for its existence. 
The current version of the federal trademark dilution statute, the 
TDRA, prohibits the use of any “famous” mark that is “likely to cause 
dilution by blurring.”131  A “famous” mark is defined by statute as one 
which is “widely recognized by the general consuming public of the 
United States” as a designation of source.132  The Act defines dilution by 
blurring as an “association arising from the similarity between a mark or 
trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the 
famous mark.”133  The TDRA does not require proof of “actual dilution,” 
in contrast to the 1995 version of the Act (as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court).134  The Act lists six non-exclusive factors that courts may 
consider in determining whether dilution by blurring is likely to occur.135 
The TDRA also includes a cause of action for “dilution by 
tarnishment,” which is defined as an “association arising from the 
similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms 
                                                
131 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). 
132 Id. at § 1125(c)(2)(A).  The statute identifies four non-exclusive factors for 
courts to consider in determining whether a mark is “famous.”  Id. at § 
1125(c)(2)(A)(i)-(iv).  The TDRA narrowed the scope of famousness, as 
compared to the FTDA, by attempting to eliminate marks that had achieved only 
niche fame or regional fame from the scope of dilution protection.  See, e.g., 
Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Fame Law:  Requiring Proof of National Fame in 
Trademark Law, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 89, 94 (2011) (noting that the fame 
requirement “functions as a gatekeeper to prevent widespread treating of 
trademarks purely as property in trademark jurisprudence”). 
133 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B).   State dilution statutes have largely adopted the 
same definition of “dilution by blurring.”  See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 
14202(l) (West 2008) (defining “dilution by blurring” as an “association arising 
from the similarity between a mark or a trade name and a famous mark that 
impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-25-
1(l) (West 2011) (same); ALA. CODE 1975 § 8-12-6(3) (2012) (same).  
134 See infra notes 156–160 and accompanying text. 
135 The Act provides that courts may consider “all relevant factors” in 
“determining whether a mark or trade name is likely to cause dilution by 
blurring,” including (but presumably not limited to) (1) “[t]he degree of 
similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous mark”; (2) “[t]he 
degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark”; (3) “[t]he 
extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in substantially 
exclusive use of the mark”; (4) “[t]he degree of recognition of the famous 
mark”; (5) “[w]hether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an 
association with the famous mark”; and (6) “[a]ny actual association between 
the mark or trade name and the famous mark.”  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i)–
(vi). 
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the reputation of the famous mark.”136  The 1995 version of the statute, 
the FTDA, did not explicitly prohibit dilution by tarnishment, although it 
was generally interpreted as having that effect.137  Unlike a cause of 
action for dilution by blurring, the TDRA suggests no specific factors for 
a court to consider when determining whether dilution by tarnishment 
has occurred. 
The TDRA also identifies certain types of trademark use that are 
not actionable:  1) fair use, 2) news reporting, and 3) noncommercial 
use.138  Unlike the FTDA, the TDRA specifically includes parodies or 
criticism of a famous trademark within its definition of “fair use.”139  
However, the TDRA excludes from fair use protection any use of a mark 
that serves as a “designation of source” for the defendant’s “own goods 
or services.”140 
Although commentators initially heralded the TDRA as a 
“sensible and progressive reform of American federal antidilution 
protection,”141 it has expanded the dilution cause of action in some ways 
that were perhaps unanticipated by its drafters.  Under the TDRA’s 
likelihood of dilution standard, particularly as the courts have interpreted 
it, proof of association between plaintiff’s and defendant’s respective 
marks has become tantamount to proof of dilution.  Even when the 
competing marks are not substantially similar, proof of association may 
be enough to avoid summary judgment on a dilution claim. The TDRA 
also allows claims for dilution of trade dress and lawsuits between 
                                                
136 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C).  
137 Compare Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432 (2003) 
(noting the absence of any direct reference to tarnishment in the FTDA and 
questioning whether the statute actually embraced this cause of action, despite 
references to tarnishment in the legislative history), with Kraft Foods Holdings, 
Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d 942, 948–50 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (holding that 
pornographic website’s use of the mark “VelVeeda” was likely to tarnish the 
Velveeta trademark, in violation of the FTDA); Victoria's Cyber Secret Ltd. 
P’ship v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2001) 
(holding that defendants’ use of domain names “victoriassexsecret.com” and 
“victoriassexysecret.com” to sell “entertainment of a lascivious nature suitable 
only for adults” was likely to tarnish the Victoria’s Secret trademark, in 
violation of the FTDA).  
138 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3).     
139 Id. at § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii).     
140 Id. at § 1125(c)(3)(A).     
141 Beebe, supra note 105, at 1144; see also Jennifer Files Beerline, Note, Anti-
Dilution Law, New and Improved: The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 
2006, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 511, 513 (concluding that, “while imperfect, the 
TDRA is a vast improvement over the FTDA”).  
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competitors, which again draws dilution away from the narrowly 
prescribed paradigm that it was initially intended to address. 
1. The Decline in Relevance of Mark Similarity and the Increase in 
Significance of Mark Association 
The hypothetical case envisioned by the legislatures that enacted 
dilution statutes was one in which a defendant copied, essentially 
verbatim, a well-known trademark and used it to sell his own (unrelated) 
goods or services, thereby diluting the distinctiveness of the well-known 
trademark.142  Although imagined cases of “Buick aspirin” and “Dupont 
shoes” may be the inspiration for dilution law,143 they bear little 
resemblance to most of the published cases in which a defendant’s use of 
plaintiff’s trademark has been found to dilute but not infringe, 
particularly under the TDRA.   In the majority of cases, the mark used by 
the defendant is not identical to the plaintiff’s famous trademark.  Rather, 
defendant’s use of the mark is better characterized as a play on words 
deriving from plaintiff’s famous trademark.  In far too many cases, 
evidence of “mental association” between plaintiff’s and defendant’s 
marks has become tantamount to proof of dilution itself. 
When Congress amended the Act and passed the TDRA, it 
modified the statutory language in a manner that effectively decreased 
the importance of mark similarity and increased the relevance of mark 
association in dilution cases.  It did so largely in response to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Moseley, which interpreted the former version of the 
federal dilution statute, the FTDA.  In this case, the Supreme Court held 
that, when the competing marks were not identical, the plaintiff had to 
prove more than mere association between them to demonstrate that 
defendant had “impaired the distinctiveness” of and thereby diluted 
plaintiff’s famous trademark.144 The “actual dilution” standard articulated 
in Moseley was roundly criticized by the holders of famous 
trademarks.145 
In Moseley, the plaintiff, owner of the admittedly famous 
Victoria’s Secret trademark, sued Victor and Cathy Moseley, proprietors 
                                                
142 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.  
143 See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 
1026, 1031 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting the legislative history of New York’s state 
dilution statute). 
144 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003). 
145 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. 6 (2005) (statement of Anne Gundelfinger on behalf of the 
International Trademark Association (INTA)). 
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of a business named “Victor’s Little Secret,” for trademark infringement 
and dilution.146  The trial court granted summary judgment on plaintiff’s 
trademark infringement and unfair competition claims, finding that the 
Moseleys’ use of the mark “Victor’s Little Secret” created no likelihood 
of consumer confusion.147  However, the trial court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Victoria’s Secret on the dilution claim, and the 
Sixth Circuit affirmed.148  The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, 
holding that evidence of “association” between the two marks was 
insufficient to prove dilution. 
Plaintiff introduced only one piece of evidence that its famous 
trademark had been diluted and tarnished by the Moseleys’ use of the 
name “Victor’s Little Secret.”  An army colonel, who happened upon an 
advertisement for the grand opening of the Moseleys’ store, “was 
offended by what he perceived to be an attempt to use a reputable 
company’s trademark to promote the sale of ‘unwholesome, tawdry 
merchandise,’” and therefore sent a copy of the ad to Victoria’s Secret.149  
The Supreme Court observed that the colonel’s “mental association” 
between Victor’s Little Secret and Victoria’s Secret did not impair the 
distinctiveness of or tarnish the Victoria’s Secret trademark: 
There is a complete absence of evidence of any lessening of the 
capacity of the VICTORIA’S SECRET mark to identify and 
distinguish goods or services sold in Victoria's Secret stores or 
advertised in its catalogs. The officer was offended by the ad, but it 
did not change his conception of Victoria’s Secret. His offense was 
directed entirely at petitioners, not at respondents.150 
The Court in Moseley specifically rejected the notion that mere 
association between non-identical marks was sufficient to prove dilution.  
In reaching this conclusion, it commented upon an earlier Fourth Circuit 
opinion holding that a slogan adopted by the state of Utah, “The Greatest 
Snow on Earth,” did not dilute the famous slogan of the Ringling 
                                                
146 Moseley, 537 U.S. at 422.  The name of the store was originally “Victor’s 
Secret,” but the Moseleys changed the name after receiving a letter from 
plaintiff’s lawyer indicating that plaintiff believed that the name both infringed 
and diluted its federally registered trademark.  Id. at 423. 
147 Id. at 425.  Plaintiff did not appeal the court’s ruling on the trademark 
infringement and unfair competition claims.  Id. at 428.  
148 Id. at 425.  
149 Id. at 423.  The advertisement in question promoted the sale of “‘Intimate 
Lingerie for every woman’; ‘Romantic Lighting’; ‘Lycra Dresses’; ‘Pagers’; and 
‘Adult Novelties/Gifts.’”  Id. 
150 Id. at 434. 
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Brothers Barnum & Bailey Circus, “The Greatest Show on Earth.”151  
The Supreme Court endorsed the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that 
Ringling Brothers had not proved dilution merely because it had shown 
that Utah’s slogan, which admittedly was not identical to “The Greatest 
Show on Earth,” nonetheless invoked an association with it: 
[M]ental association will not necessarily reduce the capacity of the 
famous mark to identify the goods of its owner, the statutory 
requirement for dilution under the FTDA.  For even though Utah 
drivers may be reminded of the circus when they see a license plate 
referring to the ‘greatest snow on earth,’ it by no means follows that 
they will associate ‘the greatest show on earth’ with skiing or snow 
sports, or associate it less strongly or exclusively with the circus.  
‘Blurring’ is not a necessary consequence of mental association. 
(Nor, for that matter, is ‘tarnishing.’)152 
The FTDA, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, therefore made 
it difficult for a plaintiff to prove dilution of a famous trademark in cases 
where the marks in question were not identical, even if plaintiff could 
show that consumers “associated” the defendant’s mark with that of the 
plaintiff.153  In the wake of Moseley, many courts held that “[a] plaintiff 
cannot prevail on a state or federal dilution claim unless the marks at 
issue are ‘very’ or ‘substantially similar.’”154  Although Moseley may 
have temporarily sounded the death knell for dilution cases involving 
non-identical marks, the impact of the decision was decidedly short 
lived.  Congress amended the federal trademark dilution statute, largely 
                                                
151 170 F.3d 449, 463 (4th Cir. 1999).  
152 Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433–34.  
153 Id. at 434 (noting that the customer “did not change his conception of 
Victoria’s Secret,” despite being “offended by the ad”).  In dicta, the Court 
suggested that, if the junior and senior marks were “identical,” the plaintiff 
would have “circumstantial evidence” of actual dilution.  Id.  
154 Playtex Prods., Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.  390 F.3d 158, 167 (2d Cir. 
2004); see also Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 905 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (referring to the “recently-established requirement that for a dilution 
claim to succeed, the mark used by the alleged diluter must be identical, or 
nearly identical, to the protected mark”); Fed. Express Corp. v. Fed. Espresso, 
Inc., 201 F.3d 168, 176 (2d Cir. 2000) (same); Luigino’s, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 
170 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 1999) (“To support an action for dilution by 
blurring, the marks must at least be similar enough that a significant segment of 
the target group of customers sees the two marks as essentially the same.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
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in response to the Moseley decision, and redefined the standard of proof 
in these cases. 155 
Under the TDRA, a plaintiff need only prove a likelihood of 
dilution to prevail on a claim seeking injunctive relief.156  The Act directs 
courts to consider “all relevant factors” in assessing likelihood of 
dilution.157  However, it identifies only six “relevant” factors, and in 
practice the vast majority of courts confine their analysis to these six 
factors.  Three of the six factors relate to the overall strength of the 
plaintiff’s mark, and, in that sense, overlie the factors considered relevant 
to determine whether the mark is famous.158  The remaining three factors 
relate to (1) the degree of similarity between the marks, (2) defendant’s 
intent to create an association with the famous mark (or lack thereof), 
and (3) any evidence of “actual association” between the marks.159  The 
impact of these statutory amendments, at least in comparison to the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FTDA, has been to de-emphasize 
the importance of mark similarity160 and to increase the significance of 
evidence of “association” between the two marks. 
Professor Thomas McCarthy has characterized the six TDRA 
factors as “both incomplete and misleading” because none of them 
“directs attention to the crucial issue: is there a likelihood that this 
defendant’s mark is likely to be a use that ‘impairs the distinctiveness of 
                                                
155 See, e.g., Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 104 
(2d Cir. 2009) (noting that the TDRA was passed “in response to” the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Moseley).  
156 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006). 
157 Id. at § 1125(c)(2)(B). 
158 These factors include “[t]he degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of 
the famous mark”; “[t]he extent to which the owner of the famous mark is 
engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark”; and “[t]he degree of 
recognition of the famous mark.”  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(ii)–(iv).  These 
factors are essentially identical to three of the “famousness” factors listed in the 
former version of the statute, the FTDA.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(A), (F)–
(G) (superseded). 
159 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(v)–(vi). 
160 Some early post-TDRA cases suggested, and some commentators have 
argued, that the “identical mark presumption” should persist in the face of the 
TDRA’s revised statutory language.  See, e.g., Jeremy M. Roe, Note, The 
Current State of Antidilution Law: The Trademark Dilution Revision Act and the 
Identical Mark Presumption, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 571, 590 (2008) (arguing that 
“courts should strictly enforce the use of the identical mark presumption”). 
However, post-TDRA case law appears to be trending in the opposite direction. 
See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 
1158, 1166–71 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing and distinguishing earlier post-TDRA 
cases).  
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the famous mark?’”161  He concludes that, “[l]ike a signpost pointing in 
the wrong direction, the list of factors directs attention away from the 
key issue of whether there is a likelihood of damage to the famous 
mark.”162  In the wake of the TDRA, few courts require dilution plaintiffs 
to prove much beyond the mere fact that consumers “associate” 
defendant’s mark with that of the plaintiff, even when the marks in 
question are far from identical. 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s 
Borough Coffee, Inc.163 illustrates many of the changes arising from the 
TDRA.  In this case, the owner of another undeniably famous trademark, 
Starbucks, sued a small business, Black Bear Microroastery (“Black 
Bear”), for federal trademark infringement, dilution, and related state law 
claims.164  Black Bear was sued because it sold a dark roasted coffee 
under the name “Charbucks Blend” and “Mr. Charbucks” (the 
“Charbucks marks”).165  The trial court, after a bench trial, ruled in favor 
of Black Bear, finding no likelihood of confusion and no likelihood of 
dilution under federal or state law.166  The Second Circuit affirmed the 
judgment as to the trademark infringement claim, but reversed and 
remanded on the claim asserted under the TDRA.167 
In the Starbucks case, the district court determined that the two 
trademarks in question, Starbucks and Charbucks, were only “minimally 
similar” due to the differences in the context in which they were 
presented to the consumer (e.g., packaging and logos).168  The court of 
appeals agreed.169  The Second Circuit nonetheless reversed the trial 
court’s decision in part because the trial court had given too much weight 
to the similarity factor.  The circuit court reasoned that if Congress had 
wanted to require “substantial similarity” between the competing marks 
to establish a dilution claim, it would have put those words in the TDRA, 
                                                
161 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 24:119 (2011).   
162 Id. 
163 Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2009).   
164 Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 472, 474 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).  
165 Starbucks Corp., 588 F.3d at 103.  
166 Id. at 104.  
167 Id. at 109, 119.  The original lawsuit against Black Bear was filed under the 
1995 version of the Act, the FTDA.  However, the revised Act (TDRA) went 
into effect after the bench trial in the case, and the case was reviewed under the 
TDRA by the Second Circuit on appeal.  Id. at 104. 
168 Id. at 106–07 (describing differences between the two trademarks). 
169 Id. 
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and it did not do so.170  In other words, because Congress did nothing to 
indicate that the “degree of mark similarity” was more important than the 
other listed factors, the trial court could not give it special weight.  The 
Ninth Circuit has reached the same conclusion.171 
The Second Circuit in Starbucks also critiqued the district court 
for giving too little weight to the evidence presented regarding 
“association” between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks.  Although 
the court found that Black Bear did have an “intent to associate” its 
coffee with Starbucks, it did not weigh that factor in favor of a likelihood 
of dilution finding because it determined that Black Bear did not act “in 
bad faith.”172  The Second Circuit noted that the TDRA does not require 
or even mention evidence of “bad faith” in the context of this factor, and 
it was therefore error to consider it.173  Similarly, it held that the district 
court erred in failing to take into account evidence of “actual 
association” between the two marks.  That evidence was a survey finding 
that 30.5% of 600 consumers surveyed thought of “Starbucks” when they 
heard the name “Charbucks.”174  That evidence of actual association, 
under the TDRA, was significant.  In some district court cases, courts 
have issued injunctive relief when the only proof of dilution, other than 
some similarity between the marks, has been defendant’s intent to 
associate with the famous mark of the plaintiff.175 
                                                
170 See id. at 108 (finding it significant that “the federal dilution statute does not 
use the words ‘very’ or ‘substantial’ in connection with the similarity factor”). 
171 See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158, 
1172 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that “the plain language of 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(c) does not require that a plaintiff establish that the junior mark is 
identical, nearly identical or substantially similar to the senior mark in order to 
obtain injunctive relief”).  In this case, the district court dismissed the dilution 
claim because the advisory jury found that the two designs were not “identical 
or nearly identical.”  Id. at 1160.  The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, 
holding that the court had misstated the degree of similarity necessary to support 
a dilution claim under the TDRA.  Id. at 1159. 
172 588 F.3d at 109.  
173 Id. 
174 Id.  Only about 3% of consumers who participated in the telephone survey 
thought Starbucks was the “possible source” of Charbucks.  Id. 
175 See, e.g., Hershey Co. v. Art Van Furniture Inc., 2008 WL 4724756 (E.D. 
Mich. 2008).  In this case, the court issued a preliminary injunction to prevent 
defendant from advertising furniture with a picture of a brown couch emerging 
from a wrapper reminiscent of a Hershey candy bar (on the side of a furniture 
delivery van).  Id. at *1.  Although the court found no likelihood of confusion 
and therefore no likelihood of success on the merits of plaintiff’s trademark 
infringement claim, it found defendant’s mark was likely to dilute Hershey’s 
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In the tarnishment context, the potential impact of the TDRA in 
elevating the importance of “association” between the defendant’s mark 
and the plaintiff’s famous one is even starker, even though the TDRA 
lists no specific factors for courts to consider in the context of a dilution 
by tarnishment claim.  In one of the few appellate cases that has 
considered the tarnishment provisions of the TDRA, the Sixth Circuit 
concluded that proof of association equates proof of tarnishment, citing 
the legislative history of the TDRA as well as Congress’s specific 
concern that the “actual dilution” standard articulated by the Supreme 
Court in Moseley “creates an undue burden for trademark holders who 
contest diluting uses and should be revised.”176 
The Sixth Circuit case interpreting the TDRA’s tarnishment 
provisions features none other than Victor and Carol Moseley.177 
Although the Supreme Court held that summary judgment on plaintiff’s 
dilution claim was inappropriate under the FTDA,178 on remand the 
FTDA did not apply.  When the same facts were analyzed under the 
TDRA, the Sixth Circuit (and the district court) reached the opposite 
conclusion.179 
In analyzing the Moseleys’ case for the second time, the circuit 
court noted that “[t]here appears to be a clearly emerging consensus . . . 
that the creation of an ‘association’ between a famous mark and lewd or 
bawdy sexual activity disparages and defiles the famous mark and 
reduces the commercial value of its selling power.”180  The court 
                                                                                                         
famous trademark and trade dress, and therefore issued the injunction.  Id. at 
*12, *14.  
176 V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 387 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(citing U.S.C.C.A.N., 109th Cong. 2d Sess. 2006, Vol. 4, pp. 1091, 1092, 1097) 
[hereinafter Moseley II].  Of course, it is possible that the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision in Moseley II will not be followed by other federal circuits, and that its 
expansive interpretation of dilution by tarnishment will ultimately die on the 
vine.  At least one commentator has predicted that the tarnishment cause of 
action under the TDRA is actually “a much narrower cause of action than 
existed in pre-TDRA tarnishment case law.” Sarah L. Burstein, Dilution by 
Tarnishment: The New Cause of Action, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1189, 1189 
(2008).  However, given that the Sixth Circuit decision is the most 
comprehensive judicial interpretation of the TDRA tarnishment provision to 
date, particularly in the context of an allegedly tarnishing use with sexual 
connotations, its opinion should not be ignored and, at the very least, will 
constitute persuasive authority in other circuits. 
177 Moseley II, 605 F.3d at 382.   
178 See supra notes 144–150 and accompanying text.  
179 Moseley II, 605 F.3d at 387.   
180 Id. at 387–88 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing cases).   
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concluded that, when plaintiff can show a “clear semantic association” 
between a new mark that is used to sell “sex-related products” and the 
famous one, this association creates “a kind of rebuttable presumption, or 
at least a very strong inference” that the new mark is likely to tarnish the 
famous one.181  If the presumption is established, the owner of the new 
mark has “the burden of coming forward with evidence that there is no 
likelihood or probability of tarnishment.”182  In effect, the court conflated 
the blurring factors of mark similarity and mark association, creating a 
rule that if the marks are similar enough to create a “semantic 
association” between them, the likelihood of dilution is presumed, even 
when, as in this case, the court finds that the tarnishing effect on 
plaintiff’s famous trademark is “somewhat speculative.”183  The opinion 
effectively shifts the burden of proof in a dilution by tarnishment case 
from the plaintiff to the defendant so long as the plaintiff can show an 
“association” between the two marks.184  Perhaps predictably, when the 
burden of proof was shifted in this case, the Moseleys could not produce 
evidence disproving that their use of the mark “Victor’s Little Secret” 
had tarnished the image of the famous Victoria’s Secret trademark.185 
In sum, one effect of the TDRA has been to decrease the 
relevance of mark similarity in trademark dilution cases and to increase 
the significance of proof of mark association.  Although dilution laws 
may have been conceived as necessary to prevent a defendant from using 
a mark identical to plaintiff’s famous one (evading liability for trademark 
infringement by placing the mark on unrelated goods), this type of case 
does not appear to be common.  Moreover, if such misuse of a mark does 
occur, it is rarely the case that dilution constitutes plaintiff’s only viable 
claim.  Rather, at least in recent cases decided under the TDRA, dilution 
seems to have relevance as a cause of action primarily when defendant’s 
                                                
181 Id. at 388.  The “rebuttable presumption” language appears in the majority 
opinion, but it was rejected in the concurrence in favor of creating a “strong 
inference” of tarnishment.  Id. at 390. 
182 Id. at 388.  The court suggested that such proof could include “expert 
testimony or surveys or polls or customer testimony.”  Id. 
183 Id. at 389. 
184 One judge in the three-judge panel that decided Moseley II dissented and 
argued that the court had misinterpreted both the plain language and the 
legislative history of the TDRA in reaching this conclusion.  Id. at 391–95 
(Moore, J., dissenting).  
185 Id. at 388–89.  The type of evidence cited by the court as helpful in 
disproving tarnishment – expert testimony and consumer surveys – is 
notoriously costly.  See, e.g., Lon Tai Shing Co., Ltd. v. Koch & Lowy, 19 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1081, 1095 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1991) (estimating the cost of 
conducting consumer survey in the instant trademark case at approximately 
$100,000).  
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mark is not particularly similar to the plaintiff’s, such that the 
dissimilarity between them precludes, at least in part, a finding of 
trademark infringement.186  In this type of case, proof of mental 
association between the two marks goes a long way towards proving a 
likelihood of dilution, and it may be dispositive in cases involving claims 
of tarnishment. 
2. Dilution by Competitors   
In addition to mark identity, the other hallmark of the traditional 
dilution claim—at least as articulated by those who enacted the dilution 
statutes—has been the use of a famous mark to sell unrelated goods or 
services.  As discussed above, Schechter’s original “rational basis” 
theory was largely born of frustration with the limitations of trademark 
infringement law of his era, particularly because it did not always offer 
relief when the defendant placed its mark on goods that were not of the 
“same descriptive properties” as those of the plaintiff.187  It is therefore 
not surprising that he cited Kodak bath tubs and Mazda shoes as 
examples of the harm that dilution was intended to prevent.188  Dilution 
claims are, however, often litigated under the TDRA in cases where 
plaintiff and defendant are not selling goods or services in radically 
different markets and, in fact, may be competitors.189 
                                                
186 See Beebe, supra note 62, at 1623 (concluding, based on empirical data, that 
“the similarity of the marks factor is by far the most important factor in the 
multifactor test” for determining likelihood of confusion and trademark 
infringement).   
187 See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.  
188 Schechter, supra note 7, at 830. 
189 The application of the dilution doctrine in cases involving competitors is not 
without controversy.  In his iconic trademark treatise, Professor McCarthy 
states, “[i]t is difficult to understand why an anti-dilution law is invoked when 
the parties operate in competitive or closely related product or service lines. The 
legal theory of anti-dilution was conceived to protect strong marks against a 
diluting use by a junior user in a product or service line far removed from that in 
which the famous mark appears. Thus, using the anti-dilution law when the 
parties are competitors in the same market sounds a dissonant and false note. 
Why the need to invoke the ‘super weapon’ of anti-dilution law to resolve what 
appears to be a garden variety infringement case.”  J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 4 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:72, at 24–136 
(Supp. 12/2003).  The Second Circuit rejected this reasoning (without citing 
McCarthy), based on the plain language of the FTDA: “In the absence of 
contrary legislative command, the fact that other remedies [such as trademark 
infringement] may be available to prevent a perceived ill does not seem to be 
sufficient reason to construe a statute as not reaching circumstances that fall 
squarely within its words.  The fact that injured senior users may thus be given a 
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In these cases, the defendant typically chooses a trademark for 
his business that creates an association with the plaintiff’s famous mark 
for the purpose of communicating information about his own business to 
the consuming public.  In some of these cases, the defendant is a 
relatively small business owner who is attempting to tell consumers that, 
at some level, his business and that of the famous trademark holder are 
similar.  The desire to create an association with the famous mark is not 
the same as a desire to “pass off” one’s goods as those of the mark 
holder.  In other words, the defendant does not intend to trick the public 
into buying his goods instead of the plaintiff’s.  If such facts were 
proven, the case would undoubtedly be one of trademark infringement, 
without the need to resort to a trademark dilution claim.190  However, as 
discussed above, evidence of an “intent to associate” alone currently 
constitutes powerful evidence of a likelihood of dilution.  It is perhaps 
not surprising, then, that those with the most incentive to create this kind 
of association (competitors) may find themselves defending a trademark 
dilution lawsuit. 
The trademark case filed by coffee behemoth Starbucks against 
Black Bear squarely illustrates this phenomenon.  Starbucks and Black 
Bear both sell coffee, although not in comparable amounts.  Black Bear 
is described as a “family-run business that ‘manufactures and sells . . . 
roasted coffee beans and related goods via mail order, internet order, and 
at a limited number of New England supermarkets.’”191  Black Bear 
operates one retail outlet and occasionally hires part-time workers.192  
The Starbucks trademark, on the other hand, is associated with “8,700 
retail locations in the United States, Canada, and 34 foreign countries 
and territories.”193  Moreover, Starbucks coffee is sold in “hundreds of 
                                                                                                         
choice of remedies is not sufficient reason to read into the antidilution statute 
limitations that Congress did not write.”  Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 
F.3d 208, 223 (2d Cir. 1999).  Moreover, the court hypothesized that “failure to 
construe the antidilution statutes as reaching competing products may lead to a 
gap in coverage; the products might be found too far apart to support a finding 
of likelihood of confusion—(and therefore an infringement action)—yet too 
close together to permit a finding of dilution.”  Id. 
190 See Beebe, supra note 62, at 1628 (concluding, based on empirical data, “a 
finding of bad faith intent creates, if not in doctrine, then at least in practice, a 
nearly un-rebuttable presumption of a likelihood of confusion”). 
191 Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 103 (2d Cir. 
2009).  
192 Id.  
193 Id. at 102.  
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restaurants, supermarkets, airlines, sport and entertainment venues, 
motion picture theaters, hotels, and cruise ship lines.”194 
The district court understandably found that Black Bear’s choice 
of the names “Mr. Charbucks” and “Charbucks Blend” for its coffee 
product was intended to invoke an association with the famous Starbucks 
mark.195  In its appellate brief, Starbucks claimed that Black Bear 
adopted “Charbucks” as a mark “because there ‘could not have been a 
more perfect way for [Black Bear] to grab the attention of 
consumers.’”196  In addition to invoking a general association with the 
famous coffee retailer, the name was apparently chosen to convey 
information about this particular blend of coffee.  The owner of Black 
Bear testified that “‘[t]he inspiration for the term Charbucks comes 
directly from Starbucks’ tendency to roast its products more darkly than 
that of other major roasters.’”197  The slogans accompanying the name 
emphasized that the blend was dark roasted, promising that the coffee 
was “[r]oasted to the Extreme . . . For those who like the extreme.”198  
The name and the slogan can be interpreted as suggesting that the Black 
Bear coffee blend, like some Starbucks coffee, is dark roasted, but better 
than Starbucks.199  This is a form of comparative advertising, one in 
which a small competitor attempts to enter a market to challenge a 
dominant competitor. 
The Moseley case similarly involved parties operating in related 
if not identical markets.  The Moseleys, who had one store in 
                                                
194 Id.  
195 Id. at 109.  
196 Proof Brief for Plaintiff-Counter-Defendants-Appellants, Starbucks Corp., 
588 F.3d 97 (2006) (No. 06-0435-cv), 2006 WL 4846966 at *17.  Black Bear 
did not admit that its choice of the Charbucks name was intended to invoke an 
association with Starbucks.  In its appellate brief, Black Bear argued that it 
“chose the descriptor ‘Charbucks Blend’ as a humorous way to alert customers 
that the very dark roast was different from Black Bear’s typical products.”  Brief 
for Defendant-Appellee, Starbucks Corp., 588 F.3d 97 (2006) (No. 06-0435-cv), 
2006 WL 4846967 at *3.   
197 Starbucks Corp., 588 F.3d at 113.  
198 Id. at 103.  Another slogan stated, “You wanted it dark . . . You’ve got it 
dark!”  Id.  
199 The Second Circuit rejected Starbucks’ claim that Black Bear’s use of the 
name Charbucks resulted in tarnishment of the Starbucks trademark by evoking 
an image of “bitter, over-roasted coffee.”  Id. at 110.  At least one pre-TDRA 
case did find dilution by tarnishment in a case between competitors, where the 
plaintiff’s famous logo was used in defendant’s comparative advertisement in a 
manner that mocked the plaintiff.  See Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 
F.3d 39, 44–45 (2d Cir. 1994) (interpreting New York anti-dilution law).   
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Elizabethtown, Kentucky and no employees, sold adult videos and “adult 
novelties,” including women’s lingerie, which accounted for 
approximately five percent of total sales.200  The plaintiff, which operated 
over 750 Victoria’s Secret stores and reported annual sales in excess of 
$1.5 billion at the time of the litigation, described its product as 
“moderately priced, high quality, attractively designed lingerie sold in a 
store setting designed to look like a wom[a]n’s bedroom.”201  Testimony 
in the case indicated that Victoria’s Secret attempts to create and 
maintain a “sexy and playful” image.202 
Although Victoria’s Secret and the Moseleys may not have 
shared the same business model, this case is hardly one of Kodak pianos 
or Dupont shoes.  As the record in the case plainly illustrated, the 
Victoria’s Secret trademark has deliberately cultivated sexual 
connotations,203 which is most likely why the Moseleys initially chose 
the names “Victor’s Secret” and “Victor’s Little Secret” for their 
business.  Although there was little evidence of any likelihood of 
confusion between the two businesses, which is why summary judgment 
was granted on the trademark infringement claim, both companies tried 
to cultivate a sex-related image.  By using a name evoking an association 
with the famous Victoria’s Secret trademark, the Moseleys attempted to 
convey precisely such an image to their potential customers.      
It should not be surprising that dilution cases arise in contexts 
wherein the plaintiff’s goods or services bear some resemblance to those 
of the defendant.  A defendant who copies a mark like “Kodak” onto an 
unrelated item such as a piano receives a limited amount of benefit from 
doing so, given that the specific attributes of a Kodak camera have little 
significance in terms of assessing the attractiveness of a large musical 
instrument.  Moreover, to the extent the Kodak piano appealed to the 
consumer because she was misled into believing that the owner of the 
Kodak trademark somehow endorsed the product, the defendant would 
be liable for trademark infringement, and a claim for dilution would be 
unnecessary. 
                                                
200 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 424 (2003).  
201 Id. at 422–23.  
202 Moseley II, 605 F.3d 382, 394 (6th Cir. 2010) (Moore, J., dissenting). 
203 The dissent in Moseley II took note of Victoria’s Secret advertisements for 
“‘sexy little things’ lingerie.” Moseley II, 605 F.3d at 394.  These ads urge 
customers to “‘[b]e bad for goodness sake’” by wearing Victoria’s Secret 
merchandise, specifically “‘peek-a-boo’s, bras and sexy Santa accessories.’”  Id.  
The ads also encourage participation “in the store’s ‘panty fantasy,’ which they 
describe as ‘Very racy. Very lacy.’”  Id.     
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However, a play on words that associates with a famous brand in 
a related market—like Victor’s Little Secret or Mr. Charbucks— may 
signal certain information to the consumer about the product, particularly 
given the almost universal recognition of famous brands.  These types of 
names, when presented in contexts clarifying that the famous trademark 
holder is not the source of the relevant good or service, also have the 
benefit of avoiding the creation of a likelihood of confusion, i.e., 
trademark infringement.  If this type of word play is actionable, dilution 
is the most likely claim. 
3. Dilution of Trade Dress 
Dilution claims have also arisen outside the classic formulation 
of identical marks on unrelated goods in cases involving trade dress.  
Although the FTDA did not specifically refer to trade dress dilution, 
some courts did apply the Act in trade dress cases.204  The TDRA 
explicitly applies to cases involving trade dress.205  Although the number 
of trade dress dilution cases is relatively small, they deserve mention 
because, given the nature of the claim, they tend to arise in the context of 
disputes between competitors.  Defendant’s trade dress is unlikely to 
allegedly dilute that of plaintiff if the parties are in unrelated industries. 
An early case involving a claim of trade dress dilution was 
brought by the maker of a product that is certainly “famous” to the 
parents of young children:  the Goldfish cracker, a product of Pepperidge 
Farms.206  The goldfish shape of the cracker, which Pepperidge Farms 
claimed as its trade dress,207 was allegedly diluted by a new brand of 
cracker manufactured by Nabisco that included, among other shapes, a 
                                                
204 See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999); I.P. 
Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 1998) (considering 
FTDA trademark dilution claim regarding trade dress of KOHLER faucet); but 
see Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 633, 639 (7th Cir. 
1999) (expressing doubt as to whether trade dress falls within the scope of the 
FTDA). 
205 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (2006).  
206 Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 208.  This case held that, under the 1995 version of 
the federal trademark dilution law (the FTDA), only proof of a “likelihood of 
dilution,” rather than “actual dilution” was required.  Id. at 214.  The Supreme 
Court overruled this holding in Moseley, requiring proof of “actual dilution,” 
but, as discussed above, that holding was in turn abrogated by the 2006 
amendments to the Act (the TDRA).  The TDRA explicitly requires proof only 
of a “likelihood of dilution” rather than “actual dilution.”  See supra notes 156-
160 and accompanying text. 
207 Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 212–13.  
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cracker in the shape of a fish.208  In the ensuing lawsuit, Pepperidge 
Farms alleged that Nabisco’s cracker mix both infringed and diluted its 
trade dress in the Goldfish cracker.  Its infringement claim failed at the 
trial court level, but its dilution claim prevailed and was upheld on 
appeal. 
The Second Circuit concluded that the Nabisco crackers were 
“likely to dilute” the distinctiveness of the Pepperidge Farms goldfish.  
The court explicitly considered and rejected the argument that dilution 
was not an appropriate cause of action in a case between two 
competitors, as snack food giants Pepperidge Farms and Nabisco 
undoubtedly are.  First, it noted that the express language of the FTDA 
contained no such limitation; to the contrary, the statute provided that 
dilution could occur “regardless of the presence or absence of . . . 
competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties.”209  
The TDRA contains essentially identical language.210  Moreover, the 
court reasoned that “the closer the products are to one another, the 
greater the likelihood of both confusion and dilution. The senior user has 
a right to the antidilution law’s remedy in either case.”211  
4. The Limitations of Fair Use 
When it was enacted, the TDRA’s definition of “fair use” was 
widely perceived to be more generous than that encompassed in the 
FTDA.  Unlike the FTDA, the TDRA does contain an express 
affirmative defense for parodies.212  However, the Act exempts from 
parody protection any mark used “as a designation of source for the 
[defendant’s] own goods or services.”213 As a result of that exemption 
and the constrictive interpretation of fair use by many courts, the fair use 
                                                
208 Nabisco did not randomly choose to manufacture a cracker in the shape of a 
fish.  The Nabisco product was designed as a joint promotion with Nickelodeon 
Television Network, to promote the Nickelodeon CatDog cartoon.  Id.  The 
cartoon featured a two-headed creature (half cat, half dog) that liked to eat fish 
(for the cat) and bones (for the dog).  Id.  The CatDog cracker mix was to 
contain crackers in the shape of the CatDog cartoon character and its favorite 
foods, fish and bones.  Id. at 213.  
209 Id. at 222 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127(c)).  
210 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).  
211 Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 222; see also supra note 189.  
212 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii) (providing that “[a]ny fair use” is not 
actionable dilution, including use in connection with “identifying and parodying, 
criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services 
of the famous mark owner”). 
213 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A).  
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defense under the TDRA remains inadequate to insulate from liability 
many uses of a famous trademark that should not be actionable.  
In the context of trademark law, courts have defined “parody” as 
“a simple form of entertainment conveyed by juxtaposing the irreverent 
representation of the trademark with the idealized image created by the 
mark’s owner.”214  Simply stated, parodies use trademarks (often famous 
ones) to make fun of the companies who “own” those marks and may 
profit from them to an enormous degree.  Historically, trademark holders 
have not appreciated this type of humor and often consider it to 
constitute dilution, particularly dilution by tarnishment.215  At least to 
some degree, however, the First Amendment protects “successful” 
parodies.216 
The predecessor to the TDRA, the FTDA, did not contain an 
explicit statutory exemption from liability for fair use in the form of 
parody.217  Rather, if parody was exempted from statutory liability at all, 
it was because it fell within the scope of the general “noncommercial 
use” exemption.218  This omission was heavily criticized for its potential 
                                                
214 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 260 
(4th Cir. 2007); see also People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. 
Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 2001) (same).  
215 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902–03 (9th Cir. 
2002) (alleging that the song “Barbie Girl” by the band Aqua tarnished the 
Barbie trademark because the song was “inappropriate for young girls”); Haute 
Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d 252, 264 (alleging that  “Chewy Vuiton” dog toys were 
likely to tarnish the Louis Vuitton mark because the toys “pose a choking hazard 
for some dogs”); Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 44–45 (2d 
Cir. 1994) (alleging that MTD’s portrayal of the John Deere logo as a fleeing, 
frightened deer amounted to dilution by tarnishment); Jordache Enterprises, Inc. 
v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1486 (10th Cir.1987) (alleging that the use 
of the name “Lardashe” on the seat of jeans “for larger women” amounted to 
tarnishment of the Jordache trademark).  
216 See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902–07 (discussing tension between liability for 
dilution under the FTDA and the First Amendment in the context of parody). 
217 The FTDA definition of fair use was limited to “use of a famous mark by 
another person in comparative commercial advertising or promotion to identify 
the competing goods or services of the owner of the famous mark.”  15 U.S.C. 
§1125(c)(4)(A).  The FTDA also contained a general exemption for 
“noncommercial uses” of a mark, which is identical to the language in the 
current version of the statute.  Id. at (c)(2)(C). 
218 Both the FTDA and the TDRA contain a general exemption from dilution 
liability for “[a]ny noncommercial use of a mark.”  See 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(c)(3)(C). 
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negative impact on the right of free speech.219  In response to that 
criticism, the TDRA exempts from liability any “fair use” of a mark 
designed to identify and parody, criticize, or comment upon “the famous 
mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark owner.”220  
However, this statutory exemption does not apply when the defendant 
has used the plaintiff’s mark “as a designation of source” for her “own 
goods or services.”221 
To be considered “successful” and hence not actionable as 
trademark infringement or dilution, a parody must copy the original 
trademark only so much as is necessary to communicate to the public 
that it is making fun of the trademark (and/or its owner) and is not a 
message originating from the trademark holder itself.  “Thus, ‘[a] parody 
relies upon a difference from the original mark, presumably a humorous 
difference, in order to produce its desired effect.’”222  In a case that 
contains perhaps the most thorough judicial analysis of the TDRA’s 
parody provisions to date, the Fourth Circuit held that Haute Diggity 
Dog’s use of the mark “Chewy Vuiton” for its own brand of dog toys 
was a successful parody of the famous trademark held by Louis Vuitton, 
maker of luxury purses.223  The court concluded that Haute Diggity 
Dog’s parody of Louis Vuitton succeeded because it “undoubtedly and 
deliberately conjures up the famous [Louis Vuitton] marks and trade 
dress, but at the same time, it communicates that it is not the [Louis 
Vuitton] product.”224  Even though the parody was “successful,” 
however, the statutory language designed to protect parodies did not 
apply. 
The court in Louis Vuitton held that a finding of a successful 
parody does not guarantee immunity from liability under the TDRA’s 
fair use exemption from liability, which by its plain language does not 
apply when defendant’s mark is being used as a designation of source for 
                                                
219 See, e.g., Sarah Mayhew Schlosser, Note, The High Price of (Criticizing) 
Coffee:  The Chilling Effect of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act on 
Corporate Parody, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 931, 962 (2001) (criticizing the fact that 
trademark laws “emphasize economic and commercial factors over free 
speech”). 
220 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii).  
221 Id. at (c)(3)(A).  
222 Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d at 260 (quoting Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d, 1482, 1486 (10th Cir.1987)). 
223 Id.  In a case interpreting state anti-dilution law, the court held that the use of 
the mark “Lardashe” for jeans was a successful parody of the “Jordache” jeans 
trademark.  Hogg Wyld, 828 F.2d at 1482. 
224 Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d at 260.  
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its goods, as in this case.225  Moreover, it did not discuss the First 
Amendment in its analysis of the defendant’s parodic use of the Louis 
Vuitton trademark.  Rather, the court considered the parodic nature of 
Haute Diggity Dog’s use of the Louis Vuitton mark in balancing the 
statutory factors for dilution by blurring.226  In affirming the trial court’s 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Haute Diggity Dog on the 
dilution by blurring claim, the court of appeal speculated that the Chewy 
Vuitton parody might actually increase, rather than decrease, the 
distinctiveness of the Louis Vuitton mark:  “[B]y making the famous 
mark an object of the parody, a successful parody might actually enhance 
the famous mark’s distinctiveness by making it an icon.  The brunt of the 
joke becomes yet more famous.”227  The court also paid scant attention to 
Louis Vuitton’s dilution by tarnishment claim, for which it had little to 
no evidentiary support.228 
The scope of the TDRA’s parody exemption, at least as 
interpreted by the Fourth Circuit, appears to be quite narrow and still 
raises First Amendment concerns.229  Because the statute’s fair use 
defense categorically excludes all parodies that function as trademarks,230 
courts must engage in a fact-specific weighing of factors in these types of 
cases to determine whether the use will “impair the distinctiveness” of 
the famous trademark or harm its reputation.231  Although the court in 
                                                
225 Id. at 266.  
226 Id. at 267.  
227 Id. at 267 (citing cases).  
228 Id. at 268–69.  Although Haute Diggity Dog’s goods, specifically the Chewy 
Vuiton dog toy, were clearly of inferior quality when compared to luxury Louis 
Vuitton handbags, the evidence cited in the summary judgment motions (and 
consequently on appeal) regarding dilution by tarnishment focused on the 
peculiarly narrow claim that Louis Vuitton’s reputation could be harmed 
because a dog could choke on the Chewy Vuiton toy.  Id.  Based on this limited 
evidence and argument, the court affirmed summary judgment on this claim.  Id. 
at 269.   
229 See, e.g., Jesse A. Hofrichter, Note, Tool of the Trademark:  Brand Criticism 
and Free Speech Problems with the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1923, 1940 (2007) (“While the vast majority of dilution 
cases do not implicate First Amendment issues, there have been a number of 
cases under federal and state anti-dilution statutes that have broached the 
topic[.]”); see also infra notes 346-360 and accompanying text. 
230 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A).  
231 Other circuits may of course choose to reject the test adopted by the Fourth 
Circuit in the Haute Diggity Dog case, either on statutory or Constitutional (First 
Amendment) grounds.  See, e.g., Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, 
Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 113 (2d Cir. 2009) (declining to decide whether to adopt the 
Fourth Circuit’s analysis of the statutory exemption from liability for parodies, 
when defendant’s parody is also used as a trademark).    
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Louis Vuitton ultimately concluded that the Chewy Vuitton parody 
would have neither effect, that result was not a foregone conclusion.232 
Moreover, subtle yet potentially humorous references to a 
famous trademark are not likely to be considered successful parodies.  
For example, in Charbucks, the Second Circuit found that Black Bear’s 
reference to the Starbucks trademark was at best a “subtle satire” and 
therefore too indirect to be considered a parody.233  Under the specific 
language of the Act, the business owner who wishes to choose a 
trademark that parodies but does not dilute is therefore faced with a 
difficult task.  A parody, by its very nature, evidences an “intent to 
associate” with a famous trademark.234  That intent to associate, however, 
is one of the factors that tends to show a likelihood of dilution by 
blurring.235  If the parody is ultimately deemed unsuccessful—either 
because it is not considered humorous by the judge or jury, fails to 
sufficiently distinguish itself from the famous trademark, or any other 
reason—efforts to associate with the mark owner will almost certainly 
not be viewed in a favorable light.  The would-be parodist must thus 
choose a name that invokes the original in a humorous way, directly 
enough so that the humor is apparent, but not so directly as to leave 
himself open to a claim of trademark infringement or dilution.  If the 
reference is too indirect the parody defense will likewise fail, as it did in 
the Starbucks case. 
The statute’s fair use exemption for comparative advertising236 
likewise does not appreciate subtlety.  Comparative advertising has long 
been considered a fair use defense to a claim alleging misuse of a 
trademark, both in the infringement and dilution contexts.237  However, if 
the comparative advertising is not stated in an obvious way, the purveyor 
of the advertisement will not be insulated from liability.  The Starbucks 
case illustrates this principle as well.  Black Bear’s parody defense, as 
                                                
232 In contrast to the court’s decision in Haute Diggity Dog, see Deere & Co. v. 
MTD Products, Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 44 -45 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding trademark 
dilution where defendant used plaintiff’s famous logo in a comparative 
advertisement that mocked plaintiff). 
233 Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 113 (2d Cir. 
2009).  
234 See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 
260 (4th Cir. 2007) (“A parody must convey two simultaneous—and 
contradictory—messages:  that it is the original, but also that it is not the 
original and is instead a parody.”) (citations omitted). 
235 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(v).  
236 See id. at (c)(3)(A)(i) (exempting from liability any “advertising or 
promotion that permits consumers to compare goods or services”). 
237 See, e.g., Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 526, 565–66 (9th Cir. 1968).  
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noted above, was rejected in part because the reference that it made to 
the Starbucks trademark was too subtle and indirect.  Somewhat 
ironically, the parody claim was also rejected because the court 
interpreted Black Bear’s message, as communicated via the Charbucks 
marks, as one of comparative advertising (casting Starbucks in a positive 
rather than a negative light) rather than humor.  The court described the 
Charbucks logo as a “beacon to identify Charbucks as a coffee that 
competes at the same level and quality as Starbucks in producing dark-
roasted coffees.”238  If Black Bear had made this statement directly— 
“this coffee competes at the same level and quality as Starbucks in 
producing dark-roasted coffees”—rather than using the Charbucks marks 
as a “beacon” to convey the same message, presumably its use would 
have been protected from a dilution claim as a matter of law. 
In sum, the TDRA has led trademark dilution law far away from 
its Rational Basis roots.  Because Congress has eliminated the 
requirement of proving “actual dilution,” it is now difficult to determine 
what exactly the plaintiff is required to prove to sustain a claim of 
dilution.  Proof of association (and intent to create the same) between the 
two marks clearly goes a long way.  Fair use is often an ineffective safety 
valve.  Proof of harm caused by dilution may be difficult to come by 
because, in fact, dilution causes no economic harm.  These results are 
profoundly problematic. 
II. THE MORAL PREDICATE OF DILUTION  
As discussed above, the economic justification for the dilution 
cause of action is weak at best.  However, despite the less than 
convincing evidence of the harm it is supposed to address, the cause of 
action has expanded rather than contracted in recent years.  Given that 
the holders of famous trademarks are typically corporate entities with a 
duty to maximize shareholder value, it therefore may seem facially 
surprising that they would champion the dilution cause of action and 
often spend vast sums of money litigating these claims.  The economic 
harm caused by dilution, assuming it exists, is almost certainly dwarfed 
by the cost of enforcement.  If economic harm were the only, or even a 
primary, rationale motivating these claims, we would expect the holders 
of famous trademarks to be considerably less enthused about dilution 
laws. 
A better explanation for the existence of dilution law, as well as 
its practical utilization, is that it confers a moral right upon the 
corporations that create, nurture, and profit from famous trademarks.  
                                                
238 Starbucks Corp., 588 F.3d at 113.  
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Like the authors of creative works, these corporate entities would like to 
control all uses of their marks, particularly those that are offensive to 
them, and not just those that cause them economic harm.  For example, 
when testifying before Congress on the subject of the Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act, counsel for Warner Brothers Studios said,  “[T]he 
trademark owner, who has spent the time and investment needed to 
create and maintain the property, should be the sole determinant of how 
that property is to be used in a commercial manner.”239  Dilution, at least 
as currently construed, comes close to granting this wish. 
A.  Moral Rights in the United States 
A moral right is one that does not (unlike most intellectual 
property law in the United States) depend upon an economic or 
utilitarian framework to justify its existence.  Moral rights are based on 
the personal rights of the creator, with the idea being that the creator of 
an artistic work should retain some amount of control over it, even if he 
does not “own” the work.  Moral rights primarily encompass (1) the right 
of attribution (the right to be named as the author of the work) and (2) 
the right of integrity (the right to prevent others from mutilating the work 
or to present it in a manner not approved by the author).240  The right of 
attribution broadly “gives the author the right to control the association 
of his name with the work,” including the right “not to associate his 
name with the work,” and the right to be anonymous.241  The right of 
integrity, sometimes referred to as the “right of respect,” enables the 
author to prevent any modification or distortion of his work that 
misrepresents his “vision or concept.”242  In sum, these rights “function 
                                                
239 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 
111 (1995) (statement of Nils Victor Montan, Vice President and Senior 
Intellectual Property Counsel, Warner Brothers).  
240 See ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY:  FORGING A 
MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 6-7 (2010) (noting that “both the 
right of attribution and the right of integrity function to safeguard the author’s 
meaning and message, and thus are designed to increase an author’s ability to 
safeguard the integrity of her texts”); see also Edward J. Damich, The Visual 
Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal System of Moral Rights Protection 
for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945, 958–64 (1990).   
241 Damich, supra note 240, at 949 (emphasis added); see also KWALL, supra 
note 240, at 5 (“The right of attribution safeguards the author’s right to be 
recognized as the creator of the work.”); id. at 87–110 (discussing the right to be 
anonymous or to use a pseudonym).  
242 Damich, supra note 240, at 949.    
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to safeguard the author’s meaning and message, and thus are designed to 
increase an author’s ability to safeguard the integrity of her texts.”243 
Perhaps as a result of the lack of economic or utilitarian 
justification for moral rights, moral rights have gained limited traction in 
the United States.  Although other U.S. laws may be interpreted as 
indirectly supporting the moral rights of the author, the statute that most 
explicitly protects the rights of attribution and integrity is the Visual 
Artists Rights Act, or VARA, which was appended to the Copyright Act 
in 1990.244  VARA was enacted in an effort to comply with the Berne 
Convention, which the United States had signed two years earlier.245  The 
Berne Convention requires its signatories to provide authors with the 
moral rights of attribution and integrity: 
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the 
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim 
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or 
other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the 
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.246 
VARA is largely regarded as insufficient to satisfy the United 
States’ obligations under the Berne Convention.247  Although VARA 
                                                
243 KWALL, supra note 240, at 6.  
244 See id. at 25–35; Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650 (tit. 
VI), 104 Stat. 5128 (codified in various sections of 17 U.S.C.).  
245 See KWALL, supra note 240, at 27–28 (discussing legislative history of 
VARA).  
246 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 
6bis(1), Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.  Article 6bis further provides that 
“[t]he means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this Article shall 
be governed by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed.”  Id. 
at 6bis(3).  The House Report on VARA observes that the United States joined 
the Berne Convention “[a]fter almost 100 years of debate,” primarily due to 
“debate over the requirements of Article 6bis. The principal question was 
whether that article required the United States to enact new laws protecting 
moral rights.”  H.R. Rep. 101-514, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6917 (1990). 
247 See, e.g., KWALL, supra note 240, at 37 (“[T]here is a stark reality that we 
may not be in compliance with our obligations under the Berne Convention.”); 
Damich, supra note 240, at 996 (characterizing VARA as “a step in the right 
direction,” although it “does not meet the requirements of the Berne 
Convention”); Coree Thompson, Note, Orphan Works, U.S. Copyright Law, and 
International Treaties: Reconciling Differences to Create a Brighter Future for 
Orphans Everywhere, 23 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 787, 805 (2006) (“VARA 
failed to . . . bring the United States into full compliance with the Berne 
Convention . . . .”).  
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does provide for basic rights of attribution and integrity,248 it does not 
apply to all types of authorial works.  As its name implies, VARA’s 
protections extend solely to authors of works of “visual art.”249  A work 
of visual art is defined as a “painting, drawing, print, or sculpture” and 
some photographs.250  VARA’s exclusion of entire categories of works, 
such as sound recordings and books, is probably the most obvious way in 
which it conflicts with the Berne Convention.251  VARA also allows an 
author to waive (but not transfer) her rights.252  VARA’s waiver 
provisions are arguably inconsistent with Berne’s definition of a moral 
right, which is said to exist “[i]ndependently of the author’s economic 
rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights.”253  Traditionally, 
moral rights have been considered inalienable and nonwaivable, owing to 
their intrinsically personal nature.254  As a result of these and other 
limitations, one commentator has characterized VARA as the “Mini Me” 
of moral rights laws.255 
The federal trademark statute (the Lanham Act) makes no 
specific reference to moral rights or the right of attribution or integrity.  
However, Section 43(a) of the Act, which prohibits “false designations of 
origin,”256 has been cited as a source of moral rights protection.257  At 
                                                
248 The House Report accompanying VARA states that the Act “provides . . . 
artists with the rights of ‘attribution’ and ‘integrity.’  The former ensures that 
artists are correctly identified with the works of art they create, and that they are 
not identified with works created by others.  The latter allows artists to protect 
their works against modifications and destructions that are prejudicial to their 
honor or reputations.”  H.R. Rep. 101-514, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 1990 WL 
258818 (1990).  
249 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006).  
250 17 U.S.C. § 101.  Photos are covered only if produced “for exhibition 
purposes only,” and then only if signed by the author.  Id.  Copies of the 
original, as to any type of work, are protected only if signed and consecutively 
number by the author; 200 is the maximum number of allowed copies.  Id.  The 
Act specifically excludes from the definition of a visual work of art, among 
other things, “applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, 
magazine, [and] newspaper.”  Id.  
251 See Damich, supra note 240, at 951–58 (discussing this aspect of VARA); 
KWALL, supra note 240, at 28 (describing this exclusion as problematic).  
252 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e).   
253 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 
6bis(1), Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.  
254 See Damich, supra note 240, at 966–67 (arguing that moral rights should not 
be waivable, due to their personal nature and the inequality of bargaining power 
likely to exist between artist and patron).   
255 See Dana L. Burton, Artists’ Moral Rights: Controversy and the Visual 
Artists Rights Act of 1990, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 463, 505 (2011).  
256 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).   
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least in some cases, Section 43(a) has been successfully invoked to 
prevent a “mutilated” version of the author’s work from being presented 
under the author’s name.258  In one such case, the Second Circuit 
reasoned that “[t]o deform [the author’s] work is to present him to the 
public as the creator of a work not his own, and thus makes him subject 
to criticism for work he has not done.”259  
However, the Supreme Court in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp.260 interpreted Section 43(a) narrowly, thereby 
thwarting its extension into the moral rights arena.  The key question in 
this case was whether the defendant could edit and repackage footage 
from plaintiff’s television series (the copyright for which had expired) 
and sell it under defendant’s name, with no mention of plaintiff.  In 
essence, plaintiff argued that Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act protected 
the moral right of attribution via a cause of action for “reverse passing 
off.”  The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the author of the 
original work (the television series) constituted the “origin” of the goods 
in that case, rather than the producer of the videotapes containing edited 
footage from the original work.261  The Court reasoned that extending the 
Lanham Act in this manner would “conflict with the law of copyright, 
which addresses [the right of attribution] specifically,” in VARA.262  
Absent Congressional intent explicitly to the contrary, the Court 
concluded that “[t]he right to copy, and to copy without attribution, once 
a copyright has expired . . . passes to the public.”263  Dastar’s 
                                                                                                         
257 See KWALL, supra note 240, at 30–31 (describing Section 43(a) as a source 
of moral rights protection under US law).  
258 See, e.g., Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 24–25 
(2d Cir. 1976) (holding that re-broadcast of substantially edited or “mutilated” 
Monty Python scripts, attributed to Monty Python, constituted a false 
designation of origin and therefore violated Section 43(a)).  
259 Id. at 24 (internal citation omitted). 
260 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).  
261 Id. at 33–34.   
262 Id. 
263 Id. at 33.  Similarly, in Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of America, Inc., 9 
F.3d 1091, 1103 (4th Cir. 1993), the court observed that to preserve competition, 
“Congress . . . . has therefore confined and limited the rewards of originality to 
those situations and circumstances comprehended by our patent, copyright, and 
trade-mark laws. When these statutory frameworks are inapplicable, originality 
per se remains unprotected and often unrewarded. For these reasons and with 
these limitations the bare imitation of another’s product, without more, is 
permissible. And this is true regardless of the fact that the courts have little 
sympathy for a willful imitator.” Id. 
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interpretation of Section 43(a) thus severely restricted its applicability in 
these types of cases.264 
Given the intensely personal nature of moral rights, it is hard to 
imagine why a corporation would want them.  Moreover, as the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Dastar illustrates, the Lanham Act itself does not 
guarantee moral rights, at least in literal terms.  To understand the 
analogy between moral rights law and dilution, one first must consider 
the sometimes intensely personal relationship between corporate 
America and its brands. 
B.  Corporate America’s Love Affair with the Brand 
Corporate megabrands—the type of trademarks that are easily 
considered “famous” under the TDRA—are much more than source-
identifiers for a particular product.  These brands also derive a massive 
amount of value from their embodiment of expressive meanings, well 
beyond their concurrent roles as source identifiers and symbols of 
corporate goodwill.265  The corporations that develop and promote these 
trademarks deliberately cultivate expressive meanings associated with a 
given mark.  In doing so, the creators of the mark endeavor to generate a 
specific type of “emotional connection” with the consumer.266  When the 
trademark is used in an unapproved manner that is inconsistent with the 
corporation’s vision of its mark, the corporation’s message becomes 
distorted.  Corporations accordingly try to control the manner in which 
their marks are used to the full extent permitted by the dominant legal 
regime. 
                                                
264 See generally Justin Hughes, American Moral Rights and Fixing the Dastar 
“Gap,” 2007 UTAH L. REV. 659 (2007) (critiquing the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Dastar and the lower courts’ subsequent interpretation and 
application of it).  
265 See infra notes 346-355 and accompanying text.  
266 Ruth Shalit, The inner Doughboy: How an army of admen battle to define 
and protect the true nature of the Jolly Green Giant, the Pillsbury Doughboy 
and other advertising spokescharacters, SALON.COM (March 23, 2000, 12:00 
PM), http://www.salon.com/media/col/shal/2000/03/23/doughboy (quoting 
David Altschul, president of the advertising division at Will Vinton Studios, as 
stating, “[w]e are focused on the emotional connection with the consumer”); see 
also Peter Walshe, Brand Personality: Unlocking key traits for success and 
value, in BRANDZ TOP 100 MOST VALUABLE GLOBAL BRANDS 45 (2012), 
http://www.millwardbrown.com/brandz/2012/Documents/2012_BrandZ_Top10
0_Report.pdf (concluding that “understanding a brand personality enables the 
brand owner to deliver a consistent brand experience that connects with 
consumers and leaves a deeper and more sustainable impression”).  
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The famous trademarks that perhaps best illustrate this 
phenomenon are the anthropomorphized corporate children that have 
fictional personalities and “friends” on Facebook.  For example, Mattel’s 
iconic doll/trademark, Barbie, has over 2.5 million friends on the social 
media website Facebook and identifies herself as a Public Figure who is 
“[i]n a relationship” (presumably with Ken).267  In one recent post, 
Barbie reported the following status:  “Relaxing today with my tried and 
true solution . . . retail therapy!”268  Sometimes her posts are more 
inspirational:  “I’ve had over 130 careers and I don’t plan on stopping! If 
you can dream it, you can be it!”269  Barbie even comments on recent 
events.270  She seems to think she is a real person.271  Mattel deliberately 
uses Barbie’s online image to create a specific persona associated with 
the famous Barbie trademark. 
Even corporate icon/trademarks less human-looking than Barbie, 
like the Pillsbury Doughboy and the Planters Peanut, similarly articulate 
scripted personalities that endeavor to create an emotional connection 
with the consumer.  Pillsbury maintains a detailed set of official 
guidelines dictating the Doughboy’s personality and what he can and 
cannot do.272  The Doughboy is described as “warm and sweet and 
enthusiastic and helpful.”273  Mr. Peanut is apparently more emotionally 
complex.274  According to a Planters corporate officer, Mr. Peanut is 
“very classy and upscale” – “someone you might meet at a celebrity 
                                                
267 Barbie, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/#!/barbie (last visited Aug. 
15, 2012).  
268 Id.  In the same vein, Barbie reports, “Woke up from a terrible nightmare that 
all of my shoes went missing!  I was so happy to open my closet and see them 
safe and sound. Phew!”  Id.  (August 10, 2011).  
269 See Barbie, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/#!/barbie (last visited 
August 24, 2011).  
270 On August 23, Barbie commented on a rare East-coast earthquake:  “O.M.D. 
Seems like my dolls on the East Coast and in Colorado experienced an LA-style 
quake! Hope everyone is safe and sound.”  Id.  
271 Studios have also established on-line identities for movie characters (e.g., 
Ricky Bobby, played by Will Ferrell in the film Talladega Nights).  See 
Elizabeth Holmes, On MySpace, Millions of Users Make ‘Friends’ with Ads, 
WALL ST. J. Aug. 7, 2006 at B.1; see also Ricky-Bobby, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/#!/pages/Ricky-Bobby/146097352118333 (last 
visited Aug. 15, 2012) (Facebook site for Ricky Bobby, self-identified 
“Athlete”).  
272 Shalit, supra note 266. 
273 Id.  
274 Mr. Peanut also identifies himself as a Public Figure on Facebook.  See Mr. 
Peanut, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/mrpeanut (last visited Aug. 15, 
2012). 
No. 2] THE MYTH AND REALITY OF DILUTION 276 
party, or at a new club, or lounge or bar.  And – to your surprise – he 
talks to you!  He engages you in conversation!  So yes, he’s got his top 
hat and monocle.  But paradoxically, he’s also quite approachable and 
down-to-earth.”275   
Even brands that do not employ spokescharacters like the 
Planters peanut endeavor to cultivate “personality characteristics” to 
connect with the consumer.276  For example, one marketing expert 
characterizes the Mercedes brand as “relatively ‘assertive’ and ‘in 
control,’ while BMW is more ‘sexy’ and desirable.’”277  The Apple brand 
is considered “‘creative’” and “‘adventurous,’” while Red Bull (an 
energy drink) is “‘adventurous’ and ‘brave,’ if a bit ‘arrogant.’”278  These 
brand personalities enable the trademark holder to more effectively reach 
the target market for the products her brands are designed to sell.  
One common feature of many brand guidelines is a keen concern 
for maintaining the “icon’s moral hygiene.”279  Pillsbury’s desire to keep 
the Doughboy morally flawless, for example, prevented him from 
appearing in a commercial sponsored by the California Milk Processor 
Board.  As part of the Board’s “Got Milk?” campaign, the planned ad 
featured an “all-American family” sitting down to enjoy a plate of 
freshly baked Pillsbury cookies.  In the ad, the dad discovers, to his 
dismay, that someone has drunk the last of the milk.  The culprit turns 
out to be a chagrined Doughboy, who promptly dashes off camera.  
Pillsbury would not, however, consent to the Doughboy being portrayed 
in this manner.  Pillsbury’s director of brand development explained why 
the company rejected the ad:  “For some other character, taking the milk 
might be fine. . . .   But not the Doughboy.  He doesn’t trick people.  He 
doesn’t take advantage.  It’s not in his character to do that.”280 
                                                
275 Shalit, supra note 266.  Other trademark icons are similarly invested with 
personalities.  An advertising executive described the M&M characters as 
follows:  “The red M&M – he’s the calculating one.  A little bit small-minded, a 
little ambitious and full of himself.  Yellow is good hearted, but a bit slow on the 
uptake.  Blue is closer to Woody Allen in terms of attitude.  A little more wry, a 
little more understated.  Occasionally a bit sarcastic.”  Id.  
276 Walshe, supra note 266, at 45.  
277 Id. 
278 Id. at 47.  
279 Ruth Shalit, The Mr. Peanut Chronicles: Burned by past disasters, icon 
managers have learned the hard way that the suave mascot must never wear a 
wetsuit and that Ronald McDonald cannot hang out in bars, SALON.COM 
(March 24, 2000), http://www.salon.com/media/col/shal/2000/03/24/doughboy2. 
280 Shalit, supra note 266. 
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Given Pillsbury’s refusal to have the Doughboy portrayed as 
“mischievous” enough to drink the last of the milk,281 it is perhaps not 
surprising that the company filed a lawsuit when the Doughboy appeared 
in Screw magazine engaging in sexual intercourse and fellatio.282  In that 
case, Pillsbury prevailed on its state law dilution claim,283 but the court 
declined to grant relief for “tarnishment of trade characters,” which it 
characterized as a “theretofore unheard of cause of action.”284  In 
pleading this cause of action, Pillsbury claimed that the defendant had 
“altered the image” of the Doughboy, to whom it referred as its 
“corporate spokesman,” in a way that made him “distasteful or even 
repulsive” to many Pillsbury customers.285  Pillsbury’s “tarnishment of 
trade character” cause of action clearly evinces a perceived entitlement to 
a type of moral right in its trademark Doughboy.  Although the purported 
“trade character” cause of action was unsuccessful, Pillsbury got the 
same injunctive relief under a claim of dilution. 
In a similar vein, toymaker Mattel sued artist Thomas Forsythe 
when he produced a series of photos that depicted “one or more nude 
Barbie dolls juxtaposed with vintage kitchen appliances” in “various 
absurd and often sexualized positions” (“Food Chain Barbie”).286  The 
artist explained that the photos were intended to critique and lambaste 
the “objectification of women” and “conventional beauty myth” 
embodied by Barbie.287  Forsythe earned less than $3,700 in gross 
revenue from the Food Chain Barbie series of photographs, over half of 
which derived from sales to Mattel investigators.288  The Ninth Circuit 
                                                
281 Id. According to the Milk Processor Board, one reason cited by Pillsbury for 
refusing the milk-and-cookies ad was the lack of the word “mischievous” in the 
Doughboy guidelines.  “‘Playful’ is there.  ‘Mischievous’ is not.”  Id. 
282 Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 125, 126 (N.D. Ga. 
1981). 
283 Pillsbury Co., 214 U.S.P.Q. at 135. The court reasoned that “[t]he basis for 
[the dilution] cause of action is the belief that the owner of these marks should 
not have to stand by and watch the diminution in their value as a result of 
unauthorized uses by others. All the plaintiff need show to prevail is that the 
contested use is likely to injure its commercial reputation or dilute the distinctive 
quality of its marks.”  Id. 
284 Id. 
285 Id. 
286 Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2003).  
(“For example, ‘Malted Barbie’ features a nude Barbie placed on a vintage 
Hamilton Beach malt machine. ‘Fondue a la Barbie’ depicts Barbie heads in a 
fondue pot. ‘Barbie Enchiladas’ depicts four Barbie dolls wrapped in tortillas 
and covered with salsa in a casserole dish in a lit oven.”)  Id. 
287 Id.  
288 Id. at 797 & n.3.  
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affirmed summary judgment for Forsythe on Mattel’s trademark and 
trade dress dilution claims, holding that the works constituted a 
noncommercial fair use and were protected by the First Amendment.289 
Although Mattel and Pillsbury clearly have a tremendous 
economic stake in their brands, the amount of money and effort they 
invested in these lawsuits is disproportionate to the economic threat 
posed by these defendants.  Particularly in the Mattel case, the artistic 
depictions of Barbie that offended the company received vastly greater 
circulation and publicity as a result of the lawsuit than ever would have 
been the case if the artist had been ignored.  Moreover, the company 
spent more money litigating the claim than the economic harm caused by 
the artist, if any, could possibly justify.290  Both lawsuits used claims for 
trademark dilution as a tool to preserve the perceived integrity of their 
famous trademarks, much like an artist who raises a claim of moral rights 
to prevent the mutilation or distortion of his work.  In the United States, 
however, the corporate trademark holder is more likely to succeed on 
such a claim, under a theory of dilution, than would be the artist. 
C.  The Path to Moral Rights in Trademark 
Given this country’s hesitance to guarantee or enforce the moral 
rights of authors, even in the face of an international treaty compelling it 
to do so, it is difficult to imagine why the U.S. would be willing to 
extend such rights to corporations.291  If dilution is in fact a type of moral 
right, or at least analogous to one, then the immediate question becomes 
why it exists.  
  
                                                
289 Id. at 812.     
290 In addition to granting summary judgment in favor of the artist/defendant in 
this case, the district court also awarded defendant $1.8 million in attorney fees 
and costs. Id. at 816.  The court noted that “[p]laintiff had access to 
sophisticated counsel who could have determined that such a suit was 
objectively unreasonable and frivolous. Instead, it appears Plaintiff forced 
Defendant into costly litigation to discourage him from using Barbie’s image in 
his artwork.” Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 2004 WL 1454100 (C.D. 
Cal. 2004).   
291 See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Markets, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 137, 172 n.167 (2010) (noting that “the moral rights argument would be 
particularly unpersuasive in the trademark context, since moral rights are 
thought to derive from the intimate connection an author has with her work. The 
‘authors’ of trademarks, which generally are corporate entities, have no human 
dignity at stake when others use their marks.”) 
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1. Dilution as a “Moral” Right  
The cause of action for trademark dilution bears more than a 
passing resemblance to the author’s moral right of integrity, the right to 
prevent others from mutilating or distorting the author’s work.292  In a 
manner not unlike the author who has created a sculpture or work of 
literature, the companies who create and nurture famous trademarks have 
a genuine desire to maintain and enhance the image they have created for 
their brands.  The author likewise has an intrinsically personal interest in 
ensuring that his vision for the work he created is not distorted by others, 
even those who may obtain a subsequent ownership interest in his work. 
Dilution, at least in its modern conception, protects a 
corporation’s right to preserve the “integrity” of a famous trademark by 
granting a broad power to restrict others’ use of the mark, even when the 
trademark holder cannot show that it has been economically harmed by 
that use.  As discussed above, if the trademark holder can prove that a 
consumer is likely to “associate” the famous trademark with that of the 
defendant, then that association is, in many cases, tantamount to proof of 
a likelihood of dilution.293  Whether the cause of action for dilution is 
based on a theory of blurring or tarnishment, the effect is the same:  the 
owner of the famous trademark obtains a considerable degree of control 
over the manner in which the mark can be used by others, even 
referentially, particularly in commercial settings. 
2. Legislating Moral Rights in the Copyright and Trademark Arenas 
One reason why trademark dilution has encountered less 
legislative resistance than moral rights in the copyright context is 
because dilution does not expressly bear the “moral rights” label.  
Dilution as a cause of action is instead justified under the same basic 
economic model that grounds claims for trademark infringement, i.e., 
reduction of consumer search costs and preservation of goodwill.294  
Although some commentators have referred to dilution as a “moral right” 
in a trademark,295 Congress and the courts have not.  If the corporations 
                                                
292 See supra notes 240-243 and accompanying text.  
293 See supra notes 142-186 and accompanying text. 
294 See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.  
295 See, e.g., Kenneth L. Port, The Expansion Trajectory: Trademark 
Jurisprudence in the Modern Age, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 474, 
486 (2010) (“The trademark right in the United States has slowly come to be far 
more similar to the nature and extent of moral right protection, rather than the 
mere right to exclude.”); see also Robert C. Bird, Moral Rights: Diagnosis and 
Rehabilitation, 46 AM. BUS. L. J. 407, 438-39 (2009) (comparing trademark 
dilution protection and moral rights); Kenneth L. Port, Judging Dilution in the 
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who hold famous trademarks had directly asked Congress to pass 
legislation preserving their “moral rights” in those marks, they probably 
would have been considerably less successful. 
The relative ease with which trademark dilution legislation was 
passed in the U.S. Congress, as compared to VARA, can also be 
explained, at least in part, through pure and simple politics.296  The 
corporations that hold famous trademarks are some of the wealthiest and 
most influential companies in the United States.  For example, in 2012, 
the three most valuable brands, Apple, IBM, and Google,297 were all 
listed among the top 100 of the Fortune 500 companies.298  These 
corporations are all members of the International Trademark Association 
(INTA), a group that describes itself as “a leading advocate for the 
interests of brand owners”299 and “a powerful network of powerful 
brands.”300  Representatives of INTA and other advocacy groups that 
promote the interests of trademark holders, such as the American 
Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA), provided extensive 
testimony to Congress on the TDRA.301  By contrast, only a limited 
                                                                                                         
United States and Japan, 17 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 667, 681 
(2008) [hereinafter Judging Dilution] (“The only justification that makes sense 
[for U.S. dilution laws] is to say that the holders of famous marks obtain a 
personality right in and to that mark much like the notion of a moral right.”); 
Roe, supra note 160, at 604 (characterizing dilution by tarnishment as 
“analogous to copyright law’s moral rights doctrine”).  
296 Professor Denicola has also observed that an imbalance of political power 
may at least be partially responsible for the expansion of trademark rights in 
recent years.  See Robert C. Denicola, Freedom to Copy, 108 YALE L.J. 1661, 
1683–84 (1999) (noting that, compared to copyright users, “[t]he users of 
others’ trademarks. . . are less likely to be either influential or sympathetic”).  
297 BrandZ Top 100 Most Valuable Global Brands 2012, MILLWARDBROWN, 
HTTP://WWW.MILLWARDBROWN.COM/BRANDZ/2012/DOCUMENTS/2012_BRANDZ
_TOP100_CHART.PDF (last visited Aug. 31, 2012).  
298 On the Fortune 500 list for 2012, Apple ranked 17th; IBM was 19th; and 
Google was 73rd.  Fortune 500, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/ 
magazines/fortune/fortune500/2012/full_list/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2012).    
299 Policy and Advocacy, INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK ASS’N, 
http://www.inta.org/Advocacy/Pages/main.aspx (last visited Aug. 15, 2012).    
300 Overview, INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, http://www.inta.org/About/Pages 
/Overview.aspx (last visited Aug. 15, 2012).  INTA’s members include “5,900 
trademark owners, professionals and academics from more than 190 countries.”  
Id. 
301 See, e.g., Federal Trademark Dilution Act Hearing of the Subcommittee on 
Courts, The Internet, and Intellectual Property of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong., 2d Sess., Serial No. 53 (Feb. 14, 2003) (statement of 
Kathryn Barrett Park, Executive Vice President, International Trademark 
Association, arguing in favor of a likelihood of dilution standard of proof);  id. 
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amount of opposing testimony was offered by free speech advocates such 
as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).  In passing the earlier 
version of the federal dilution law, the FTDA, Congress heard hardly any 
testimony, and all of it was in favor of the bill.302   Comparatively 
speaking, federal dilution legislation cut through Congress like a hot 
knife through butter. 
By contrast, proponents of moral rights legislation in the 
copyright context faced a much stiffer opposition, in particular, the 
powerful entertainment and film industries.303  Although, like the FTDA, 
VARA passed through Congress with little debate, that lack of debate did 
not evidence a lack of opposition.  VARA passed on the last day of the 
Congressional session, and it was included in a bill that authorized 
eighty-five new federal judgeships.304  Without that piece of legislative 
horse-trading (and the compromises that have weakened VARA’s 
impact),305 it is unclear whether and in what form VARA would have 
been passed. 
3. The Rhetoric of Moral Rights 
Substantive as well as political reasons help to explain the ease 
with which dilution has been accepted and implemented as a moral right, 
while those same types of rights have encountered so much hostility in 
the copyright context.  First, dilution neatly fits into the rhetoric of the 
natural law of property rights and hostility to free riding on the efforts 
and property of others.  These themes are pervasive in American 
jurisprudence, including intellectual property law.  Moral rights in the 
copyright context, however, cut against that grain.  Dilution is viewed as 
                                                                                                         
(statement of Michael K. Kirk, Executive Director of the American Intellectual 
Property Law Association).   
302 The Supreme Court summarized the legislative history of the FTDA as 
follows:  “On July 19, 1995, the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual 
Property of the House Judiciary Committee held a 1-day hearing on H.R. 1295. 
No opposition to the bill was voiced at the hearing and, with one minor 
amendment that extended protection to unregistered as well as registered marks, 
the subcommittee endorsed the bill and it passed the House unanimously. . . . In 
the Senate an identical bill, S. 1513, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., was introduced on 
December 29, 1995, and passed on the same day by voice vote without any 
hearings.”  Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 431 (2003). 
303 See KWALL, supra note 240, at 28; see also David Goldberg & Robert J. 
Bernstein, Legislation by the 101st Congress, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 18, 1991, at 3 
(noting “intense and extensive opposition to extending specific moral rights 
protection to audiovisual and other works”).  
304 See KWALL, supra note 240, at 28 (describing VARA legislative history). 
305 See supra notes 247-255 and accompanying text. 
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protecting property holders’ rights against interlopers (i.e., “pirates and 
cheats”306).  On the other hand, the moral rights of authors have been 
characterized as undermining property rights.  Second, extensive moral 
rights protections in copyright law have been criticized for having a 
negative impact on the First Amendment rights of others, due to the 
restrictions moral rights may place on works that have otherwise entered 
the public sphere.307  Although trademark dilution laws have also been 
criticized for their negative impact on that same public sphere and the 
First Amendment, that criticism has been more muted because these 
laws, by their nature and by statutory definition, typically impact 
commercial speech.  At least until relatively recently, commercial speech 
has been entitled to limited First Amendment protection. 
The rhetoric of property rights is prevalent in trademark law.308  
The Lockean notion that one should not reap where one has not sown has 
intuitive appeal, and has been cited as the true policy concern driving the 
development and expansion of trademark dilution law in the United 
States.309  Although trademark law, at least in the modern era, has 
consistently warned that trademark rights are limited and do not exist “in 
gross,” it is equally certain that the holders of famous trademarks view 
them as extremely valuable forms of property over which they should 
exercise considerable, if not complete, control.  As explained by a 
spokesperson for Ralph Lauren, “We consider the Polo brands to be the 
                                                
306 The legislative history of the Lanham Act specifies that “where the owner of 
a trade-mark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the 
product, he is protected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates 
and cheats.”  S.Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1946).  
307 See Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Right in Copyright, 58 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 795, 814 (2001) (observing that, when an author objects to the 
alteration or use of his work in a context that may be characterized as “fair use,” 
“implementation of the traditional droit moral may result in prohibiting actions 
based on the First Amendment’s right of free expression”) (emphasis added).   
308 The Lockean notion that one is entitled to the fruits of one’s labor – and the 
converse, that one is not entitled to profit from the results of someone’s else’s 
labor – was dominant in the nineteenth century and prevalent in early trademark 
law.  Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1847, 1876 (2007).  
309 See, e.g., David J. Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a 
Coherent Theory of the Anti-Free-Rider Principle in American Trademark Law, 
56 HASTINGS L. J. 117, 119 (2004) (“A strong case can be made that free-riding 
on a famous mark is unfair and economically undesirable. The judicial 
inclination to punish free-riding deserves respect and refinement, not dismissive 
condemnation.”); see also S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946) 
(“Where the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy, time and money in 
presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his investment from its 
appropriation by pirates and cheats.”) (legislative history of 1946 Lanham Act).   
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essence of our company.  They are our identity, our face, our worth – in 
other words, our property.  For Polo Ralph Lauren, and many other 
American companies, the most valuable piece of property that they own 
is their good name, or, as we say in the industry, their brand . . . .”310  
Dilution law enables trademark holders to prevent others from free-
riding on their “property,” an idea that resonates in U.S. law, even 
though U.S. dilution law has never codified this policy goal, and it has 
been subject to vigorous critique.311  In other nations’ legal systems, such 
as the European Union and Japan, the desire to discourage and punish 
free-riders explicitly justifies and underlies trademark dilution statutes.312 
                                                
310 Oral Statement of Sherry L. Jetter, Vice President, Intellectual Property, Polo 
Ralph Lauren Corporation, before the Hearing of the Subcommittee on Courts, 
The Internet, and Intellectual Property of the Committee on the Judiciary, 107th 
Cong., 2d Sess., Serial No. 53 (Feb. 14, 2003).  
311 The anti-free riding impulse in U.S. unfair competition law historically has 
been tempered by the law’s concurrent resistance to monopoly and devotion to 
the value of competition, which is inevitably restrained when the ability to copy 
is impeded.  In the words of an iconic First Amendment scholar, “Most of us get 
along by developing the ideas of others.  That is how the world progresses. . . .  
‘A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant can see farther than the giant 
himself.’  Columbus discovered America, but here we are.”  Zechariah Chafee, 
Unfair Competition, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1318 (1940).  Many commentators 
have deplored the dangers of “over-propertizing” trademark law.  See, e.g., 
Lemley & McKenna, supra note 291, at 187 (concluding that “a trademark law 
that is distorted into a right to own markets—one that seeks out and tries to 
forbid all free riding on a mark—ends up interfering with rather than enabling 
competition”); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L. J. 
367, 455 (1999) (concluding that “property-based trademark is likely to have a 
more substantial anticompetitive impact than deception-based trademark”); 
Stacey L. Dogan, What is Dilution, Anyway?, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 103, 106 (2006) (arguing in favor of retaining a dilution standard 
focused on preventing harm to the plaintiff, rather than punishing free riding by 
the defendant).      
312 In the European Union, “marks with a reputation” are protected from uses 
that take “unfair advantage of” or are “detrimental to the distinctive character or 
the repute of the trade mark.” First Council Directive to Approximate the Laws 
of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks 89/104/EEC, art. 5, 1989 O. J. (L 
40) 5 (EC).  See Thomas J. McCarthy, Dilution of a Trademark: European and 
United States Law Compared, 94 TRADEMARK RPTR. 1163, 1165 (2004) 
(arguing that the phrase in the European Union’s Trademark Directive, “without 
due cause takes unfair advantage,” invokes the notion of free riding); Marcus H. 
Luepke, Taking Unfair Advantage or Dilution of a Famous Mark—A 20/20 
Perspective on the Blurred Differences Between U.S. and E.U. Dilution Law, 98 
TRADEMARK RPTR. 789, 813 (2008) (noting the “unfair advantage” cases 
recognized by the European Union include “instances where there is clear 
exploitation and free-riding”); see also Port, Judging Dilution, supra note 295, 
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In the copyright context, however, moral rights are controversial 
largely because they have been characterized as restricting the property 
rights of copyright owners, who often are not the original author(s) of the 
work.313  Under U.S. law, copyrights are alienable and transferrable.314  
The notion that an author should be able to control the manner in which 
her work is used, even after she has sold her copyright in the work to 
someone else, contradicts the fundamental definition of what it means to 
“own” something in the United States.315  Some have argued that 
investment of moral rights in existing works might effect an 
unconstitutional taking of property (from the holder of the copyright).316  
Therefore, moral rights law, in the copyright context, clashes with the 
rhetoric of property.  Moreover, when legislation implementing the 
Berne Convention was debated in Congress, that clash generated 
considerable political opposition from powerful groups who purchase 
and hold large numbers of copyrights (e.g., movie studios), who did not 
wish to have laws enacted that would constrain their ability to exploit 
their copyrights.       
Moral rights in copyright law have also encountered resistance 
due to their perceived negative impact on the public domain.  Unlike 
trademarks, which can continue to exist so long as they are being used, 
                                                                                                         
at 681–82 (“The concern in Japan centers around . . .  whether a defendant 
simply is riding on the goodwill of another.”).  
313 Media mogul Ted Turner, who undertook to colorize certain films that had 
originally been shot on black-and-white film, encountered resistance from the 
original directors of those films.  In response to the controversy, he stated, “The 
last time I checked, I own those films.”  William H. Honan, Artists, Newly 
Militant, Fight for their Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1988, at C29.   
314 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining a “transfer of copyright ownership” as 
“an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, 
alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights 
comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, 
but not including a nonexclusive license”); see also 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (transfer 
of copyright must be in writing).  
315 See Lee, supra note 307, at 814 (“The notion that an artist may, in the name 
of the personal interests in the work, prevent the purchaser and holder of title in 
the work from doing with it what she wishes may run contrary to the American 
socio-legal culture and border on the heretical.”); see also Roberta Kwall, 
Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. 
L. REV. 1, 2 (1985) (referring to the “tradition of safeguarding only the 
pecuniary rights of a copyright owner” in the United States). 
316 See, e.g., Lawrence Adam Beyer, Intentionalism, Art, and the Suppression of 
Innovation: Film Colorization and the Philosophy of Moral Rights, 82 NW. 
UNIV. L. REV. 1011, 1071 (1988).  
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copyrights eventually expire.317  When they do, works of authorship pass 
into the public domain, for the public to use as they see fit, regardless of 
the desires of the author.318   Moreover, even during the life of the 
copyright, the statutory fair use doctrine and the First Amendment permit 
uses of copyrights that are arguably inconsistent with the concept of 
moral rights.319  For these reasons, not only copyright owners but also 
free speech advocates have opposed the adoption and vigorous 
enforcement of moral rights laws in the context of U.S. copyright law.320 
Free speech advocates have opposed the enactment and 
enforcement of dilution law as well, but their arguments have had less 
impact, in part for the political reasons discussed above.  Moreover, as a 
substantive matter, free speech arguments in the trademark context have 
had limited success because most trademark disputes arise in the 
commercial speech arena.  When trademark holders have filed lawsuits 
to constrain noncommercial speech, specifically artistic speech that is 
more frequently the subject of copyright disputes, their arguments have 
met with limited success.321  Although dilution law undoubtedly imposes 
costs in terms of its impact on the right to free expression protected by 
the First Amendment, as discussed infra, those costs have often been 
downplayed (perhaps unjustifiably) because the speech constrained is 
commercial.322 
 
 
 
                                                
317 See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (listing duration of copyright for various types of 
work); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (upholding 
constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension Act, which extended the duration 
of most copyrights to the life of the author plus seventy years).  
318 VARA does not conflict with this aspect of copyright law, as it provides that 
its rights do not extend beyond the life of the author. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1). 
319 See supra note 307. 
320 But see NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 216 (2008) 
(arguing that limited moral rights protections in the United States would 
enhance rather than detract from First Amendment values).  
321 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that the use of the Barbie trademark in a song lampooning Barbie  
qualified as a non-commercial use under FTDA and therefore did not dilute the 
Barbie mark); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 
2003) (holding that the use of the Barbie trademark in photographic works of 
parody did not dilute or infringe).  
322 See infra notes 361–369 and accompanying text (analyzing constitutionality 
of dilution as a restriction on commercial speech).  
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4. An Alternative Explanation: The Right of Publicity 
Trademark holders’ rights under dilution law have also been 
analogized to the right of publicity.323  The right of publicity (which 
exists under state law only324) gives an individual the ability to control 
others’ use of his image or identity for commercial purposes.325  The 
right of publicity has itself been characterized as a type of moral right, as 
it originated (at least in part) to protect the integrity of the individual.326  
Particularly in the case of anthropomorphized famous trademarks, like 
Barbie and the Pillsbury Doughboy, it is not difficult to see the parallels 
between an individual’s right of publicity and a famous trademark 
holder’s right to protection against dilution.  If Vanna White has the right 
to enjoin Samsung’s use of a wheel-spinning robot that evokes her 
image,327 why shouldn’t Barbie have the right to control others’ 
commercial use of her image as well?  Moreover, the right of publicity, 
like dilution laws328 and unlike the droit moral in the copyright 
                                                
323 See, e.g., Mary LaFrance & Gail H. Cline, Identical Cousins?: On the Road 
with Dilution and the Right of Publicity, 24 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. 
L. J. 641, 642–645 (2008) (discussing the parallels between dilution law and the 
right of publicity); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 89, at 1197–1200 (same).  
324 Compared to state law claims for dilution, state laws regarding the right of 
publicity are much less uniform.  Moreover, there is no federal cause of action 
for infringement of the right of publicity.  Therefore, although generalizations 
can be made about this tort, based on the rules adopted in the majority of states 
that recognize the cause of action, its application varies widely, depending on 
the jurisdiction. 
325 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (1995) (defining 
such “purposes of trade” relevant for the right of publicity claim); Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977) (holding that news 
broadcast of plaintiff’s performance as a “human cannonball” violated plaintiff’s 
right of publicity); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (holding that use of a female-shaped robot in defendant’s 
advertisement violated plaintiff’s right of publicity); Haelan Labs v. Topps 
Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953) (recognizing a baseball 
player’s right of publicity in his image); Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr for Social 
Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prod., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 702–03 (Ga. 1982) 
(holding that the manufacture and sale of plastic busts of Dr. Martin Luther King 
violated right of publicity held by Dr. King’s heirs).  
326 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 89, at 1180–84 (discussing moral rights 
theory underlying the right of publicity). 
327 See White, 971 F.2d at 1399 (holding that the defendant’s advertisement, 
when viewed as a whole, violated Vanna White’s right of publicity); see also 
Stacey L. Dogan, An Exclusive Right To Evoke, 44 B.C. L. REV. 291, 292 n.7 
(2003) (discussing the White case). 
328 See supra notes 306-312 and accompanying text.  
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context,329 arguably finds justification in the anti-free-riding impulse that 
permeates property law in the United States.330 
However, there are some key differences between the right of 
publicity and the dilution cause of action as well.  At least in its modern 
conception and in the typical case, the right of publicity relates less to the 
individual’s desire and ability to control her image and more to her 
ability to profit from it.331  Therefore, damages (in addition to injunctive 
relief) are routinely awarded as a form of relief in right of publicity 
cases.332  However, damages are the exception and not the rule in the 
context of dilution law.  Under state dilution laws, an injunction was 
originally the only form of available relief.  Even under the TDRA, 
damages are available only in cases of “willful” dilution, and injunctive 
relief remains the primary form of remedy.333  Moreover, at least in most 
                                                
329 See supra notes 313-316 and accompanying text.  
330 See, e.g., Sheldon Halpern, The Right of Publicity: The Maturation of an 
Independent Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 
HASTINGS L.J. 853, 873 (1995) (“There is, at bottom, recognition of the fact that 
there is something wrong, a manifest ‘unfairness,’ when one person seeks to 
trade on the personality of another.  The right of publicity is the means to 
address and ameliorate that wrong.”); but see Dogan & Lemley, supra note 89, 
at 1181-83 (critiquing “labor and unjust enrichment rationales” for the right of 
publicity).    
331 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 89, at 1181–82 (“Even assuming that 
human dignity includes the right to prevent people from making true statements 
about you to sell a commercial product, it fits uneasily with a right of publicity 
that is only rarely about preventing such uses and almost always about 
maximizing the celebrity’s profit from them.”) 
332 Statutory damages are commonly available under right of publicity statutes.  
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2012) (providing for relief in the 
form of statutory damages of $750 or actual damages, whichever is greater); 
WASH. REV. CODE. § 63.60.060(2) (2011) (providing for relief in the form of 
statutory damages of $1500 or actual damages, whichever is greater); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2741.07(A)(1)(a)&(b) (West 2011) (providing for relief in the 
form of statutory damages of $2,500-$10,000 or actual damages, at plaintiff’s 
election).  At least at common law, the right of publicity may also require proof 
of harm as an element of the cause of action.  See, e.g., Slivinsky v. Watkins–
Johnson Co., 270 Cal. Rptr. 585, 590 (Cal. App. 1990) (“Resulting injury is the 
sine qua non of a cause of action for misappropriation of name.”); Cohen v. 
Facebook, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (same). 
333 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (providing for injunctive relief when plaintiff 
proves likelihood of dilution); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5)(B)(i)&(ii) (providing for 
damages and potentially attorney fees when defendant’s conduct is “willful”); 
see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 14247(a) & (b) (West 2008) (providing for 
injunctive relief; damages available only when defendant’s conduct is willful).    
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states, the right of publicity is freely alienable and transferable.334  
Trademarks generally are not.  Under trademark law, at least in theory, 
the holder of a famous trademark cannot sell or even license it without 
also transferring the accompanying goodwill.335  Transfers of interest 
without goodwill can lead to the invalidation of the trademark. 
These doctrinal divergences derive from the variance in the 
theory and policy at the core of these respective doctrines.  Although the 
right of publicity has origins in the right of privacy and other distinctly 
“moral” predicates, the doctrine in its current form is more about 
commodification than control.  The basic theory behind most right-of-
publicity cases is that the defendant has unjustly profited by using the 
plaintiff’s image or likeness, without her consent.  The right of publicity 
tort forces the defendant to pay plaintiff for the use of her image. 
The desire to be compensated for economic harm (even under a 
theory of unjust enrichment) has never driven trademark holders’ 
enthusiasm for the dilution claim.  Although dilution laws are justified on 
                                                
334 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2741.04 (West 2011) (“The right of 
publicity in an individual’s persona is freely transferable and descendible. . . .”); 
WASH. REV. CODE. § 63.60.030(1) (2011) (right of publicity “shall be freely 
transferable, assignable, and licensable, in whole or in part”); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 47-25-1103(b) (2012) (right of publicity is “freely assignable and licensable”); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 597.800(1) (2011) (right of publicity is “freely 
transferable”); IND. CODE § 32-36-1-16 (2012) (right of publicity is “freely 
transferrable and descendible, in whole or in part”). 
335 Both naked licenses and assignments in gross (transfers of interest in a 
trademark without the accompanying goodwill) are considered forms of 
trademark abandonment.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1) (allowing trademarks to be 
assigned “with goodwill”); In re XMH Corp., 647 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(“A trademark owner . . .  might delegate so much responsibility to the service 
provider as to lose the right or power to assure the quality of the trademarked 
brand, and then he would lose the trademark. . . .”); Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp. v. Marvel Enterprises, Inc., 277 F.3d 253, 259 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that 
the licensor of a trademark must “maintain some control over the quality of the 
licensed property . . . . or risk abandonment of its mark”); Tumblebus, Inc. v. 
Cranmer, 399 F.3d 754, 764–65 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that one method for 
abandoning the trademark is through “naked licensing”); Marshak v. Green, 746 
F.2d 927, 929–30 (2d Cir.1984) (observing that courts have not allowed trade 
names or marks to be validly assigned in gross); but see Calboli, The Sunset of 
Quality Control, supra note 83, at 384 (arguing that recent practices involving 
assignments or licenses-back “profoundly deviate[] from the traditional view of 
trademark law”); Calboli, Trademark Assignment with Goodwill, supra note 83, 
at 774 (noting that “trademark practices have traditionally provided instruments 
to minimize, if not legally overcome, the effects” of the rule against assignment 
in gross). 
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the theory that dilution causes economic harm, that harm is 
acknowledged to be so inchoate and minute, at least in individual cases, 
as to be incapable of measure.  Therefore, the cause of action exists 
“regardless of the presence or absence of . . . actual economic injury.”336  
Famous trademark holders do not want alleged diluters to pay for the use 
of famous marks; they want such unauthorized uses to cease.  As 
explained above, the most likely explanation for the trademark dilution 
claim – one which is consistent with the elements of the cause of action 
and the typical forms of relief that it provides – derives from the 
trademark holder’s desire to control the manner in which others use (or 
evoke) the famous mark. 
5. Dilution and the Personification of Corporate America 
Despite their differences, the right of publicity and the copyright 
concept of moral rights do share one key trait:  they are distinctly 
personal rights.  Extending this type of right to the holders of famous 
trademarks, the vast majority (if not all) of which are corporations, 
continues the trend seen in other areas of the law, such as the First 
Amendment, in which distinctions between the legal rights of natural 
persons and the corporate personality have faded.  In Citizens United, the 
United States Supreme Court held that political speech, in the form of 
monetary campaign contributions made by corporate entities, was 
entitled to full First Amendment protection.337  This opinion has been 
subject to vigorous critique, not just for its public policy implications in 
terms of campaign finance regulation, but also for its conclusion that 
corporations should enjoy the same First Amendment rights as 
individuals.  Writing in dissent, Justice Stevens opined that “[t]he conceit 
that corporations must be treated identically to natural persons in the 
political sphere is not only inaccurate but also inadequate to justify the 
Court’s disposition of this case.”338 
                                                
336 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006).  
337 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 900 (2010) (holding that “political 
speech does not lose First Amendment protection ‘simply because its source is a 
corporation’”) (citation omitted).  The Court observed that “[c]orporations and 
other associations, like individuals, contribute to the ‘discussion, debate, and the 
dissemination of information and ideas’ that the First Amendment seeks to 
foster.” Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also id. at 904 (“Political speech ‘is 
indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true because 
the speech comes from a corporation rather than an individual.’”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
338 Id. at 930 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see generally Randall P. Bezanson, No 
Middle Ground? Reflections on the Citizens United Decision, 96 IOWA L. REV. 
649 (2011) (critiquing the Citizens United decision).  
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The policy implications of extending moral rights to the 
corporate holders of famous trademarks—like the expansion of speech 
rights for corporate actors in Citizens United—are significant.  If the 
point of dilution law is to allow the holders of famous trademarks to 
preserve the integrity of their marks and to prevent others from 
mutilating them, then logically they should not be required to prove 
actual harm, actual dilution of the mark’s distinctiveness or goodwill, or 
actual damages.  The harm caused by the violation of a moral right is 
inchoate and essentially incapable of economic proof.  When the proper 
label is placed on the cause of action, however, a further, more 
fundamental question should be answered: Should we enforce a cause of 
action that enables corporations to protect their “moral rights” in a 
trademark?  If so, should that cause of action look like the current 
version of the federal dilution law?  The answer to those questions, as 
explained below, is “no.” 
III. DILUTION REFORM 
Vindicating the moral rights of corporations may seem like a 
questionable legislative endeavor.  However, if the dilution cause of 
action imposed no costs—in other words, if dilution laws were harmless, 
as some have perceived them to be—then the exact nature of the interest 
they are intended to protect would be largely academic.  Dilution laws 
do, however, impose substantial costs that must be considered in 
assessing whether the cause of action should continue to exist, at least in 
its current form.  Those costs, particularly the negative impact on speech 
and competition created by the enforcement of these laws, outweigh their 
benefits.  Although the outright repeal of the TDRA is unlikely, the 
statute should be amended or at least narrowly construed to minimize the 
externalities that it imposes. 
A.  Why Dilution Laws Matter 
The practical effect of a dilution cause of action is difficult to 
precisely identify.  Few complaints solely assert a cause of action for 
trademark dilution.  Moreover, famous trademarks are entitled to such a 
broad degree of protection in trademark infringement actions that the 
dilution claim is typically superfluous.339  Perhaps as a result, empirical 
data from the ten-year period preceding enactment of the TDRA (1996-
                                                
339 Beebe, supra note 105, at 1161; see also Robert N. Klieger, Trademark 
Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 
58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 846–47 (1997) (noting that trademark dilution law 
“simply relieves the senior users of such marks from having to make a confusion 
showing”). 
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2006) indicated declining rates of enforcement of dilution claims in 
federal courts.340  Based on this data, Professor Clarissa Long concluded 
that “[i]n the federal courts, . . . dilution cases are not exactly a 
juggernaut.”341  An empirical study of cases decided in the year 
following the enactment of the TDRA yielded similar results, leading 
Professor Barton Beebe to opine that the dilution claim remained 
superfluous and that anti-dilution law had “no appreciable effect on the 
outcomes of federal trademark cases or the remedies issuing from those 
outcomes.”342 
The characterization of dilution claims as superfluous hardly 
constitutes a ringing endorsement.343  As Professor Beebe and others 
have argued, famous trademark holders may not “need” dilution 
protection in the vast majority of cases, given the scope of modern 
trademark infringement law.  If dilution claims imposed no costs, their 
superfluous nature would at least potentially render them harmless if not 
helpful. 
However, dilution claims tend to matter the most when their 
potential for negative impact on speech and competition hits its peak: 
cases in which the plaintiff cannot prove trademark infringement, even 
under today’s broad standards.  Conversely, in such cases the likelihood 
that the trademark holder has suffered any significant economic injury 
reaches its nadir.  The manner in which courts have interpreted the 
TDRA (in addition to the language of the Act itself) has exacerbated this 
problem.  Moreover, the mere threat of a dilution suit in federal court, 
with the possibility of being forced to pay plaintiff’s attorney fees in 
addition to your own, is often more than enough to chill protected speech 
and potentially suppress competition.  As a result, the cost of superfluous 
or even frivolous dilution claims may be substantial. 
B.  The Externalities of Modern Dilution Law 
Dilution laws come close to granting trademark rights “in gross.”  
Traditionally, trademark law has not reached this far, primarily because 
(1) unlike copyrights and patents, trademarks are not constitutionally 
sanctioned monopolies; and (2) also unlike copyrights and patents, 
                                                
340 Clarissa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1029, 1031 (2006) 
(observing that the relief rate for dilution claims has been on a “downward 
trajectory” since the first year of the FTDA’s existence).  
341 Id.   
342 Barton Beebe, The Continuing Debacle of U.S. Antidilution Law: Evidence 
from the First Year of Trademark Dilution Revision Act Case Law, 24 SANTA 
CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 449, 450 (2007-2008).   
343 The phrase “damning with faint praise” comes to mind.  
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trademarks do not have an expiration date; they endure so long as they 
continue to be used to identify the mark holder’s goods or services.344  
The expansive rights granted by trademark dilution laws have been 
justified or at least excused on the grounds that, in practical application, 
they impose little in terms of costs.345  In other words, protecting 
trademark holders against dilution has been characterized as creating few 
significant externalities.  This view of trademark dilution law, however, 
underestimates its capacity to harm. 
1. The Clash between Dilution Law and the Value of Speech 
The famous trademarks that are most likely to qualify for 
dilution protection, e.g., Google and Coca-Cola, are ironically the marks 
that objectively need dilution protection the least.  Empirically speaking, 
their fame insulates them from dilution, as the brand is so well 
established in the consumer’s mind that it is difficult to budge.346  
Moreover, their sheer ubiquity makes it easy to argue, whatever the 
context, that another’s use of the same or a similar mark will lead to a 
likelihood of consumer confusion. 
These marks are also the ones that carry with them the most 
potential for expressive use.347   The famous brands that are entitled to 
protection under the TDRA are not just “mega-valuable corporate 
assets”; they also are part of contemporary culture and, as such, embody 
a host of linguistic meanings.348  As discussed above, the corporations 
                                                
344 See Desai & Rierson, supra note 17, at 1800–01 (discussing distinctions 
between trademarks and copyrights and patents, and the policies underlying the 
prohibition of trademark rights “in gross”).   
345 See supra notes 339–342 and accompanying text; but see Carter, supra note 
80, at 784-86 (arguing that trademark law insufficiently accounts for the 
externalities that it creates). 
346 See supra notes 104–105 and accompanying text.  
347 See Desai & Rierson, supra note 17, at 1801–05 (discussing trademarks’ 
capacity for expressive use); see also Beebe, supra note 42, at 624 (arguing that 
trademarks are “a semiotic doctrine elaborating the principles of . . . language.  
If there is a ‘language of commodities,’ then trademark doctrine is its grammar, 
and this grammar must be understood not simply in economic, but also in 
linguistic terms.”); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity:  Trademarks 
as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 401 (1990) 
(discussing trademarks’ ability to exhibit both “their signaling and expressive 
functions”). 
348 Desai & Rierson, supra note 17, at 1804; but see Landes & Posner, supra 
note 82, at 168–69 (examining economics of language and noting, “[t]he 
importance of trademarks to language is only modest, however, because the 
contribution they make to the language is mainly a byproduct of the contribution 
that the products they designate make to the world of things.”). 
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that seek dilution protection for famous marks definitely comprehend 
these trademarks’ significance beyond their commercial function and 
attempt to cultivate (and control) that aspect of their meaning.349   
The staggering value of these brands350 derives in large part from 
their expressive function.  “Brands can become symbols by which people 
define and express themselves, such that people spend money far beyond 
the cost of the utility of the good to reinforce that identity or have that 
means of expression.”351  For example, a Louis Vuitton purse signals that 
the consumer who owns it is in the company of celebrities and others 
who can afford to pay $1000 for a purse (and are willing to do so).352  
Although the purse is hopefully well constructed, it is highly unlikely 
that the majority of the purchase price derives from the value of the labor 
and materials required to make it.  Reduction in consumer search costs 
and goodwill does not account for billions of dollars in brand value. 
Famous trademarks may also take on expressive meanings that 
are not deliberately created by their corporate handlers, and which may 
be neutral or even negative in terms of their impact on brand value.  For 
example, the word “Barbie” not only signals a doll manufactured by 
Mattel, complete with the image Mattel would like her to represent, but 
also functions expressively when used to refer to a beautiful yet “empty-
headed” woman.353  The pop band Aqua undoubtedly intended to tap into 
the unofficial expressive meaning of Barbie when it produced the hit 
song Barbie Girl, as the lyrics demonstrate.354  As is often the case, 
                                                
349 See supra text accompanying notes 265–290. 
350 According to the BrandZ report published by Millward Brown, the top three 
brands in 2012 were Apple, IBM, and Google, each of which was valued at over 
$100 billion.  See BrandZ Top 100 Most Valuable Global Brands 2012, 
MILLWARD BROWN http://www.millwardbrown.com/brandz/2012/Documents/ 
2012_BrandZ_Top100_Chart.pdf (last visited August 24, 2012).  
351 Desai & Rierson, supra note 17, at 1796; see also Beebe, supra note 43, at 
624 (noting that “firms produce trademarks as status goods”); see generally 
MICHAEL J. SILVERSTEIN & NEIL FISKE, TRADING UP: WHY CONSUMERS WANT 
NEW LUXURY GOODS—AND HOW COMPANIES CREATE THEM (2005). 
352 See Dilbary, supra note 90, at 647-63 (explaining the economic rationale 
behind the willingness to pay more for branded products).  
353 Dreyfuss, supra note 347, at 400.  To illustrate the expressive meaning of 
“Barbie,” Dreyfuss quotes Joan Kennedy, who once said the following about her 
experiences on the campaign trail with her husband, Senator Ted Kennedy:  
“When I campaign alone I’m approachable. Women talk to me. . . . but when 
I’m with Ted I’m a Barbie doll.”  Id. at 397 (citation omitted). 
354 See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(noting that the singer, who identifies herself as “Barbie,” describes herself as “a 
blond bimbo girl, in a fantasy world,” who commands, “Dress me up, make it 
tight, I’m your dolly.”)  Id. at 901. 
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Mattel was not amused and filed suit for trademark infringement and 
dilution.  Although the court ultimately held that the use of the Barbie 
mark in a song was not actionable because it was a constitutionally 
protected parody, the language of the FTDA (the governing statute at the 
time) by no means clearly embraced the “Barbie Girl” song as a fair 
use.355  Moreover, the litigation was enormously contentious and hence 
expensive, prompting Judge Kozinski to end his opinion by advising the 
parties “to chill.”356 
The federal dilution statute, both in its current version (the 
TDRA) and its previous incarnation (the FTDA), provides scant room for 
these types of expressive uses, particularly in commercial contexts.  
Although the TDRA more clearly exempts parodies from dilution 
liability than did the FTDA, the statutory exemption does not apply when 
the parody is embodied within a trademark.357  As a result, at least one 
circuit court has held that parodies that are also trademarks are protected 
only if they do not dilute.358  Although the court in that case found no 
dilution, it is far from certain that every court will reach the same 
conclusion, given the fact-specific nature of the inquiry.  For example, in 
the Barbie Girl case, the court concluded that the Barbie Girl song was 
in fact “dilutive” and insulated from liability only because it constituted a 
“noncommercial use” of Mattel’s trademark.359  The narrow scope of the 
fair use defense therefore raises serious First Amendment concerns.360 
Even outside noncommercial or obviously expressive uses of 
trademarks, i.e., in the realm of purely commercial speech, the dilution 
cause of action still impacts First Amendment rights.  Some 
                                                
355 See id. at 904–07 (interpreting statutory language re “noncommercial use” 
and discussing First Amendment limitations); see generally Patrick D. Curran, 
Comment, Diluting the Commercial Speech Doctrine: ‘Noncommercial Use’ 
and the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 71 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 1077 (2004).  
356 Mattel, 296 F.3d at 908.  Somewhat ironically, Mattel later licensed the 
Barbie Girl song and used it (with modified lyrics) to promote sales of the 
Barbie doll.  Stuart Elliott, Years Later, Mattel Embraces ‘Barbie Girl,’ THE 
NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 26, 2009, 4:30 PM), available at 
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/26/years-later-mattel-embraces 
-barbie-girl/?pagemode=print.  
357 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (2006); see also supra notes 217-221 and 
accompanying text. 
358 See supra notes 223-232 and accompanying text.  
359 Mattel, 296 F.3d at 903, 904-07.  
360 See Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark 
Law, 61 S.M.U. L. Rev. 381, 438-47 (2008); see also Jesse A. Hofrichter, Note, 
Tool of the Trademark: Brand Criticism and Free Speech Problems with the 
Trademark Dilution Act of 2006, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1923 (2007).  
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commentators have convincingly argued that the dilution cause of action 
fails the Supreme Court’s Central Hudson test for commercial speech 
and therefore violates the First Amendment.361  Commercial speech is 
protected under the First Amendment if it concerns lawful activity and it 
is not misleading.362  Speech that constitutes trademark infringement is 
not protected because the likelihood of consumer confusion that it creates 
renders it misleading.363  Because a dilution claim does not require proof 
of likelihood of confusion, the speech it targets is not misleading and, 
therefore, should be entitled to constitutional protection. 
Moreover, speech that allegedly dilutes may be affirmatively 
valuable to both consumers and competitors.  In Central Hudson, the 
government claimed that the speech at issue (advertisements by a 
monopolistic electric company) was not entitled to constitutional 
protection because, even though the speech was non-misleading, it was 
not “of any worth,” as it did not convey useful information to 
consumers.364  The Court rejected that argument, reasoning that “[e]ven 
in monopoly markets, the suppression of advertising reduces the 
information available for consumer decisions and thereby defeats the 
purpose of the First Amendment.”365  Similarly, speech that allegedly 
dilutes a famous trademark can provide useful information to consumers 
about the defendant’s goods and services and thereby allow the 
defendant to more effectively compete. 
When a proprietor chooses a name for her business (i.e., a 
trademark) that taps into the expressive meaning of a famous mark, 
without creating a likelihood of consumer confusion, both the proprietor 
and the consumer stand to benefit.  By associating herself and her 
                                                
361 See Mary LaFrance, No Reason to Live:  Dilution Laws as Unconstitutional 
Restrictions on Commercial Speech, 58 S.C.L. REV. 709 (2007); see also 
Ramsey, supra note 360, at 438–39 (arguing that dilution laws constitute 
content-based restrictions on speech); Paul Alan Levy, The Trademark Dilution 
Revision Act--A Consumer Perspective, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 1189, 1193 (2006) (“[D]ilution law’s limits on truthful commercial 
speech raise serious questions of public policy as well as constitutionality.”). 
362 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 
U.S. 557, 564 (1980).  
363 See Castrol v. Pennzoil, 987 F.2d 939, 949 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[I]t is well settled 
that false commercial speech is not protected by the First Amendment and may 
be banned entirely.”); FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 
35, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that “the subcategory of commercial speech 
consisting of false and deceptive advertising ‘remains subject to restraint.’  In 
fact, ‘[m]isleading advertising may be prohibited entirely.’”) (citations omitted). 
364 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566–67.  
365 Id. at 567.  
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business with the famous trademark, the proprietor increases the 
efficiency of her new mark by conveying useful information about the 
good or service to which it is attached.366  The consumer benefits because 
the mark more effectively reduces search costs.  For example, a person 
who sees an ad for “Victor’s Little Secret” has some idea of what is for 
sale, without knowing anything about the store other than its name.  Yet 
an intent to associate with a famous mark weighs in favor of a finding 
that the proprietor of such a business has diluted the famous mark.367 The 
TDRA thus undoubtedly (and intentionally) discourages such associative 
uses, thereby suppressing speech. 
If commercial speech is protected, then the regulation restricting 
it must directly advance a “substantial government interest.”368  The 
Supreme Court has clarified that “[t]his burden is not satisfied by mere 
speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain 
a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it 
recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a 
material degree.”369   
Dilution laws do not appear to directly advance a substantial 
government interest.  By their express terms, the TDRA and state 
dilution laws do not require a finding that the plaintiff has been 
economically harmed.  They are not designed to protect consumers in 
any meaningful way.  Although the TDRA prohibits uses of famous 
trademarks that “cause” dilution of those marks, the plaintiff need not 
prove that any such dilution or actual harm has occurred to prevail under 
this statute.  The alternative, more realistic, explanation for dilution laws 
is that they exist to facilitate the preservation and control of corporate 
persona and image, as embodied in famous trademarks.  While 
corporations may have a substantial interest in achieving this end, the 
government does not.  For these reasons, the dilution cause of action 
raises significant First Amendment concerns. 
The corporations that “own” famous trademarks cultivate and 
profit enormously from the expressive meanings that these marks 
convey.  Much like an artist who has crafted a great sculpture, these 
trademark holders wish to control all uses of their creations, especially 
                                                
366 See Dogan, supra note 327, at 321 (concluding that “courts should be 
mindful of the positive reasons for allowing parties to evoke others’ products or 
services in pro-competitive ways”). 
367 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(v) (2006). 
368 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. 
369 Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 
(1999). 
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those they find offensive.  However, in the absence of any real economic 
injury to the trademark holder (and certainly not any measurable one), 
the control granted via the dilution cause of action should take into 
account the costs that go along with it.  Prohibiting others from tapping 
into these expressive meanings, even in commercial settings, is a 
substantial externality of the dilution cause of action and arguably one of 
Constitutional proportion.  
2. The Impact of Trademark Dilution Law on Competition 
The expressive function of famous trademarks is enormously 
valuable, both for the holders of such marks and the public at large.  
Preventing proprietors from tapping into those expressive meanings in 
developing their own trademarks, when such uses do not cause a 
likelihood of confusion with the original mark holder, deprives the 
proprietor of an efficient trademark and negatively impacts his ability to 
compete.  Current dilution doctrine, particularly under the TDRA and 
recent interpretations of that statute, poses more direct threats to 
competition as well.  Although suits between direct competitors were not 
originally envisioned under the dilution cause of action, such lawsuits are 
in fact often the cases in which dilution claims matter the most.  When a 
trademark infringement claim fails because the facts will not support it, 
dilution is a useful stand-in.  In such cases, it may be difficult if not 
impossible to distinguish the kind of association between two marks that 
constitutes actionable dilution from the “injury” that a trademark holder 
suffers as a result of regular competition.  The extent to which dilution 
laws suppress competition should be recognized as a cost and considered 
in examining the scope of the doctrine. 
Lawsuits between competitors, based on the use of their 
respective trademarks, have traditionally been resolved under the rubric 
of the trademark infringement cause of action, specifically the likelihood 
of confusion standard.  The interests of consumers and the plaintiff are 
largely aligned in such cases:  both are harmed by trademark 
infringement.370  At least in theory, the dilution claim should have no 
impact in these lawsuits.  In such suits, one would expect that a dilution 
claim would be superfluous.371  However, the plain language of the 
TDRA (and its predecessor, the FTDA) does not bar its application in 
lawsuits between competitors and, in fact, says the opposite.372  Dilution 
                                                
370 See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.  
371 See supra notes 321-342 and accompanying text. 
372 15 U.S.C. § 1025(c)(1) (providing injunctive relief against any use of a 
famous trademark that causes dilution, “regardless of the presence or absence of. 
. . competition”).  
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claims are becoming increasingly relevant in such lawsuits, to the 
detriment of competition.   
As discussed previously, some courts have interpreted the 
TDRA’s six-factor test for dilution as eliminating the “substantial 
similarity” test from trademark dilution analysis.373  As a result, in some 
cases a trademark dilution claim has survived summary judgment or 
other adjudication when a trademark infringement claim has not, often 
because the marks in question were not similar enough to support an 
infringement claim.  In essence, the dilution claim picks up where 
infringement leaves off, resulting in potential liability, or at least the 
inability to win the case on a summary judgment motion, in a case where 
the plaintiff would otherwise be expected to lose.  Such cases may do 
more to create “unfair competition” than eliminate it.   
A recent case involving Levi Strauss and Abercrombie & Fitch 
illustrates how suits between direct competitors, particularly in the 
context of trade dress dilution, poses problems.374  Both Strauss and 
Abercrombie sell blue jeans that are adorned with pocket stitching.375  
The pocket stitching by Strauss, the plaintiff, is considered famous, and 
in fact would be easily recognized by most American consumers.  
Strauss alleged that Abercrombie’s pocket stitching infringed and diluted 
Strauss’s famous design.  Analyzing the infringement claim in this 
lawsuit would have required an answer to the following question:  Would 
a person encountering Abercrombie’s pocket stitching on the backside of 
a pair of jeans likely be confused into thinking that the jeans were in fact 
made by Strauss?  The answer to that question was apparently “no.” 
The dilution claim, by contrast, poses a much more difficult 
question:  After encountering Abercrombie’s pocket stitching on the 
backside of a pair of jeans (which the consumer would not be likely to 
mistake for Levi’s), would the consumer think of Strauss just as quickly 
the next time she saw Strauss pocket stitching, or would her response 
time be slower because her mind had been “polluted” by subconscious 
images of the Abercrombie design?  As an empirical matter, that 
question is exceedingly difficult to answer,376 but, more importantly, it is 
unclear how this kind of “mental pollution” differs from the desired 
                                                
373 See supra text accompanying notes 168-171. 
374 Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158 (9th 
Cir. 2011).  
375 Attachment A, appended to the end of this article, reproduces a photo of the 
parties’ respective designs that was attached to the court’s opinion in this case.  
376 See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text (discussing empirical 
evidence of dilution and the limitations of that evidence). 
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effect generated by legitimate competition.377  Of course Abercrombie 
wants to pollute the customer’s mind with images of its own jeans in 
addition to the ones sold by Levis; that is the point of competition.  If 
Abercrombie is prohibited from provoking these kinds of associations, its 
ability to compete will be compromised.  Although Strauss might like to 
prevent all other jeans makers from adorning the backsides of jeans, lest 
such adornments intrude upon the “uniqueness” of the Strauss trademark, 
it is unclear why this is a desirable result from anyone’s perspective other 
than Strauss. 
The trade dress utilized by a competitor may often bear some 
resemblance to the plaintiff’s because the two parties are, in fact, 
competitors, i.e., they produce goods or services in the same market.  
Particularly given that the “substantial similarity” test no longer acts as a 
robust gate-keeper in the dilution analysis,378 the danger presented by 
trade dress cases like Levi Strauss is that courts and juries will have 
difficulty distinguishing between the type of “association” that tends to 
prove actionable dilution under the TDRA and the association between 
products that is deliberately and legitimately generated in the course of 
competition.379 
The existence of a trade dress dilution claim also implicates the 
doctrine of aesthetic functionality, an affirmative defense that exists to 
ensure that trade dress protection does not negatively impact free 
competition.380  When trademark protection is extended beyond the 
                                                
377 See Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 834 F.2d 368, 371 (3d Cir. 
1987) (“A response that one ‘associates’ a given product with the name of a 
competitive product may simply reflect the recognition that the two products are 
competitive and serve the same purpose.”).  
378 See supra text accompanying notes 168-171 (describing evolution of 
substantial similarity standard under the TDRA). 
379 Professor Stacey Dogan has made this point as well:  “[T]he public 
frequently benefits when a new market entrant uses product trade dress to evoke 
the strong trade dress of an entrenched market participant. So long as there is no 
confusion, however, the evocation serves an important public policy goal of 
market competition. With dilution protection for trade dress, some of this 
desirable activity might subside.”  Dogan, supra note 327, at 317; see also 
Robert G. Bone, A Skeptical View of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 11 
INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 187, 196-98 (2007) (criticizing TDRA for extending 
dilution protection to trade dress); Paul Heald, Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. The 
West Bend Co.:  Exposing the Malign Application of the Federal Dilution 
Statute to Protect Product Configuration, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 415, 423–24 
(1998) (arguing that the FTDA should not be construed to apply to trade dress). 
380 For example, when Wallace Silversmiths claimed trade dress infringement of 
its Grand Baroque silverware pattern, it was not allowed to enjoin a competitor 
from producing similar-looking (although not identical) silverware, because the 
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“precise expression of a decorative style,” there is a danger that 
competitors will lose access to “basic elements” of the style that are 
important to competition in the relevant market and hence should remain 
part of the public domain.381  Granting too wide a swath of trade dress 
protection risks depriving competitors of a sufficient range of alternative 
designs, thereby hindering their ability to compete.382 In such cases, it is 
not unusual for the market entrant to be aware of or “inspired by” the 
more famous trade dress,383 but that type of awareness or intent should 
not suggest actionable infringement or dilution. 
The same issue may arise in cases involving word marks, 
particularly when a small business owner desires to compete with the 
owner of a famous trademark.  The small business owner may want, both 
understandably and legitimately, to draw upon the expressive meaning of 
the famous trademark to communicate a message about his own 
business.  The proprietor may also wish to convey to consumers, through 
his own trademark, that he not only is competing with the famous 
trademark holder, but that his product is better than the famous one.  If 
such claims were made directly—e.g., my coffee is better than 
Starbucks—they would almost certainly be considered comparative 
advertising and hence a fair use of the Starbucks trademark.384  However, 
when the proprietor attempts to convey the same message in a more 
subtle or humorous way—e.g., by selling a blend called “Mr. 
                                                                                                         
design was deemed aesthetically functional.  The court reasoned that Wallace 
could not “exclude competitors from using those baroque design elements 
necessary to compete in the market for baroque silverware. It is a first principle 
of trademark law that an owner may not use the mark as a means of excluding 
competitors from a substantial market.”  Wallace Int’l Silversmiths, Inc. v. 
Godinger Silver Art Co., Inc., 916 F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1990).    
381 Id.  
382 Id. at 81; see also TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 
23, 33 (2001) (noting that “[i]t is proper to inquire into a ‘significant non-
reputation-related disadvantage’ in cases of esthetic functionality”); Qualitex 
Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 170 (1995) (“The ‘ultimate test 
of aesthetic functionality’. . . . ‘is whether the recognition of trademark rights 
would significantly hinder competition.’”); Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves 
Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 2012 WL 3832285 at *9 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(noting that “Lanham Act protection does not extend to configurations of 
ornamental features which would significantly limit the range of competitive 
designs available”) (citation omitted). 
383 See Wallace, 916 F.2d at 77 (noting that defendant admitted its designers 
were “inspired by and aware of” plaintiff’s design).  
384 See supra text accompanying notes 236-238 (discussing comparative 
advertising fair use defense to claims of trademark infringement and dilution). 
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Charbucks”—he may be subject to a claim of trademark dilution.385  
Both instances of comparative advertising threaten the uniqueness of the 
Starbucks mark in the same way.  When the more subtle or humorous use 
of the mark does not cause a likelihood of confusion, it is unclear why it 
should be actionable. 
In sum, dilution claims may negatively impact competition when 
they are raised in cases between competitors.  The cost of allowing such 
claims is particularly evident when the trademark infringement claim that 
accompanies the dilution one is weak and perhaps does not survive, and 
only the dilution claim keeps the case in court.  These costs should also 
be considered in construing the TDRA and contemplating its future. 
3. The Cost of Trademark Bullying 
The final dilution externality involves the phenomenon of 
trademark “bullying.”386  The true impact of dilution law cannot be 
measured by tallying the number of cases in which it appears as a stand-
alone cause of action or by any alternative measure that focuses on 
complaints filed (or published decisions).387  A more accurate account 
must consider the number of times the dilution claim is threatened and 
attempt to gauge the impact of those threats, a certain percentage of 
which are objectively meritless, on consumer behavior.  Like the harm 
caused by dilution itself, this injury is difficult if not impossible to 
accurately measure.  However, the phenomenon of trademark 
overreaching in the form of threatened lawsuits of questionable merit is 
real, and it is exacerbated by the existence of the federal dilution cause of 
action.  This, too, is a cost to be considered in assessing the externalities 
of dilution. 
                                                
385 The record in the Starbucks case demonstrated that defendant’s intent in 
choosing the Charbucks mark was at least in part a desire to convey a message 
of comparative advertising.  The Second Circuit characterized the Charbucks 
logo as a “beacon to identify Charbucks as a coffee that competes at the same 
level and quality as Starbucks in producing dark-roasted coffees.”  Starbucks 
Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 113 (2d Cir. 2009).  
386 See generally Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WISC. 
L. REV. 625 (2011); Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion:  The End of 
Trademark Law, 65 WASH. &  LEE L. REV. 585 (2008); Kevin Greene, Abusive 
Trademark Litigation and the Incredible Shrinking Confusion Doctrine – 
Trademark Abuse in the Context of Entertainment Media and Cyberspace, 27 
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 609 (2004); see also Desai & Rierson, supra note 17, 
at 1834–42 (discussing problems caused by over-policing of trademarks).  
387 See Long, supra note 340, at 1031 (acknowledging that “[i]t could well be 
the case that dilution law is a powerful bargaining chip in cease-and-desist 
letters and in negotiations outside the legislative arena”).  
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As Deven Desai and I have elsewhere observed, “Typically, the 
threat of litigation alone (even when ever so lightly implied) by a 
corporate giant is sufficient to dissuade a person from making fair use of 
a trademark.”388  Frequently, when small businesses like Victor’s Little 
Secret and Black Bear Coffee receive a cease-and-desist letter from the 
likes of Victoria’s Secret and Starbucks, threatening to sue them in 
federal court, they will do whatever is necessary to prevent such lawsuit 
from being filed.  Cease-and-desist letters typically demand that the 
recipient change the name of her business and/or her website.  Given the 
level of financial resources, time, and energy required to defend a federal 
lawsuit, even a “winnable” one, most people would rationally choose to 
change the name of their business.  Moreover, given the inherent 
ambiguity of dilution law, discerning the winnable cases from the 
unwinnable ones poses a challenge for even the most competent of 
lawyers. 
The website Chillingeffects.org, a joint project of the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation and various law school clinics, acts as a depository 
for a wide range of demand letters in all areas of intellectual property 
law.389  A recent example taken from this website illustrates the type of 
over-reaching that often appears in such letters.  The letter was sent by 
the National Pork Board, an agency representing purveyors of “The 
Other White Meat,” a slogan that is a federally registered trademark.  
The recipient was The Lactivist Breastfeeding Blog, which was selling t-
shirts and other merchandise bearing the slogan “The Other White Milk.”  
The National Pork Board threatened suit for both trademark infringement 
and dilution, claiming that “even were this use of the slogan ‘The Other 
White Milk’ found to be not confusing, which we think is unlikely, this 
slogan nevertheless damages National Pork Board’s rights in the famous 
mark THE OTHER WHITE MEAT, because the slogan significantly 
dilutes the distinctiveness of the mark.”390  The letter ends by demanding 
that the Breastfeeding Blog (1) destroy all of the t-shirts and promotional 
                                                
388 Desai & Rierson, supra note 17, at 1839–40.   
389 CHILLING EFFECTS, http://chillingeffects.org/.  
390 Pork Board has a Cow Over Slogan Parody, CHILLING EFFECTS, 
http://chillingeffects.org/trademark/notice.cgi?NoticeID=6418 (letter from 
National Pork Board attorneys Faegre & Benson to The Lactivist Breastfeeding 
Blog, dated January 30, 2007).  The letter also contains a somewhat humorous 
claim of dilution by tarnishment:  “[Y]our use of this slogan also tarnishes the 
good reputation of National Pork Board’s mark in light of your apparent attempt 
to promote the use of breastmilk beyond merely for infant consumption, such as 
with the following slogans on your website in close proximity to the slogan ‘The 
Other White Milk’: ‘Dairy Diva,’ ‘Nursing, Nature’s Own Breast 
Enhancement,’ ‘Eat at Mom's, fast-fresh-from the breast,’ and ‘My Milk is the 
Breast.’”  Id. 
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materials bearing the offending slogan; (2) cease use of the slogan on any 
website; and (3) agree to never again use the slogan “The Other White 
Milk.”391 
Even a person who knows little about trademark law can 
probably figure out that consumers who buy “The Other White Milk” t-
shirts are not likely to be confused:  the average consumer will not 
mistakenly believe that the shirts are sold or endorsed by the National 
Pork Board.  Even though the law is far from crystal clear, the standard is 
at least intuitive.  However, understanding what dilution is, let alone 
whether a t-shirt like the one referenced in this letter is “likely to dilute,” 
is entirely another matter.  The inchoate nature of dilution makes it 
difficult for anyone, particularly a layman, to separate the cases that have 
merit from those that do not. 
The provisions in the TDRA that allow for recovery of damages 
and attorney’s fees in cases involving “willful dilution” make it even 
more likely that a threat of suit will chill uses of a trademark that do not, 
in fact, dilute it.  The TDRA permits recovery of profits and attorney’s 
fees, in the case of dilution by blurring, whenever “the person against 
whom the injunction is sought willfully intended to trade on the 
recognition of the famous mark.”392  It is unclear how a willful intent to 
“trade on the recognition of the famous mark” differs from an intent to 
“associate” with the famous mark, one of the factors courts consider in 
assessing a dilution claim.  Whenever a person makes a referential use of 
a trademark, at least in a commercial context, that person is arguably 
attempting to “trade on the recognition of the famous mark.”  Even the 
purveyors of t-shirts bearing the slogan “The Other White Milk” were in 
some sense attempting to sell more t-shirts by trading off the recognition 
of the allegedly famous393 slogan, “The Other White Meat.”  If the pro-
                                                
391 Id. 
392 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5)(B)(i) (2006). 
393 The ambiguousness of the term “famous” itself makes it difficult to predict 
when a plaintiff may be entitled to sue under the TDRA, and hence even the 
holders of marks that are unlikely to qualify as famous may credibly threaten 
suit under the Act.  Although the TDRA was supposed to codify a fame standard 
solely for marks that qualify as “household names,” see, e.g., Nissan Motor Co. 
v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1011 (9th Cir. 2004), some of the 
trademarks that have been deemed “famous” under this Act objectively do not 
seem to meet this standard.  See, e.g., New York City Triathlon, LLC v. NYC 
Triathlon Club, Inc., 2010 WL 808885, *10 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Dallas Cowboys 
Football Club, Ltd. v. America’s Team Props., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 2d 622, 643 
(N.D. Tex. 2009); Univ. of Kansas v. Sinks, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1307 (D. 
Kan. 2008); Harris Research, Inc. v. Lydon, 505 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1166 (D. 
Utah 2007).    
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pork slogan were not recognizable to the average consumer, the pro-
lactation slogan would not be funny.  In fact, the cease-and-desist letter 
from the National Pork Board included a promise to “recover from you a 
judgment for all of your profits in connection with any infringing sale as 
well as all of [the National Pork Board’s] reasonable attorney’s fees and 
costs” in the event its demands were not met.394  The average person, 
business proprietor, or non-profit organization simply cannot risk the 
possibility of being stuck with that kind of bill.395 
In assessing the externalities of dilution, therefore, we must 
assume that some fair uses of famous trademarks will be suppressed.  
Due to the inherently amorphous nature of the dilution claim, a potential 
defendant has a low ability to assess her real exposure and, given the 
potential penalties and costs, a high incentive to avoid the risk of 
litigation. 
C.  Proposals for Reforming Dilution Law in the United States 
For these reasons and others, federal trademark dilution law is, at 
the very least, in need of reform.  Dilution does not cause measurable 
economic harm to the holders of famous trademarks (hence the statute’s 
explicit exemption from proving any such harm).  Moreover, enforcing 
dilution law, at least in its current state, imposes costs by negatively 
impacting speech and competition.  Dilution laws essentially extend a 
form of moral right protection to the holders of famous trademarks, the 
vast majority of which are corporations.  At the very least these laws 
need to be narrowly construed and statutorily reformed, and potentially 
abolished outright. 
1. Doing Away With Trademark Dilution Statutes 
Perhaps the most obvious, yet least politically feasible, solution 
to the problems addressed in this Article would be to repeal the 
trademark dilution statutes, particularly the TDRA.  The moral rights 
theory may help to explain why famous mark holders want dilution 
protection, but it does not tell us why they should get it.  In the copyright 
context, moral rights exist to preserve uniquely personal interests in 
artistic creation.  In the words of Professor Kwall, moral rights protect 
the “honor, dignity, and artistic spirit of the author in a fundamentally 
                                                
394 Pork Board has a cow over slogan parody, CHILLING EFFECTS, 
http://chillingeffects.org/trademark/notice.cgi?NoticeID=6418. 
395 See, e.g., Super Duper, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 2010 WL 2340250, *5–6 (4th Cir. 
2010) (affirming district court’s award of $2,643,844.15 in attorney fees in case 
of “willful dilution”).  
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personal way.”396  Works of art may embody “the author’s intrinsic 
dimension of creativity,” which emanates from “inner drives that exist in 
the human soul.”397  Although corporations may embrace their brands 
with fervor and take pride in their creation, neither corporations nor their 
trademarks possess the type of “human soul” that cries out for protection 
via a moral right. 
If dilution law is forced to justify its own existence on traditional 
trademark (i.e., economic) grounds, it almost certainly is a loser.  The 
benefits gained by dilution enforcement, which are slim at best, are 
outweighed by the attendant costs, including those that are occasioned by 
the inevitable overreaching that it enables.  If the holder of a famous 
trademark is injured by another’s use of its mark, trademark infringement 
law, particularly in the breadth of its modern application, should be more 
than adequate to prevent real economic injury.  Even in trademark 
infringement cases, the famous trademark holder can obtain injunctive 
relief without proving anything beyond a likelihood of confusion; harm 
is presumed.398  Moreover, to the extent another has intentionally harmed 
the mark’s reputation by making false statements about the famous 
trademark or the mark holder, tort law should provide a remedy.399  From 
the plaintiff’s perspective, dilution is an attractive cause of action, at 
least in part, because the evidentiary hurdle a plaintiff must clear to state 
a claim is low.  Whether mark holders should be entitled to such broad 
                                                
396 KWALL, supra note 240, at xiii.  
397 Id.  
398 Whether an automatic presumption of irreparable harm should persist in 
trademark infringement cases, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay 
v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006), doing away with such 
presumptions in the patent infringement context is an interesting question which 
is beyond the scope of this article.  See Sandra L. Rierson, IP Remedies After 
eBay: Assessing the Impact on Trademark Law, 2 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 163 
(2008) (questioning the justification for a presumption of irreparable harm after 
Ebay). 
399 Although various names have been given to this type of tort (for example, 
“disparagement of property, slander of goods, commercial disparagement, and 
trade libel”) it is “now generally referred to as injurious falsehood.”  Bacchus 
Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 892 (10th Cir. 1991) (internal 
quotations omitted).  A person is liable for the tort of injurious falsehood (and 
plaintiff’s resulting damages) if she (1) “publishes a false statement harmful to 
the interests of another”; (2) “intends for publication of the statement to result in 
harm to interests of the other having a pecuniary value, or either recognizes or 
should recognize that it is likely to do so”; and (3) “knows that the statement is 
false or acts in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.”  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A; see also W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. 
OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 963–64 (5th ed. 1984). 
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protection, particularly given the impact of these claims on the First 
Amendment rights of others, is dubious. 
The TDRA, then, is the legal equivalent of a sledgehammer 
levied against a gnat.  When there are plenty of fly swatters lying about, 
perhaps it is time to put away the sledgehammer.  Whether a proposal to 
do away with dilution statutes is feasible, from a political standpoint, 
however, is another matter.  As discussed above, the corporate holders of 
famous trademarks feel deeply entitled to dilution protection, and they 
have lobbied hard (and successfully) to get it.  For this reason, the 
dilution cause of action is unlikely to go away any time soon. 
2. Amending the TDRA 
Given that the TDRA is likely to be part of the legal landscape of 
trademarks for some time to come, it may be more productive to focus on 
minimizing its negative externalities.  Although dilution law may 
continue to be superfluous and hence unnecessary, its attendant costs 
could be reduced by modifying the statute. 
When Congress amended the federal dilution statute in 2006, it 
weighted the scales too heavily in favor of plaintiffs claiming trademark 
dilution.  The TDRA is essentially flawed because it eliminated the 
plaintiff’s burden of proving “actual dilution” without clearly 
establishing what plaintiffs do have to prove to prevail in these cases.  By 
elevating the importance of evidence indicating “association” between 
the parties’ marks and de-emphasizing the significance of mark 
similarity, the courts have extended dilution protection in cases that 
essentially state weak trademark infringement claims.  Once the plaintiff 
has proven that his trademark is truly “famous” and that consumers may 
“associate” defendant’s mark with his own, he has gone a long way 
toward proving a likelihood of dilution.  That burden is too light. 
The Act should be amended to codify the “identical or 
substantially similar” standard previously adopted by many courts in 
assessing claims under the FTDA.400  This rule had the advantage of 
eliminating claims that were based on non-infringing but arguably 
referential uses of famous marks.401  Perhaps more importantly, a 
requirement that the defendant’s mark be “identical or substantially 
similar” to the plaintiff’s mark would provide at least the potential for 
                                                
400 See supra text accompanying notes 168-171 (describing evolution of 
substantial similarity standard under the TDRA). 
401 See Dogan, supra note 327, at 319 (arguing that “[e]xtending dilution rights 
to all marks bearing any associational relationship to famous ones exceeds the 
narrow objectives of the [FTDA], at a significant societal cost”). 
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obtaining summary judgment in appropriate cases.  This result is less 
likely to occur when the court must engage in the intensely factual 
process of weighing the statutory factors, of which mark similarity is just 
one.   
Harmful dilution litigation under the TDRA could also be 
curtailed by restricting the availability of dilution claims in cases 
between competitors.  This end could be achieved by deleting the 
language in the statute indicating that it applies “regardless of the 
presence or absence of . . . . competition”402 and replacing it with a 
statutory factor targeting the level of competition between the parties.  A 
high level of competition between the parties would tend to suggest that 
a likelihood of dilution did not exist.  Addressing the competition issue 
by adding a factor rather than an outright prohibition of dilution claims 
between competitors would avoid the “coverage gap” problem posited by 
the Second Circuit in Nabisco; i.e., that a plaintiff would have no remedy 
under either infringement or dilution due to an insufficient level of 
competition for one claim but too much for the other.403  Whether this 
objection has any merit, particularly given the marginal relevance of 
competition under modern infringement law, is questionable.  However, 
the factorial approach (as opposed to a ban) would allow the courts to 
weigh the degree of competition appropriately, according to the facts in a 
given case.   
To further reduce the negative impact of dilution law on 
competition, the Act should be amended to eliminate dilution of trade 
dress as a cause of action.404  As discussed above, trade dress dilution 
claims are likely to arise in cases involving competitors, such as the 
recent Ninth Circuit case involving two competitors in the blue jeans 
market, Levi Strauss and Abercrombie & Fitch.  Non-competitors, 
because they do not offer the same types of products or services, are 
unlikely to use even vaguely similar trade dress.  Allowing claims for 
trade dress dilution under the TDRA, particularly as it is currently 
construed, enables dominant market players like Levi Strauss to 
discourage competition by threatening and filing dilution suits when 
trademark or copyright infringement claims would fail.  If the plaintiff is 
economically harmed in these types of cases, the alleged harm or loss of 
market share is more likely to flow from the effects of desirable 
                                                
402 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006).  
403 See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
404 Technically, this change to the Act would require deleting § 1125(c)(4), 
discussing the burden of proof in trade dress dilution cases, and adding trade 
dress claims to the list of exclusions in § 1125(c)(3).    
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competition, not the claimed dilution of the source-identifying capacity 
of the famous trade dress. 
The Act should also be amended to eliminate the availability of 
damages and attorney’s fees in cases of “willful” dilution.  If the 
prospect of damages and attorney’s fees is deemed necessary to prevent 
parties from acting in bad faith, then the statute should be amended to 
explicitly require a finding of bad faith in such cases.  By contrast, the 
current statute is ambiguous, as almost any dilution claim may carry with 
it a credible threat of damages and attorney’s fees in addition to 
injunctive relief.  The attorney’s fee provision significantly increases the 
likelihood that the threat of dilution will be used to suppress fair uses of 
famous trademarks.  
Finally, the TDRA’s fair use exemption needs to be 
strengthened.  Specifically, the requirement that the fair use exemption 
be limited to uses “other than as a designation of source for the person’s 
own goods or services” should be eliminated.  A trademark, like the 
Chewy Vuiton dog toy, may simultaneously function as both a source 
identifier and a parody.  A trademark may also communicate a subtle 
comparative advertising message, like Mr. Charbucks coffee.  These uses 
should be protected as a matter of law.  To the extent these marks are 
perceived as harmful to the more famous trademarks to which they refer, 
that injury, if any, is outweighed by the harms to both speech and 
competition that result from the suppression of their use. 
3. Re-interpreting the TDRA 
In the absence of Congressional action to modify or repeal the 
TDRA, the judiciary should interpret the Act differently.  At a bare 
minimum, the TDRA should be read narrowly to minimize the negative 
impacts of over-enforcement on speech and competition. 
The conflict between the TDRA and the First Amendment 
presents a strong justification for construing the Act narrowly (and its 
exemptions broadly).405  Some courts have recognized that “where the 
unauthorized use of a trademark is part of an expressive work, such as a 
parody, the Lanham Act must be construed narrowly.”406  Although 
                                                
405 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 
447 U.S. 557, 565 (1980) (“[T]he First Amendment mandates that speech 
restrictions be ‘narrowly drawn.’”) (citations omitted). 
406 Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 414 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (emphasis added); see also Harley Davidson, Inc. v. 
Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 813 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that parodies “often lie 
within the substantial constitutional protection accorded noncommercial speech 
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parodies and other forms of noncommercial speech reside closer to the 
heart of the First Amendment, non-misleading commercial speech is also 
entitled to First Amendment protection.407  Trademark injunctions 
necessarily suppress speech because they force the defendant to refrain 
from using certain language.408  Moreover, a broad construction of the 
dilution cause of action can negatively impact competition.    Therefore, 
courts should narrowly construe the TDRA.   
This duty to narrowly construe dilution laws should inform the 
courts’ interpretation of the factors-based approach to assessing 
likelihood of dilution.  First, even if the TDRA is not amended to codify 
the “identical or substantially similar standard,” courts should still 
heavily emphasize this factor when considering a likelihood of dilution 
claim.  The Act specifies that courts may consider “all relevant factors,” 
including the six that are listed.409  In any given case, one or more of the 
listed factors may be more relevant than others, and some will routinely 
carry more weight.410  The mere fact that the statute suggests six non-
exclusive factors, without more, does not compel the court to give each 
factor equal weight. 
Second, even if the TDRA is not amended to include a factor 
referencing the level of competition between the parties, courts should 
                                                                                                         
and may thus be the subject of liability only in the most narrow circumstances” 
(quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25, cmt. i (1995)).  
Professor Lisa Ramsey has also argued that courts have a duty to “attempt to 
resolve any conflict between trademark law and the First Amendment by 
interpreting trademark claims narrowly and trademark defenses broadly in ways 
that protect expression.”  Ramsey, supra note 360, at 448; see also id. at 447–50 
(discussing “contextual, speech-protective interpretations of trademark law”).   
407 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 
447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (“The First Amendment, as applied to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects commercial speech from 
unwarranted governmental regulation.”); New York State Rest. Ass’n v. New 
York City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 131 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[C]ommercial 
speech is entitled to the protection of the First Amendment.”); El Dia, Inc. v. 
Puerto Rico Dept. of Consumer Affairs, 413 F.3d 110, 115-17 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(analyzing government regulation of commercial speech under Central Hudson  
test). See also supra notes 346-369 and accompanying text.  
408 See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 30 n.2 (1st Cir. 
1987) (noting that “[w]hen judicial enforcement of private personal rights 
touching forms of communication restricts freedom of speech, state action is 
implicated,” in the context of analyzing trademark dilution claim); see also New 
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).  
409 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(b) (2006).  
410 See generally Beebe, supra note 62 (discussing multi-factor balancing test for 
likelihood of confusion).  
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consider such evidence regardless.  As noted above, the statute instructs 
courts to consider “all” relevant factors in assessing likelihood of 
dilution; the six listed factors are not meant to be all-inclusive.  The level 
of competition between the parties is relevant to determine whether the 
defendant’s use of plaintiff’s mark is likely to dilute it.  This solution 
would admittedly face a potential hurdle, given that the statute specifies 
that a mark holder is entitled to an injunction against another who uses 
her mark in a way that is likely to dilute it, “regardless of the presence or 
absence of . . . competition.”411  However, that language could be read as 
precluding competition (or lack thereof) from acting as an absolute 
affirmative defense to a dilution claim.  The statute should not preclude 
courts from considering the level of competition when determining 
whether a likelihood of dilution has occurred in the first place. 
Third, the courts should not create presumptions or shift the 
burden of proof to the defendant merely because one of the factors listed 
in the statute weighs in favor of the plaintiff.  For example, the Sixth 
Circuit’s recent opinion in Moseley II reads into the TDRA a 
presumption or strong inference of dilution when plaintiff has shown a 
“semantic association” between its famous mark and a mark used by 
defendant to sell “sex-related” products.412  In doing so, the court shifted 
the burden of proof to the defendant to disprove tarnishment when such 
association can be shown.413  This presumption or inference appears 
nowhere in the statute, and, particularly given the First Amendment 
issues discussed above, the courts should not place it there.  The burden 
of proof should remain with the plaintiff.   
Finally, courts should construe the damages and attorney’s fee 
provisions of the statute narrowly as well.  Even though the words “bad 
faith” do not appear in the statute, they should be read into it, as some 
circuits have done in the context of trademark infringement claims.414  
Attorney’s fee awards are “subject to the discretion of the court and the 
principles of equity,”415 which gives the courts broad leeway in 
                                                
411 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). 
412 V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 388 (6th Cir. 2010). 
413 Id.; see supra notes 180–185 and accompanying text.  
414 See, e.g., Conopco, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 95 F.3d 187, 194-95 (2d Cir. 
1996) (holding that any party must provide “evidence of fraud or bad faith” to 
recover attorney’s fees under the Lanham Act); but see Scotch Whisky Ass’n v. 
Majestic Drilling Co., Inc., 958 F.2d 594, 599-600 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that 
prevailing plaintiff must prove bad faith to recover attorney’s fees in trademark 
infringement action, but prevailing defendant need not prove bad faith to 
demonstrate entitlement to fees). 
415 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5) (2006).  
311 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW [Vol. 11 
determining whether the case presents “exceptional circumstances”416 
justifying such an award.  Attorney’s fee awards in particular should be 
reserved for cases in which one of the parties has truly acted in an 
abusive manner.417 
CONCLUSION 
This Article proposes a new way of looking at the cause of 
action for dilution.  The dilution cause of action imbues corporations 
with a broad “moral” right to control and exclude others from the 
expressive sphere surrounding their famous trademarks.  In enforcing 
this right, we impose costs on those who are excluded and controlled, 
both in terms of their right to speak freely and compete fairly.  When the 
dilution doctrine is viewed for what it really is, or at least what it has 
become, it becomes apparent that the law causes more harm than good.  
It should either be abolished or substantially reformed. 
  
                                                
416 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).  
417 What would constitute “bad faith” in the context of a trademark dilution suit 
is itself somewhat unclear.  In the trademark infringement context, courts have 
defined bad faith as conduct that is “malicious, wanton, oppressive, or 
opprobrious.”   Stephen W. Boney, Inc. v. Boney Servs., Inc., 127 F.3d 821, 825 
(9th Cir. 1997).  The key distinction between the current standard, which allows 
for enhanced penalties in cases of willful attempts to “trade on the recognition of 
the famous mark,” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5)(B)(i), and “bad faith,” would be the 
nature of the targeted intent.  As discussed above, many if not most dilution 
defendants attempt to profit by making referential use of a famous mark, often 
by tapping into its expressive meaning.  Bad faith should require proof of much 
more.  Presumably, bad faith would entail a deliberate effort to undermine the 
famous mark’s ability to identify the mark holder’s goods or services.  How a 
defendant could accomplish such a goal, without creating a likelihood of 
consumer confusion, is unclear.  The possibility of bad faith is perhaps more 
evident in the context of a claim for dilution by tarnishment.  The current statute 
targets the willful intent to “harm the reputation of the famous mark.”  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(c)(5)(B)(ii).  Requiring a showing of bad faith would target defendants 
who deliberately attempt to injure the mark holder by implying association with 
offensive matter that has no connection to them or their goods and services, 
without the intent to criticize the famous trademark or the mark holder.  By 
contrast, a defendant could attempt to harm the mark holder’s reputation because 
the defendant could in fact believe that the reputation was unearned or 
undeservedly positive.      
No. 2] THE MYTH AND REALITY OF DILUTION 312 
ATTACHMENT A  
(TO FOOTNOTE 375) 
 
These photographs were copied from the appendix to the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 
F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 
The Abercrombie Pocket Stitching Design 
 
The Levi Strauss Pocket Stitching Design 
 
